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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of the thesis is to give an answer to two questions regarding Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy. (i) What is Wittgenstein’s conception of 
philosophy? A question to which I will give the following answer: Philosophy is a 
therapeutic, critical and negative (anti-theoretical) activity that seeks to keep the 
philosopher from thinking and of saying certain things (philosophically); an activity that 
seeks to bring back the philosopher to the visible evidence of language’s appropriate use – 
evidence that becomes invisible for the one who philosophizes. (ii) Considering what 
philosophy has been traditionally (an attempt to theorize systematically an original 
intuition regarding what separates reality from appearance), how can one consider that 
Wittgenstein’s proposed activity participates in what the tradition of philosophy has done? 
A question to which I will give the following answer: like the philosophers of the tradition, 
Wittgenstein has an original intuition regarding ‘where’ reality ‘ends’ and ‘where’ 
appearances ‘begin’. Considering that real language is defined as what is appropriately used 
and that philosophical developments are defined as apparent language, his intuition is going 
to be reflected and echoed in his systematic attempts to bring the philosopher to see 
language as it is, and not as they think it should be. In other words, Wittgenstein, like 
previous philosophers, tries to trace the line of reality that is faithful to an intuition about 
the location of that line.  
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
General Orientation.  «…For me, it is a philosophical catastrophe, it is the very 
idea of a school, a regression of all of philosophy, a massive regression of philosophy. It is 
a very sad thing, the Wittgenstein affaire. They set up a system of terror, in which under 
the pretence of doing something new…but it is truly poverty brought to the level of the 
almighty (la pauvreté instaurée en grandeur). There are no words to describe this particular 
danger. It is a danger that comes back, it is not the first time that it has come back, but it is 
serious, mostly that Wittgensteinians are mean; and they break everything. If they win, then 
philosophy will have been murdered. They are assassins of philosophy. We need to be 
vigilant…»1 Those are Gilles Deleuze’s words in his Abécédaire, and they are the 
expression of a rejection without appeal (nor pity, nor charity, some would say) of a certain 
conception of philosophy. If, as an «expression», these words are crystal clear, they 
nonetheless say nothing, in the sense that Deleuze offers no substantial indication 
concerning the conception of philosophy that he rejects. 
The aim of this thesis is twofold. Firstly, it will try to give an answer to the question 
that one might feel entitled to ask Deleuze after such a brutal declaration: «what is this 
conception of philosophy that you reject so violently?». In other words, the aim of this 
thesis will be to articulate and study the conception of philosophy that is defended and 
incarnated by Ludwig Wittgenstein. A good part of the following pages (chapter 2) must 
hence be understood as being a study of an essentially exegetical nature; a study that will 
                                                          
1 L’abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze, dir. Pierre-André Boutang, with Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, France, 
1996. 
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enable me, I hope, to convince my reader of the following: if it is possible to cut 
Wittgenstein’s work in two (or three)2, it is not possible however to do the same thing when 
it comes to his understanding of what philosophy must do, and of what philosophy must 
not do. In other words, under a visible discontinuity of his thought lies a continuous 
philosophical «program», in the same way that, under the discontinuity of our clothing one 
single body is hidden.  
Secondly, I will try to defend the idea that even for the novelty and the originality 
of Wittgenstein’s philosophical activity, and even for the distance that Wittgenstein wants 
to establish at different moments between what he does and what traditional philosophers 
have done, it is nonetheless possible to say that Wittgenstein is not doing something else, 
                                                          
2 I say here ‘if it is possible’ because the question of the division of the Wittgensteinian corpus has been a 
massive theme of discussion in the last decades. Traditionally, and following the indications of commentators 
like P.M.S. Hacker, the Wittgenstein’s work has been divided in two phases, phases that would have produced 
«two powerful and complete philosophical world-pictures crystallized respectively in the Tractatus and the 
Investigations» (Hacker, Connections and Controversies, p. viii). This binary reading of the corpus has been 
supported or exacerbated by some of Wittgenstein’s own remark, for example, in the preface to the 
Investigations: «Four* years ago I had occasion to re-read my first book (the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus} 
and to explain its ideas to someone. It suddenly seemed to me that I should publish those old thoughts and 
the new ones together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the 
background of my old way of thinking». Other commentators, although some do recognize the didactic 
character of the binary division, have however argued that it (the division) was hardly justified, and that it 
promoted a lack of attention towards the philosophical importance and originality of other portions of the 
Wittgensteinian corpus, for example, the remarks gathered in On Certainty. This is notably what Danièle 
Moyal-Sharrock in The Third Wittgenstein. The Post-Investigations Works: On Certainty, through its 
thematic and philosophical insight, should be considered as a moment in and of itself, and thus separated 
from the Investigations. Hence, it would be ill-advised to reduce everything that Wittgenstein has written 
following his return to philosophy around 1929 to what would be the philosophy of the second Wittgenstein. 
It seems however that, generally speaking, and as it has been pointed out to me by one of my readers, «the 
dominant view within Wittgenstein scholarship is that we can properly speak of the early Wittgenstein and 
the late Wittgenstein. Hence, although I do indeed want to suggest a certain programmatic unity of 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy; although I do indeed want to suggest that Wittgenstein has defended one 
conception of what philosophy (or better, of what the philosopher) must do, I do recognize that this unity is 
articulated in different ways (at least two) throughout Wittgenstein’s writings. Also, in my explanation of the 
Wittgensteinian conception of philosophy, I will refer to a certain number of nuances that depend in part on 
the generally recognized and accepted binary division of the Wittgensteinian corpus. In other words, the 
programmatic unity of Wittgenstein’s philosophy does not seem to contradict the idea that this program might 
very well take different shapes in terms of actual philosophizing.  
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but that he is doing it differently. This proximity between what Wittgenstein does and what 
the philosophers of the tradition have done will not rest, like Jacques Bouveresse thinks – 
here being inspired by Wittgenstein – on the fact that the Wittgensteinian method «does 
not aim at excluding a certain type of problems (those posed by traditional philosophers; it 
rather aims at excluding a certain type of solution»3. Although this idea does have its 
charms, I must admit that it leaves me cold, and that the idea of defending an idea that I 
don’t recognize as my own leaves me doubly cold. I will rather defend the idea – an idea 
for which Wittgenstein would have no sympathy – according to which what ties 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical activity to what philosophy has traditionally done is (i) a 
common worry to go beyond the appearances that veil and obscure the eyes of the 
philosopher, so as to see reality as it is. Hence, following Jules Vuillemin who will play a 
non-negligible role in the following pages, what unites Wittgenstein and the philosophers 
of the tradition is a form of ontological worry, and its interest for what is as compared to 
what merely appears. (ii) There is also, for Wittgenstein and the philosophers of the 
tradition, the recognition of the fact that this ontological worry, this worry for reality, 
cannot be content with the evidence of appearance (which would be to accept that reality 
can be reduced to appearances), and that it actually asks for a work of thought on itself, 
concerning what it accepts as being real, what it asks of reality, etc. But this work is only 
possible when it stems from an initial choice with regards to what essentially separates 
reality from appearance, a choice to which the work, if it wants to be called ‘philosophical’, 
must remain faithful. This thesis must hence be understood as a rejection of the idea, 
                                                          
3 Jacques Bouveresse, Essais III. Wittgenstein & les sortilèges du langage¸ p. 32. 
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widespread in certain circles, philosophical or not, that Wittgenstein is in fact an 
antiphilosopher, or worst, to borrow Deleuze’s words, an «assassin of philosophy». 
Motivations. The following pages have been written under a triple impulsion: 
firstly, considering the shape of his work (the written expression of his idea), whether we 
have in mind the dogmatic propositions of the Tractatus, or the incessant questions and the 
sometimes serious, sometimes ironical remarks of the Investigations, the exegetical work 
that is needed to understand Wittgenstein’s writings is particularly demanding. Although it 
is possible to deduce or to guess some of the philosophical positions or theses that 
Wittgenstein is attacking, it is important, to understand what Wittgenstein is doing, to first 
understand why he is doing what he is doing, to first understand the optic of his demarche. 
I do not at all want to suggest that this is the only possible or desirable «gateway», but an 
adequate understanding of Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy can certainly be helpful 
when trying to understand the content of his philosophical activity. 
Secondly, I chose to approach this study of the Wittgensteinian conception of 
philosophy armed with a bibliographical apparatus constituted in part by the works of 
Jacques Bouveresse. If Bouveresse is quite known (connu), and up to a point, renowned 
(reconnu) in France and Montréal4, it is surprising and unfortunate that his name is totally 
unknown in the Anglo-Canadian academic world: surprising, because if there is one French 
philosopher that has dedicated a good amount of time and energy to discuss, study, and 
criticize Anglo-American philosophy, it is Bouveresse – his studies of Noam Chomsky, 
Richard Rorty, Bertrand Russell, G.E. Moore, Cora Diamond, James Conant and Stanley 
                                                          
4 Especially at the Université du Québec à Montréal (UQÀM), which awarded Bouveresse with a honoris 
cause doctorate in 2007. 
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Cavell, amongst others, are witnesses to this; unfortunate, because Bouveresse is a 
commentator who understands really well the thousand and one risks that endangers the 
commentator’s task. Indeed, his exegetical work is constantly shaped by a worry (souci) to 
not talk for the commented author, nor to make the author in question talk. Bouveresse also 
has a rare talent: the talent of studying his favourite authors, without treating them like 
«untouchables» (intouchables) or «sacred cows» (vaches sacrées), like «immaculate 
minds». It is for this reason that I like to think that Bouveresse’s commentaries on 
Wittgenstein and different aspects of his thoughts can be useful for my own task. My thesis, 
if it mainly intends to articulate Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy, also hopes to help 
at the diffusion, even if minimal, of Bouveresse’s writings in the Anglo-Canadian academic 
world. In other words, this thesis also wants to, modestly, weave links between a thinker 
and a certain academic sphere; a sphere that can only, I believe, benefit from the 
contribution of a voice as serious, and dedicated to philosophy as Bouveresse’s. 
Thirdly, this thesis is in a certain way symptomatic of a number of insecurities and 
questions that philosophy provokes in me: «what is philosophy?», «what do we do when 
we philosophize?», «what can philosophy offer?», «what are its promises?»…If, as 
Wittgenstein says, philosophy is a therapeutic activity that must bring the thinker to no 
longer think and say certain things, it would not be completely false to say that this thesis 
has a therapeutic vocation, in the sense that it is an occasion for me to explore some of these 
questions; it is an occasion also to purify some of the expectations that I have towards 
philosophy, a purification that will not only be, to paraphrase Wittgenstein, an intellectual 
effort, an effort of understanding, but also, and mostly, an effort of the will. 
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Determinations. The first chapter of this thesis will try to articulate what one 
could call a generic conception of philosophy. I will do so by basing myself on the writings 
of Jules Vuillemin and Jacques Bouveresse’s reading of them in his 2007-08 course at the 
Collège de France. Philosophy will here be described as an activity that essentially aims to 
trace a line, a frontier, separating reality from appearance. Philosophical activity must then 
be understood as a theoretical and systematic activity that produces a discourse of a general 
ontology. This «definition» of philosophy depends largely on the historical context of 
philosophy’s birth, that is, the Greek context; and this context is profoundly marked by the 
influence of mythological thought and nascent scientific thought. It will hence be important 
to present Vuillemin’s historical-philosophical reading of this period and of these two 
forms of discourse (mythological and axiomatic-scientific) that preceded and, in a way, 
gave birth to philosophy. Indeed, for Vuillemin, philosophy is largely defined by the 
relations that it maintains with mythological thought and scientific thought. It will be from 
this generic conception of philosophy that I will try to articulate the way in which the 
Wittgensteinian conception is faithful to a more traditional notion, and the way in which 
the former tries to distance itself from the latter. 
The second chapter of this thesis will be divided in two parts that will respectively 
try to describe what one could call the Alpha and the Omega of the philosophical activity, 
according to Wittgenstein: dans un premier temps, I will try to answer the following 
question: «what is a philosophical question?». I will present a general or formal answer to 
this question: philosophical questions emerge in the mind of the philosopher and they are 
the result of a miscomprehension of the logic of our language (TLP, 4.003). I will then 
present the different possible «causes» of our philosophical questions, and try to emphasize 
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the importance that Wittgenstein gives to these causes in the Tractatus and in the 
Investigations. Dans un second temps, I will try to answer the following question: «what 
is a philosophical answer or solution?». I will then also try, for symmetry’s sake, to present 
a formal or general answer to this question: considering the subjective – ‘subjectivity’ in 
need of a definition, of course – nature of our philosophical problems (after all, they are 
born in the mind of the philosopher), the ‘solution’ of a problem is simply the fact that the 
problems stops to be a problem for the philosopher. Indeed, as Wittgenstein says: The 
solution of the problem is seen in the vanishing of this problem (TLP, 6.521). I will then 
try to articulate the ‘content’ of this solution, which I will do by describing the method that 
Wittgenstein proposes in the Tractatus (logical analysis), and then in the Investigations 
(conception exploration). This will bring me to make a few remarks on what one might call 
the linguistic ontologies which these methods suppose and on which they stand. Dans un 
troisième temps, I will try to suggest the centrality of the metaphor of «vision» for 
Wittgenstein, as much in the Tractatus as in the Investigations; I will also try to show that 
this metaphor is primordial when trying to understand what Wittgenstein means when he 
talks of the comprehension of the logic of our language. 
The third chapter of this thesis will firstly try to trace the traits of a comparison 
between the verbal and theoretical conception of philosophy à la Vuillemin, and the 
therapeutic and silent conception à la Wittgenstein. Though this comparison will establish 
certain rapprochements regarding what constitutes a philosophical question (or what I will 
call the Alpha of philosophy), it will become obvious that when we turn our attention to the 
form of what must be a philosophical answer (the Omega of philosophy), there are radical 
differences between the two conceptions at hand. These differences will bring us to ask the 
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following question: can we legitimately talk of an identity, of a similitude or of a community 
of questions considering that the answers that we are willing to give differ in radical ways? 
Faced with this question, I will try to defend the idea that not only does there exist, between 
Wittgenstein and the philosophers of the tradition, a community in terms of questioning, 
there also exists a community in terms of answering, even for the radical differences 
mentioned earlier on: being born in the midst of a question concerning reality and what 
distinguishes it from appearance, the philosophical activity develops itself through and by 
a worry to, through the gestures that constitute it, remain faithful to an initial choice 
concerning this distinction (between reality and appearance); and this holds true for both 
Wittgenstein and the philosophers of the tradition. The radical differences in terms of 
answers mentioned are hence not the sign of a difference in terms of activity, but rather the 
expression of a difference regarding the choice that – so as to be considered as a properly 
philosophical choice – initiates and determines the activity that stems from it. 
I would like to bring this general introduction to a close by quoting Wittgenstein’s 
opening words in his preface to the Tractatus, as they reflect my attitude regarding the 
following pages: «Its object would be attained if there were one person who read it with 
understanding and to whom it afforded pleasure.» 
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CHAPTER I: Jules Vuillemin or a generic conception of philosophy 
 
«If God could say the world, here is what he would say» 
 
The aim of this first chapter will be to draw a portrait of what we could call a generic 
conception of what philosophy does, or of what it is. This generic conception of philosophy 
will be one that is defended by Jules Vuillemin, especially in his book What Are 
Philosophical Systems?, and it will be necessary to our understanding of it, or rather, to 
better understand why Vuillemin defends this conception, to articulate the ‘Greek context’ 
of philosophy’s birth. Starting from this conception, it will then be possible to determine 
the way in which the Wittgensteinian conception of philosophy breaks away from what we 
have traditionally designated as being ‘philosophy’ and also, the way in which the 
Wittgensteinian conception, on the contrary, remains faithful to this traditional notion of 
philosophy. Indeed, if Wittgenstein thought sincerely that he was doing something unheard 
of in the history of philosophy when he came back to Cambridge in the 1930s, he 
nonetheless described his activity as being «one of the heirs of the subject which used to 
be called "philosophy"»5. 
I chose Vuillemin’s work for at least three reasons. Firstly, there is the fact that the 
conception of philosophy defended by Vuillemin is articulated around a number of terms 
that will be useful when will come the time to question the type of philosophical pretentions 
that Wittgenstein rejects: the systematicity of philosophy, the theoretical character of the 
                                                          
5 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Le cahier bleu et Le cahier brun, p. 72 (the translation is mine). 
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philosophical enterprise, the particular relation that philosophy shares with ‘common 
sense’, etc. Secondly, the conception of philosophy defended by Vuillemin leaves us with 
a series of crucial and difficult questions that we could also ask (and that we have to ask) 
of Wittgenstein, especially questions regarding the place that philosophy can make for the 
concept of ‘truth’, or regarding the possibility of something like authentic ‘philosophical 
knowledge’, or again regarding the nature of what some call the autonomy of the 
philosophical discipline from other fields of human knowledge, i.e., the natural sciences, 
the social sciences, mathematics, literature, etc. If most of these questions are not the direct 
focus of this thesis, it seems to me interesting to compare two conceptions of philosophy 
that, even for the distance that separates them – as we shall see, remain haunted by a series 
of identical, or at least similar questions. A third reason would be that Jacques Bouveresse 
abundantly discusses, in his final years at the Collège de France6, not only Vuillemin’s 
attempt to trace the outlines of a general classification of the different and possible 
philosophical systems, but also Vuillemin’s conception of philosophy, that he compares 
with that of many other thinkers, including Wittgenstein. There is hence already, in what 
constitutes a large section of my bibliographical material, a suggestion of the fecundity of 
such a comparison between Vuillemin and Wittgenstein. 
As I have said, one of Vuillemin’s aim is to offer – and he does this from the 
standpoint of a historian of philosophy – a system of general classification of possible 
                                                          
6 Jacques Bouveresse, Qu’est-ce qu’un système philosophique? Cours 2007 et 2008, Nouvelle édition (en 
ligne), Paris : Collège de France, 2012 (généré le 21 juin 2014), Disponible sur Internet : 
http://books.openedition.org/cdf/1715, ISBN : 9782722601529 ; Jacques Bouveresse, Dans le labyrinthe : 
nécessité, contingence et liberté chez Leibniz : Cours 2009-2010, Nouvelle édition (en ligne), Paris : Collège 
de France (n.d.) (généré le 20 juin 2014), Disponible sur Internet : http://books.openedition.org/cdf/1785, 
ISBN : 9782722601611. 
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philosophical systems. Vuillemin’s task then was to present, not the portrait of what 
philosophical truth is, effectively, or the portrait of what a philosophical system should be, 
but, on the contrary, to mark out a «logical space»7 in which any and every philosophical 
system can exist. His enterprise of classification hence aims to essentially delimit a ‘field 
of possibilities’. However, what Vuillemin does in the field of the history of philosophy is 
not innocent, in the sense that it depends on a precise metaphilosophical conception that 
could be summarized in the following expression: philosophy is an essentially theoretical 
and systematic activity aiming to trace a line, a frontier, separating reality from 
appearance. Philosophy is hence an ontological activity in that it tries to identify what is 
as compared to what merely appears. This affirmation too, is not innocent or unfounded, 
but is the result of an inference made from a certain reading of the history of philosophy. 
This history, according to Vuillemin, is not what would be the epic tale of a discipline 
slowly but surely overcoming its original oppositions, getting closer to, and finally reaching 
a universal consensus on what would be the philosophical truth: «philosophers are divided 
and (…) no part of the philosophical enterprise has even been the object of common 
agreement. Neither Kant’s critique of metaphysics nor the so-called ‘scientific method in 
philosophy’ has been successful in bringing peace, or even armistice, to the battlefield»8. 
Vuillemin is not, of course, saying that it is not possible, by going through a book 
recounting the history of philosophy, to find ‘important’ or ‘meaningful’ philosophical 
events, for example, the Kantian critique of metaphysics, the Hegelian articulation of the 
                                                          
7 Jacques Bouveresse, «Cours 1. La pluralité des systèmes philosophiques et la question de l’applicabilité du 
concept de vérité à la philosophie» in Qu’est-ce qu’un système philosophique?, p. 5. 
8 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. vii. 
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dialectical logic, or the Husserlian advent of the phenomenological method. But the 
importance of these events is not in having created a consensus nearing universality within 
the philosophical community, nor did it bring some form of peace; these events are 
important because they have generated more philosophy, that is to say, more debates, more 
quarrels, more combats9; combats that are, for sure, often relocated on a different level, or 
within a different theoretical or conceptual context, but combats nonetheless.  
When opening a book of the history of philosophy, one can hardly deny the 
plausibility of such a reading of philosophy’s history: Plato vs. the Sophists, Plato vs. 
Aristotle, Stoicism vs. Scepticism, Descartes vs. Leibniz, Kierkegaard vs. Hegel, Lévinas 
vs. Heidegger, etc.; the history of philosophy presents itself as a succession of philosophical 
battles. Even up until very recently, there was a division within philosophy between 
‘analytic philosophy’ and ‘continental philosophy’ that suggested a dispute (or quarrel) 
concerning the method suitable to the ambition of real philosophy, concerning also the 
nature of the real question(s), concerning then the nature of the problems that are truly 
philosophical. This division is more and more recognized for what it probably – or maybe 
– is, that is to say, following Bouveresse’s words, «a difference without distinction»10. 
However these later developments are not signs of what would be a ‘grand reconciliation’ 
in the field of philosophy: if there are signs of peace, it is a peace «obtained by resignation 
rather than by victory»11. Hence, this ‘peace’ of which Vuillemin talks about, is not a peace 
                                                          
9 The most recent and absurd example of this can be found in the following article: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russian-man-shot-in-quarrel-over-immanuel-kants-
philosophy-8820327.html.  
10 Jacques Bouveresse, «Une différence sans distinction» in Essais IV. Pourquoi pas des philosophes?, 
pp. 163-203. 
11 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. viii. 
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existing within a universal philosophical community, but a certain lull between different 
philosophical communities that have chosen to sign something like a pact of non-
aggression. If the history of philosophy in any way informs us about what is to come, 
nothing indicates that this pact will be respected; and nothing points towards a mutation of 
this pact of non-aggression into a treatise of peace; or rather, one can only think this if one 
has an unfounded hope in some sort of ‘magical reconciliation’. Bouveresse talks about the 
situation of philosophy, as described by Vuillemin, in the following way: «I interpret that 
as meaning that everyone remains well convinced that they are right, but that they accept 
the idea that there is little if no hope of successfully convincing the others. To talk of 
resignation means that it is a situation one finally gets used to, and that one feels obliged to 
accept, but a situation that should not in any case be considered to be satisfactory»12. 
Regarding then the possibility of a ‘philosophical peace’, Vuillemin is not what one could 
call an optimist, although he is quite optimistic regarding the future of philosophy in terms 
of ‘material proliferation’: people will continue to philosophize. 
One of the aims of Vuillemin’s book, What Are Philosophical Systems?, apart from 
the attempt to offer a system of general classification of possible philosophical systems, is 
to articulate the reasons explaining the observation that the field of philosophy is a 
battlefield, which he will mostly do in the third chapter, «Axiomatics, Ontologies, 
Philosophies», by «examining the nature and origin of philosophy»13. In this chapter, 
Vuillemin defends the idea that the confrontations that define the field of philosophy are 
                                                          
12 Jacques Bouveresse, «Cours 4. La philosophie, les sciences et le sens commun» in Qu’est-ce qu’un système 
philosophique?, p. 4. 
13 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. vii. 
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the fruit of an oscillation between the historical contingency of philosophy’s birth and the 
necessity of the nature of philosophy; or rather, that the nature of philosophy as an activity 
is largely influenced by the historical context of its birth. ‘Philosophical pluralism’ would 
hence not be a mere description of the philosophical situation14, a contingent situation; 
Vuillemin’s philosophical pluralism is, in fact, much stronger, in the sense that it constitutes 
the description of the fundamental situation of philosophy.  
In the following pages, I will first describe the contingent aspect of Vuillemin’s 
explanation, that is to say, the Greek context of philosophy’s birth, its origin: from the 
axiomatic and scientific awakening of Greek thought from its mythological slumber, to the 
philosophical appropriation of the axiomatic method in its aim to articulate a general 
ontology. I will secondly describe the necessary aspect of Vuillemin’s explanation, that is 
to say, the nature of philosophy, its theoretical and systematic character. I will thirdly and 
finally explain Vuillemin’s idea according to which philosophy is by nature, and 
necessarily so, pluralistic. 
 
A. From Myth to the Axiomatic Method to Philosophy. 
 
A.1 From Myth… 
Common language allows for some, localised frontiers separating reality from appearances. 
For example: «There! There is someone!», or «Did you hear the thunder’s roar? It sounded 
like a cry in the night!». But, Vuillemin says, very quickly these local frontiers will prove 
                                                          
14 Indeed, this thesis says nothing that is particularly scandalous, and one only needs to pick up a book of 
history of philosophy to see and accept this ‘weak form’ of philosophical pluralism.  
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to be insufficient, as «appearances are spread out as so many puddles which never conjoin 
into one and the same river»15. These frontiers will hence be replaced within a larger 
context, that is to say, reinterpreted from the standpoint of a more fundamental, a more 
general, and in a certain sense, a more ‘real’ division: «men as a group have come to believe 
in some order hidden from their perception and taken as supporting permanent features of 
reality that they would otherwise lose sight of»16. The initial articulation of this 
fundamental division between reality and mere appearances will be mythological.  
It is here interesting to note that the mythical, for Vuillemin, is a ‘collective’ 
response: «A myth is a fabled story that symbolically represents the human condition 
particularly in its social aspect»17. Also, it plays an important role for the preservation and 
the cohesion of the social group, as it describes, through a legendary tale, the origins of an 
institution or an ensemble of institutions. It also, at the same time, justifies this or those 
institutions18. The mythical therefore plays a conditioning role, aiming at justifying an 
ensemble of social practices: «How could hungry tribes accept the hard discipline of 
scarcity during long winters if, behind the apparent death of Nature, they did not imagine 
some adventure, some descent into Hades and some exile there promising – possibly on the 
condition of some performed rites – the return to life?»19. No matter the form of the myth, 
no matter its elements, the mythological must therefore be taken seriously, considering that, 
in a certain sense, the survival of the group depends on it. But also, the myth must be 
                                                          
15 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 96. 
16 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 96. 
17 Jules Vuillemin, «Le Misanthrope, mythe de la comédie» in Dialectica, Vol. 42, No. 2, 1988, p. 117. (The 
emphasis is mine.) 
18 Jules Vuillemin, «Le Misanthrope, mythe de la comédie», p. 117. 
19 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 97. 
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understood to encompass the totality of reality: maybe it is to ensure obedience to the 
practices that the myth suggests and justifies, but it would not be completely false to say 
that, in the same way that the survival of the social group depends on a collective adhesion 
to the mythological, this collective adhesion to the mythological is only possible if the 
group firmly believes in the universality of the myth. 
Mythological discourse is hence totalizing, closed and totalitarian. Totalizing, 
because it encompasses reality as a ‘whole’; closed, because there is nothing outside this 
‘whole’ that would be opposed to it; and if I say ‘totalitarian’, it is not to shock, or to 
dramatize the matter at hand, but rather to say the following: considering that the ‘respect’ 
of the myth and of what it says is seen as a necessary condition for the survival of the group, 
the myth, if it traces a frontier between reality and appearance, also establishes a frontier 
between member and stranger, between the group and what is exterior to it; obedience must 
hence be total to protect the group from a contamination, a malediction, or a ‘collective loss 
of self’. The myth hence traces lines of obedience in the midst of everyday life, in the midst 
then of individual and collective life, and lines of classification and division in the social 
sphere, divisions that are justified by the presence, in reality, of analogous divisions: 
«Though once it was thought that persons or groups themselves were identified with 
vegetables and animals, a more accurate analysis reveals that there are rather differences or 
oppositions between persons or groups which are correlated with representative differences 
or oppositions between vegetables and animals»20. «Initiation introduces the candidate into 
the human community and into the world of spiritual and cultural values. He learns not 
                                                          
20 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, pp. 97-98. 
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only the behaviour patterns, the techniques, and the institutions of adults (…); not only does 
it relate how things came to be; it also lays the foundations for all human behaviour and all 
social and cultural institutions.»21 Reality would hence be the territory of belonging, in the 
mode of obedience, while appearance, if it becomes the justification for action (individual 
or collective), would be the lieu of transgression, in the mode of treason; or rather, the limits 
that the myth traces are understood to be as much the limit of reality then the limits of the 
group itself. The myth hence develops an ontology, a ‘tribal ontology’. Or, if we are a little 
uncomfortable at the idea of associating those two words, ‘ontology’ and ‘mythology’, the 
fact remains that the mythological discourse offers an authentic Weltanschauung, an 
authentic view of what reality is. 
A last point that should probably be mentioned is this: if, for Vuillemin, 
mythological developments are a human and collective response attempting to offer an 
«image of reality»22, these developments are necessary because this reality is not available 
or accessible to, so to speak, an ‘immediate’ reading of the world, that is to say, from the 
perceptions that we have of it; or rather, this reality is, as I have mentioned, «hidden from 
their perception»23. Hence, the myth would already be a first hermeneutical step, in the 
sense that the image that it offers of reality competes or is detached from the perceptual 
image24, judging the later to be insufficient to a proper understanding of reality, in the same 
way that a literal reading of a text is judged to be unable to offer us the ‘real meaning’25 of 
                                                          
21 Mircea Eliade, Rites and Symbols of Initiation. The Mysteries of Birth and Rebirth, pp. x-xi. 
22 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 97. 
23 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 96. 
24 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 97. 
25 The necessity of another reading, of a reading that is not literal, only makes sense if one believes that 
there is, under the text, another meaning, a truer meaning, one that is more real. 
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that text, hence the need to «read between the lines», or to search for «the spirit», and not 
only «the letter» of the text. Mythological discourse must therefore be understood as the 
first emergence of a ‘technical’ discourse that breaks away from a more common or 
immediate language, rooted in perceptual experience.  
This mode of ‘knowledge’ of reality, even for its social ‘utility’ (or rather, even for 
its essentially socializing finality), is however, according to Vuillemin, limited on three 
different levels: the mythological system first of all suffers from what we could call a 
double-form of ‘discursive instability’; secondly, the mythological system lacks any well-
defined mechanisms of ‘discursive expansion’, which amplifies, according to Vuillemin, 
the initial instability of the discourse; finally, the mythological system is limited 
alethically, on the level of truth, in the sense that cognitive adherence to the discourse does 
not rely or depend on its reference to a reality exterior to it; as Vuillemin says: «meaning 
here leaves no place to truth»26. The first limit of the mythological discourse must hence 
be understood as a double-problem, thematically and semantically, while the second limit 
must be understood as a methodological problem. I will also try to articulate the way in 
which these two first limits are intimately intertwined, and also the way in which they stem, 
in a certain sense, from the third, alethical limit. 
Discursive Instabilities: Precision27. First of all, I should probably explain the 
reason why I chose to talk of «instability», and (firstly) why I designate this instability as 
being of a «discursive» nature (as opposed to being of a «mythological» or «psychological» 
                                                          
26 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 99. 
27 Mr. Arthur Sullivan has been particularly severe here, and this severity has proved itself to be of a great 
help regarding the clarity of these paragraphs. 
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nature). By exposing the reasoning behind the choice of the individual terms of this 
expression, I hope to clarify the way in which I use the expression. Firstly, the instability 
(the meaning of which I will expose in a second moment) is not concerned with the 
psychological weakness or strength of those who believe in the truth of the mythological 
(hence explaining my refusal to coin the instability as being «psychological»). This 
expression is not concerned with the fact that it is possible to misuse language, or to accept 
something that should not be accepted. For example, the fact that somebody can wrongly 
say that 2 + 2 = 5 does not mean that the language of mathematics is discursively unstable. 
Indeed, while it is possible for a clumsy user to misuse a well-manufactured language (in 
this case, language is innocent), this case is not of the same kind as a case in which an ill-
manufactured language pushes the user to error, a case in which language is highly 
complicit of the abuses that it suffers. The instability of which I want to speak concerns 
itself with the second kind of cases; it is therefore concerned with discourse itself – 
independently of its possible uses – in its semiotic constitution, in the mechanisms that 
determine the meaning of these signs, and in the way in which one ascribes thematic 
frontiers to it. Also, I refused to designate the instability as being specifically 
«mythological», because it is not impossible to imagine a non-mythological discourse (for 
example, a poem or a certain type of novel) sharing a similar form of instability. 
Secondly, I chose the term of «instability» because, as it has been suggested earlier 
on, the first two limits emerge from the third limit, that is to say, they emerge from the 
problematic relationship (or the problematic absence of relationship) of the mythological 
discourse with the notions of «truth» and «exterior reality». The absence of a solid ground, 
the ground of reality, on which the mythological discourse could stand, makes it so that the 
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latter finds itself vulnerable to the political, religious and social inflexions that can be 
imposed upon the discourse and the significations that it carries. As we shall see, the value 
of the mythological discourse, the ‘reason’ why the believer believes it, has nothing to do 
with what would be its truth-value, has nothing to do with the fact that it corresponds to a 
reality exterior to it; rather, it is the (divine and sacerdotal) voice that pronounces it that 
gives discourse its value. In other words, it is not what is said, but the voice that says it that 
matters; and it is well known that les paroles s’envolent au gré du vent qui les porte (spoken 
words get carried away by the wind). To come back to the term of «instability», I chose it 
explicitly because of the image that it suggests: a discourse that does not have a ground on 
which to stand up is vulnerable to the winds of the arbitrary. One must keep in mind these 
types of considerations to understand what is to be exposed in the following paragraphs.       
Discursive Instabilities. To come back to the limited character of the mythological 
discourse, myth is composed of a multitude of elements, of characters, of oppositions and 
differences. The problem that Vuillemin sees in this is that this ensemble of elements, of 
characters, of oppositions and differences, is not objected to any definition. To say it 
bluntly, the class of objects ‘studied’ by the mythological discourse is not defined28, 
enabling this discourse to talk, in a certain sense, about everything and anything (de tout et 
de n’importe quoi). In fact, of the mythological discourse, one cannot even properly speak 
of a ‘class of objects’, but only of an arbitrary, heterogeneous and eclectic agglomeration 
of objects, as it is concerned with humanity, with stars, with plants, with animals, with the 
sea, with rain, etc. As Vuillemin says in a footnote, this is partly due to the fact that the 
                                                          
28 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 98. 
 21 
 
‘constructive acts’ of the mythological discourse are not organized around one, well-
defined methodological principle: «External resemblance, analogy, contiguity, contrariety, 
sameness in relative position and even psychoanalytical identification are called into 
play»29.  Hence, if a myth’s central elements are united, they do not take the form of organic 
corporality, but they rather take the form of an ‘assemblage’ of disparate elements. They 
take the form of a patchwork. In other words still, mythological discourse does not possess, 
for Vuillemin, the virtue of coherence; or rather, the idea of ‘coherence’ refers to the mere 
fact that certain elements are brought together30. The myth and its objects are hence marked 
by a certain form of arbitrariness that is, according to Vuillemin, unacceptable. The 
scattering (éparpillement) of the objects which the mythological discourse takes hold of 
makes it so that these objects are simply, and randomly, gathered (rapaillés). They are not 
systematically organized, leaving the discourse with what one could call a structural or 
thematic instability.  
A way maybe to caricature this structural or thematic instability, to better 
understand it, would be to compare the content of a given mythological discourse to the 
heterogeneous proclamations of a given individual: in the first case, the mythological 
discourse speaks of astronomical observations, psychological considerations, botanical 
findings, storytelling, biological descriptions, metaphysical inspirations, etc.; in the second 
case, the individual talks about the war in Iraq, the rise of ticket prices for the Montreal 
Canadians’ hockey games, feminine fashion, his stomach pains, the death of his cat, etc. 
                                                          
29 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 98, footnote 12. 
30 In the same way that this shirt and these pants are ‘coherent’ because and only because I wear them both, 
and not because of a given common characteristic, or because of what these two items are. 
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Vuillemin sees these two discourses as being two examples of a same type of discursive 
disorganization. Although, in both cases, there is one discourse, one can question the 
coherence and unicity of these discourses; and in both cases, it becomes legitimate to ask 
«But what are you talking about exactly?» or «What unites thematically the different things 
that you are saying?». It is the fact that the mythological speaker jumps, seemingly at least, 
without any kind of theoretical justification, from a theme to the other that is unacceptable 
for Vuillemin.  
A second form of discursive instability concerns not the mythological discourse, 
taken as an ‘ensemble of signification’, taken as a ‘whole’, but the mythological sign, 
understood as bearer of one meaning (porteur d’une signification). If each sign does have 
a meaning, this is not due to what one could call its ‘content’: it rather stems from the role 
that this sign plays within an opposition or from the difference and distance that separates 
the two signs of a given opposition. The meaning of sign is hence, in a way, formal, but 
devoid of any content, and this leaves the sign exposed to the risks of semantic 
ambivalence, that is to say that it becomes the holder of a multitude of possible meanings, 
for example: the opposition of night and day can be the symbol of an opposition between 
the living and the dead, between human and animals, between civilized and barbaric 
humans, between men and women, between adults and children, between the profane and 
the sacred, etc. The meaning of the sign ‘day’ (for example) is never, in a mythological 
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discourse, taken and understood for itself (pris et compris pour lui-même), never points 
back to what the day is, effectively31.  
To be more explicit, let us take for example the mathematical function y = 2x. What 
is in question is the definition that one gives to ‘x’. In the case of the mythological 
discourse, Vuillemin argues, the definition of ‘x’ is ‘y/2’. The problem is that, although this 
gives us a formal appreciation of ‘x’, it does not at all give us any indication concerning 
the content of ‘x’. The content of a sign, as Vuillemin says, is always neglected in favour 
of the formality of the oppositions and differences that exists between different signs32. The 
meaning of a sign is hence unstable, not because the opposition itself – night and day – is 
not formally fixed, but because the content of that opposition is never specified, which is 
again, for Vuillemin, unacceptable. 
It is then possible to talk of two varieties of discursive instability. In the first case, 
it is discourse, as an entity, as a unity, that is unstable, in the sense that it is not anchored 
within a delimited and defined thematic field of objects. In other words, it would not be 
completely false to say that what Vuillemin reproaches to the mythological discourse is the 
fact that it is not articulated around one theoretical theme: the living, the stars, the earth, 
humanity, music, etc. In the second case, the instability is more precise, or located, because 
it has a semiotic nature. It is concerned with the sign, or rather, with the way in which we 
give it meaning in the mythological context: the sign is meaningful only when it participates 
to an opposition that transcends it. Furthermore, this fixation on the opposition (and the 
                                                          
31 The sign is always, borrowing from Frege’s terminology, like an argument in a non-saturated function: the 
argument, while it does play a well-defined role in the function, is bearer of no content (or rather, which 
amounts to the same thing: it is the bearer of all and any possible content). 
32 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, pp. 98-99. 
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difference that it creates at the expense of the sign and of its content) renders it possible to 
make an opposition say anything (il est possible, à une opposition quelconque, de lui faire 
dire n’importe quoi), as long as the logic of the opposition is maintained.  
Lack of mechanisms for discursive expansion. If I have said earlier on that the 
mythological discourse was ‘closed’, one should not conclude from this that the discourse 
is ‘static’ or immutable, hence that it would be, in a certain sense, ahistorical. Eliade notes 
that «we know of none (primitive societies) that has not borrowed some cultural elements 
from the outside; not that, as the result of these borrowings, has not changed at least some 
aspects of its institutions; not that, in short, has had no history»33. A historical study of the 
mythological discourse, a history of the mythological, is hence possible. However, the 
particularity of primitive societies is that they lack a properly historical conscience34. 
Hence, an «expansion» of a myth through the addition of new elements is not possible from 
the standpoint of the myth-believer, in the sense that the believer only follows and respects 
these new practices because he believes them to have been, from the beginning, prescribed 
by the divinity whom he or she obeys. It is, for the believer, inconceivable that there could 
be a time, before, when members of the tribe lived differently. If there are indeed new 
elements that can be accepted – for example, new social practices, new tools, etc. – these 
new elements are only accepted because they «reinforce old oppositions so that the system 
runs no risk of revision or extension»35, and not because they would be the expression of 
something that is authentically new (it is in fact for the very opposite reason that these 
                                                          
33 Mircea Eliade, Rites and Symbols of Initiation, p. xi. 
34 Mircea Eliade, Rites and Symbols of Initiation, p. xii. 
35 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 99. 
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elements are accepted). Hence, «in contrast to modern society, primitive societies have 
accepted all innovations as so many ‘revelations’, hence as having a superhuman origin. 
The objects or weapons that were borrowed, the behaviour patterns and institutions that 
were imitated, the myths or beliefs that were assimilated, were believed to be charged with 
magical-religious power; indeed, it was for this reason that they had been noticed and the 
effort made to acquire them»36. The novelty that is incorporated in the ‘mythological 
bricolage’ is never really new, but rather, it is a repetition of the same, or a reaffirmation 
of the same, as it is only a way to reaffirm the eternal seniority or antiquity of the principles 
revealed by the divinity. The mythological ‘system’ is in this sense ‘closed’ as any novelty 
is quickly assimilated, or, so to speak, swallowed by the divine mouth that utters the 
mythological discourse: «traditional societies tend to project every new acquisition into the 
primordial Time, to telescope all events in the same atemporal horizon of the mythical 
beginnings»37. Considering the instability (discussed earlier) of the primary elements of the 
myth (oppositions, characters, differences…), the novelty, because it is a mere reaffirmation 
of the old, is hence bearer of the same (original) instability. In other words: even for the 
enrichment of the system in terms of content (new practices, new tools, etc.) the 
mythological discourse is formally closed, and fixed38 in its own instability. 
«…the mythological discourse is formally closed, and fixed in its own instability.» 
I feel here obliged to unpack this sentence, as doing this will enable me to articulate the 
intimacy that the discursive double-limit and the methodological limit share. As I have 
                                                          
36 Mircea Eliade, Rites and Symbols of Initiation, p. x-xi (the emphasis is mine). 
37 Mircea Eliade, Rites and Symbols of Initiation, p. xii. 
38 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 99. 
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mentioned earlier on, the mythological discourse is not anchored in a defined and specified 
field of objects; it is then thematically heterogeneous (thématiquement éclaté). 
Heterogeneity that is at least partly due, according to Vuillemin, to the fact that the 
‘constructive acts’ of the mythological discourse are not organized around a defined 
methodological principle39. The reason being that the drive of the mythological discourse, 
its will to encompass and to swallow new elements, does not depend upon the ‘nature’ of 
these elements, but rather depends upon their capacity to contribute and maintain the divine 
oppositions, differences, injunctions, etc., that shapes the tribe’s social life. The 
appropriation ‘methods’ are hence multiplied to the rhythm of the objects that are to be 
appropriated. However, these methods are as dispersed as the objects that are the aim of 
these gestures of appropriation. The dispersion of the field of objects is then reflected in 
these gestures, gestures that only amplify the initial or original dispersion. And this is due, 
or at least linked, to the mythological discourse’s tendency to overlook or to dismiss the 
semantic content of its symbols in favour of semiotic oppositions and differences. This 
tendency stems, I believe, from the third limit, that is to say, the alethic limit, to which I 
now turn.  
Alethic Limit. The mythological ‘system’ is then not only ‘closed’ but also closed 
on itself (refermé sur lui-même), and if it is possible to talk about the ‘meaning’ of a 
mythological ‘system’, it is however impossible, according to Vuillemin, to speak of the 
‘truth’40 of the system. This can be explained by Vuillemin’s idea that the mythological 
discourse has an essentially socializing or ‘totalitarian’ function: the mythological 
                                                          
39 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 98, footnote 12. 
40 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 99. 
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discourse, being motivated by a worry to preserve the existence of the tribe, as well as its 
social and political determinations (they are, after all, the expression of an order, dictated 
and willed, from the origins of time, by the gods; an order that must be reproduced and 
respected), is less the fruit of what Nietzsche calls a «will to know», than the result of a 
«will to obey»41. The meaning of a mythological opposition or sign does not stem from a 
form of reference to an exterior world or reality, but rather from its capacity to incite to the 
adoption of an ensemble of practices and of behaviours: «To understand a myth, we need 
not know in what circumstances the story would be true. We need only surmise the code at 
which the story hints»42. To use again a Fregean language, if the ‘mythological proposition’ 
does have a sense, it does not have a reference. Or rather, if a given opposition does indeed 
have a reference in nature (the opposition between night and day, for example), it is not at 
all in virtue of this reference that the symbolic opposition is accepted by a given tribe: it is 
on the contrary because of the political and social meaning (code) that an opposition can 
have that a tribe gives importance to an opposition. The myth hence closes itself on itself 
(le mythe se referme sur lui-même), in the sense that the political and social meaning (code) 
of the myth (for example the opposition between men and women) is justified by a given 
opposition in nature, that is itself justified by its ability the engender an ensemble of 
practices and behaviours that define the individual and collective life of the tribe. The value 
of an opposition hence stems not from its truth, but of its power, or of its socializing utility: 
«This mutually constant and circular support of its signs makes a myth meaningful, and 
                                                          
41 As I have said earlier: «Reality would hence be the territory of belonging, in the mode of obedience, while 
appearance, if it becomes the justification for action (individual or collective), would be the lieu of 
transgression, in the mode of treason». 
42 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 99. 
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meaningfulness is its unique law. (…) meaning here leaves no place for truth»43.  It is in 
this sense that myth is closed on itself, and why Vuillemin rejects the idea that there could 
be such a thing as a ‘mythological truth’.  
Finally, I have said earlier that the first two limits «stem, in a certain sense, from 
the third, alethical limit.» What I mean by this: the mythological discourse, considering its 
socializing vocation, is not interested by any notion of a reality that would be exterior to it. 
It is rather interested at maintaining and justifying certain forms of life, certain practices, 
and certain habitus, dictated by the divine mouth, no matter what one could call the truth-
value of the discourse itself. This disinterest for an exterior reality translates itself in a lack 
of sensibility concerning the ‘nature’ of the studied object (lack of sensibility from which 
stem the shattering of the field of objects, and the equivocal character of the signs), and 
concerning the way in which we talk about it, or the way in which it is discursively 
appropriated (from which stems the shattering of the methodological field). Indeed, if what 
is important is to maintain the logic of certain social and political oppositions and divisions, 
it does not really matter what you say, which images you use. What matters is that these 
images do have a certain logic that reproduces the logic of the oppositions and divisions 
that one wants to maintain.  There is hence a place for meaning, a code that needs to be 
transmitted, and respected by the hearer of the mythological discourse, but there is no place 
for truth. 
These three limits will become unbearable, to the point where «a complete 
revolution in the use of linguistic signs – something which amounts to creating a new 
                                                          
43 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 99. 
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language»44, will prove to be necessary. In other words, the mythological language having 
reached its own limits, a new language must brought to the science; language provided, 
according to Vuillemin, by «free philosophy and (the) axiomatic method»45. 
 
A.2 …to the Axiomatic Method… 
Although Vuillemin readily acknowledges that Greeks were not the only ones to make 
important developments in the different and particular sciences – grammar, logic, 
arithmetic, algebra, geometry, astronomy, etc. –; although others have been able to do this 
by liberating themselves from a series of mannerisms mostly defended through an 
incestuous relationship between the political and the sacerdotal classes46; and although he 
would not be inclined to talk of what would have been a miracle grec47 – or rather: he 
would certainly refuse to talk in terms of ‘miracles’, as if the passage from the mythological 
to the scientific could have been possible only through the intervention of the divine –, 
Vuillemin does however believe that Ancient Greece has been the lieu of a singular and 
particular event: the birth of philosophy and of the axiomatic method. As Bouveresse 
reminds us: «it is an event that is in no way universal, nor was it necessary; an event of 
which we must not underestimate its local and eminently contingent character»48. The 
particularity of the ‘Greek case’ is to be found, according to Vuillemin, in the following 
fact: while elsewhere, the different sciences were developed, so to speak, on their own 
                                                          
44 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 100. 
45 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 100. 
46 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 100. 
47 Cf. Paul Jorion, «Le miracle grec : pouvoirs de la pensée anti-symétrique» in Papiers du Collège 
international de philosophie, No. 51, Reconstitutions, 2000, pp. 17-37. 
48 Jacques Bouveresse, «Ouverture I : résumé du cours de l’année 2007» in Qu’est-ce qu’un système 
philosophique?, p. 2. 
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ground, behind closed doors, independently from one another, the Greek intellectual world 
has gradually developed itself through an education of the different sciences, relocated in 
the context of a larger liberal education. Hence, the sciences that were, in the non-Greek 
world, disparate, divided, and independent, have been in Greece gathered within one 
common educational demarche. But this gathering could only be made possible if all of the 
sciences shared a common methodological ground. The studying of the different sciences 
has therefore been developed and organized around a common methodological principle, 
the axiomatic method: «Only the Greeks conceived of a rational way of dealing not only 
with scientific but also with religious, political, ethical and artistic subjects. Greek science 
was a unique event in the history of mankind because of the axiomatic method it applied in 
arithmetic, geometry, logic, astronomy, harmonics and statics»49. 
As I have mentioned earlier, the mythological discourse, if it had an undeniable 
social (organizing) force, was however limited, being contaminated by at least two forms 
of discursive instability; another problem was that the ‘truth’50 of the mythological 
discourse, or rather, the belief in the truth of the mythological discourse, was not motivated 
by the content (teneur) of the discourse, but by who pronounced it: the priest, the shaman, 
that is to say, the gods. In a certain sense, if mythological thought identified the voice as 
being the lieu of truth, scientific thought will see speech (parole) as being the lieu of truth51. 
Mythological thought was hence, so to speak, still too attached to the fluctuations 
                                                          
49 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 100. 
50 I use quotation marks because, as I have said, Vuillemin refuses to talk of ‘mythological truths’, even 
though he does accept the notion of ‘mythological meaning’, or ‘mythological signification’. 
51 Aristotle says: «The false and the true, indeed, are not in the things, (…) but in 
thought» (Metaphysics, E. 4, 1027b25). 
 31 
 
encountered in the sphere of perception, and the emergence of scientific thought was an 
occasion to excavate the abstract character of thought, «at the risk of appearing indifferent 
to experience and the sensible world»52. The reason why mythological thought has 
gradually been discarded in Greece as being limited is partly due to this shift of the lieu of 
truth. Indeed, from the moment that the ‘criterion of truth’ is not the maintaining of the 
justification of an ensemble of political, religious, and familial institutions, from the 
moment that truth is not identified with the fact that it is the priest that speaks it, hence 
from the moment that truth is identified to what is said, it is evident, or at least 
comprehensible that this shift should be doubled with a methodological shift, incarnated in 
the development53 of the axiomatic method. Therefore, it is not the different elements of 
mythological discourse that will be gradually rejected as being inadequate in regards to the 
new method of Greek science, but rather, the context in and by which one should give them 
a ‘truth-value’, or the reasons which justify our belief in them. There is hence, for 
Vuillemin, a qualitative (and not only a quantitative) difference separating the mythological 
‘epistemological’ context and the scientific epistemological context; a difference that has 
the features of a real ‘break’ (coupure). 
From the beginning, the scientific activity of the Greeks will be worried to not only 
expand the area of discourse; there will also and more importantly be a worry for what one 
                                                          
52 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 100. 
53 Once again, one must not talk here of a miracle, or of the ‘apparition’ of the axiomatic method, because we 
risk forgetting the deeply historical character of this event; also, we risk constructing a mythical history of 
thought, something that Vuillemin wants to avoid at all cost. In this sense, it is more accurate to speak of the 
‘development’ of the axiomatic method: «The thought from which stems modern thought does not brutally 
awake in the fifth century B.C. in Ancient Greece: it has been in gestation for centuries in the Mediterranean 
region» (Paul Jorion, «La linguistique d’Aristote» in V. Rialle & D. Fisette (ed.), Penser l’esprit : des sciences 
de la cognition à une philosophie cognitive, p. 261).  
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could call the ‘organic unity’ of the discourse, a worry for the internal coherence of speech. 
The scientific discursive production will hence no longer be but a mere process of 
juxtaposition, or a ‘proliferation of the absurd’54, as Bergson would say; it will also have to 
be internally ‘continuous’ in three different senses of the word that correspond and are, in 
a sense, a ‘response’ to the three limits of the mythological discourse that have been 
discussed earlier. 
Looking for discursive stability. Firstly, the axiomatic method will address the two 
issues of discursive instability: the instability of the signs, taken as a ‘whole’, and the 
instability of the sign, taken in its individuality. Indeed, Greek science will cultivate the 
importance of stabilising the structures that it constructs, and this will be done through an 
effort to delimit the ‘field of study’ (champ d’étude possible), by establishing the 
fundamental and irreducible concepts and principles of each of the sciences55. For example, 
biology will delimit its interest to the world of the ‘living thing’ and exclude from its field 
of study the ‘inanimate thing’; astronomy will delimit its interest to the celestial movements 
and phenomena. The different sciences, contrary to mythology that left its field of possible 
objects opened to any sort of intrusion, will ‘close’ and organize themselves around a given 
domain of objects. That being done, the ‘constructive acts of the discourse’ that were, in 
the context of mythological thought, heterogeneous and eclectic, will slowly enter a process 
of organization to better correspond to the nature of the studied objects, or to the nature of 
the class of objects. For example, while mythology understands the men-women dichotomy 
by reference to the night-day dichotomy, biology will be unable to benefit from this kind 
                                                          
54 The Bergsonian expression is cited by Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 102. 
55 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 100. 
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of explanatory detour, won’t be able to proceed by mere resemblance, or by analogy, and 
will have to concentrate its attention on the men-women dichotomy itself. Science will 
hence fix its gaze on an ensemble of objects and, through this, the, so to speak, quality of 
these objects will bring the scientist to limit their ‘epistemic gestures’, that is to say, their 
‘acts of knowledge’, that enable them to know these objects, that give them access to the 
objects. 
The organization of the accepted ‘constructive acts of the discourse’, their 
‘specialization’ according to their object of study, will also lead to a semantic stabilisation 
of the sign, understood in its individuality. Indeed, the establishment of the conceptual and 
principled foundations will have consequences: when I understand this sign, I now 
understand it, not in virtue of other signs, or in virtue of an opposition of which this sign is 
part of, but rather, in virtue of what this sign is, in virtue of its content. The sign is hence 
no longer like a simple argument in a non-saturated function, as it now has a fixed value. 
Science will hence overturn the primacy that myth conferred to oppositions and differences 
existing between signs, and that, at the expense of the content of these signs, to now affirm 
the primacy of the sign’s content. I now understand, for example, what a human being is, 
not in virtue of its opposition with the Olympian gods, but in virtue of an ensemble of 
characteristics that are those of the human being: two-legged, ability to speak, sociality, 
culturality, religiosity, etc. The meaning of a sign is hence transformed: while the meaning 
of the mythological sign was defined by the other sign (and vice-versa), the meaning of the 
scientific sign is now the fruit of a research surrounding the sign and its referent56. 
                                                          
56 This does not mean that mythological meanings were automatically rejected; it rather means that they were 
verified, put to the test, the test of the new scientific method: «Even those who tended to restore traditional 
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Looking for a mechanism of discursive expansion. Secondly, as I have said earlier, 
the mythological discourse, if it was possible from the outside to constitute its history, it 
could not however accept the idea of an ‘internal historicity’, nor could it accept the idea 
of an authentic novelty within the discursive body. These ideas were unacceptable because 
they were in contradiction with the immutable, permanent and totalizing character of the 
divine revelation that gives life to myth. The god of mythology always has already said 
everything, and if he seems to say something new (propose a new practice, propose a new 
tool, or a new plant, etc.), it is only appearance and is in fact the result of our bad hearing 
(le résultat de notre mauvaise écoute). The novelty is, and this is how it can be accepted 
and believed as true, swallowed by the divine mouth so that the latter can reveal the former 
to us since the beginning (afin qu’elle puisse nous la révéler depuis toujours): «for the man 
of traditional societies everything significant – that is everything creative and powerful – 
that has ever happened took place in the beginning, in the Time of myths»57. Hence, when 
a new object appears, «since traditional societies have no historical memory in the strict 
sense, it (takes) only a few generations, sometimes even less, for a recent innovation to be 
invested with all the prestige of the primordial revelations»58. 
                                                          
faith did it from positivist arguments and according to demonstrative schemes in agreement with the new 
scientific method» (Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 104). For example: «Patrick» is no 
longer merely understood as the opposite of «Arthur», or is no longer understood from «Arthur»: the meaning 
of «Patrick» is now, so to say, discovered through a studying of the object that is Patrick: he is 26 years old, 
studies at MUN, is supervised by Arthur, is interested in Wittgenstein, Bouveresse, Vuillemin and Granger, 
has a passion for music, for soccer, etc. This again, does not mean that the Patrick-Arthur opposition, the 
student-supervisor opposition is necessarily rejected; it must rather answer to a new criterion, that of the «new 
scientific method».  
57 Mircea Eliade, Rites and Symbols of Initiation, p. xi. 
58 Mircea Eliade, Rites and Symbols of Initiation, p. xii. 
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On the contrary, scientific thought admits the internal historicity of the discourses 
that it produces; it admits the possibility of novelty, the possibility of its own «expansion»: 
new concepts, new objects of study, etc. Hence, if the different sciences present themselves 
as being ‘closed’ – in the sense that they close themselves around a particular class of 
objects, or in a defined and delimited field of investigation (i.e.: the field of the living, the 
field of the stars, the field of the divine, etc.) – it is nonetheless possible to say that the 
sciences expose themselves and the discourses that they produce to the possibility of 
revision and change, an exposure that mythology refused. The scientific expansion of 
knowledge, contrary to the eclectic and heterogeneous expansion of mythological belief, 
cannot however be arbitrary, but must respect a series of rules of construction, definition 
and deduction59. The expansion of the scientific discourse will hence be, in a certain sense, 
guided, and ‘logical’. Logic will not be however a mere tool in the perpetuation enterprise 
of the same and of the opposition and differences that constitute it, as it was the case for 
the myth: indeed, while myth could only accept novelty if it was understood to be already 
ancient, that is to say, already filled by the discourse’s original oppositions and differences, 
science tries to accommodate novelty, it tries to accommodate difference qua difference, 
by including it in a explicative hypothetic-deductive system60. Science tries, through a 
series of axioms, to explain as much of different things as possible. The knowledge that the 
scientist acquires of a thing is no longer constituted by a detour through a recognition of a 
more ancient opposition, but rather, assembled by the weaving of explanatory links 
between elements, weaving that is operated in line with rules of construction, definition, 
                                                          
59 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 100. 
60 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 103. 
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and deduction that are understood as axioms. By understanding things on their own terrain, 
and not on the terrain of an original opposition, the nature of the scientific expansion is 
changed: it ceases to be an enterprise of classification of things to become an enterprise of 
explanation of things61 and phenomena. As a classification tool, a natural opposition (night 
and day) was used to justify classifications and divisions within society (men vs. women, 
adult vs. children, profane vs. sacred). Science not only classifies, but it also aims at 
explaining these classifications by studying the classified objects for their own sake. 
There is another thing that I believe has to be mentioned: the axioms of a science 
are never considered to be pronounced by the voice of the divine; they are not therefore 
exempted from possible revisions. Indeed, even if the mythological and the scientific 
discourse share a somewhat common nature, in that they both aim to offer an «image of 
reality», for Vuillemin, their mode of discourse differ from one another, the mythological 
discourse being an enterprise of classification, and the scientific discourse being an 
enterprise of explanation. In the first case, the classification process is made following a 
principle that escapes any form of verification or revision; this principle is, in a sense, 
before or outside of experience, outside of the world (an evidence of that is the divine origin 
of the voice that reveals the mythological discourse). In the second case however, the 
explanation is valid or acceptable only if it can account for the studied phenomenon or 
object. Hence, even if a series of axioms A can explain a certain ‘quantity’ of things, it can 
                                                          
61 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 103. 
 37 
 
and must eventually be replaced by another series of axioms A’ or B that will be able to 
explain what A explains and more. We can therefore talk, in science, of ‘progress’62. 
Alethic investigation.  Finally, if for Vuillemin, it was possible to attribute a 
meaning to the mythological discourse, it was out of question to give it any form of ‘truth-
value’ in the strict sense of the word ‘truth’, because «to understand a myth, we need to 
know in what circumstances the story would be true. We need only surmise the code at 
which this story hints. (…) Meaning here leaves no place for truth»63. In fact, myth, as well 
as the discourse that it produces and enables – and this might be the reason of the eminently 
social role that it plays – is conservative in the sense that, as Eliade reminds us, it tries to 
justify a series of institutions and social and political practises. The source of the myth’s 
‘truth’ is hence to be found in the myth itself. The scientific discourse on the other hand, 
although it does start somewhere, that is to say, although it does start with a series of 
axioms, of definitions, of rules of deduction and observation, etc., the scientific discourse 
then merely uses these elements to better explain a set of phenomena. Attributing a truth-
value to a scientific proposition is only possible if this proposition gives an adequate 
explanation of a phenomenon or an object that is (pre)supposed to be ‘exterior’ to 
discourse; the proposition only has value in the sense that it is capable of reconstructing the 
region of reality that it tries to describe and explain. The source of the truth of the discourse 
                                                          
62 The scientific discourse is hence, in a certain way, the first step of what we could call a ‘humanization’ or 
a ‘weakening’ (fragilisation) of truth, in the sense that discourse cannot rest or assess its strength on the origin 
of the voice that pronounces it; it must rather support itself, stand on its own two feet, and this can only be 
done slowly and difficultly, as it is the case for a child learning to walk, through a learning process defined 
by trials and errors; and this also holds true for the fundamental principles and concepts that enable the 
opening and the articulation of the scientific discourse. 
63 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 99. 
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is then no longer found in the discourse itself (as it was the case with the mythological 
discourse), but rather in the phenomenon, in the studied object64. 
Also, it is necessary to note that the coherence that exists between the axioms of a 
science and the coherence existing between these axioms and the discursive developments 
that they permit ensure that truth can, so to speak, spread through the entirety of the 
scientific discursive tissue; and it is in this sense that Greek science was understood as 
being able to say something true about reality: «just as the set of these principles was 
recognized by the Greeks as true, and just as the rules of deduction were seen to preserve 
truth-values, so the logical consequences of the principles were themselves recognized as 
true»65.  
 
A.3 …to Philosophy.  
The Greek scientists, newly liberated from the viscous and vicious circularity of 
mythological discourse, newly ‘initiated’ to the demands and requirements of the scientific 
method, were now faced with two unprecedented difficulties; two difficulties for which it 
would be philosophy’s task to address. 
Firstly, if science could rest its developments on an ‘axiomatic basis’ from which it 
could articulate a coherent and explanatory discourse about the studied phenomenon, this 
basis is as enigmatic as its status uncertain: «Many mathematicians admit – as did even the 
ancients – the reality of the objects about which they speak (…). But such an interpretation 
                                                          
64 If the source of truth is in the phenomenon or in the object, this idea does not contradict what I have said 
earlier about the lieu of scientific truth being in the discourse. Il en est ainsi, in the same way that the source 
of the sea is the different rivers that fills it, while its lieu is its own bed. 
65 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 100. 
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is never forced upon us by the axioms themselves, which do not tell us what the elements 
are»66. For a mind newly liberated from myth, to leave this kind of interrogation 
unanswered is to dive back in the mythological mode of justification, the scientist now 
taking the place of the shaman or the priest, and the axioms now being what is divinely 
murmured to the scientist’s ear – which is, of course, unacceptable67. The scientist feels the 
need to found his discourse on an even more solid basis. If the scientific discourse 
constitutes itself downstream from the axiomatic apparatus guided by the logical voice of 
Virgil, philosophical discourse will constitute itself upstream from that same apparatus, 
guided by the equally logical voice of Beatrice. Philosophy hence takes the form of an 
ontological interrogation concerning the constitutive elements of the scientific discourse. 
We can hence, in a certain sense, understand philosophy as a return or a reversal of the 
axiomatic method on itself in the sense that it is the (scientific) products of the axiomatic 
method that are now put into question: «What are numbers, points and lines? What kind of 
existence may be claimed for them? These are philosophical question»68. The scientific 
discourse, constructed through axiomatic means, and contrary to mythology, had estranged 
itself from any reference to the ontological69, and it was up to philosophy to root the 
scientific discourse into the ontological ground. Philosophy’s first task, as described by 
Vuillemin, seems to be of a foundational nature, that is to say: to secure the axiomatic 
foundations of the science. 
                                                          
66 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 104 (the emphasis is mine). 
67 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 101. 
68 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 104. 
69 «As a hypothetico-deductive system, axiomatics is thus completely foreign to ontology» (Jules Vuillemin, 
What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 104). 
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Secondly, if scientific developments permitted an expansion of the surface of our 
knowledge about the world and of its phenomenon, and if philosophy at first concerned 
herself with questions of local ontology, the fact remains that the passage from the 
mythological to the scientific left a fundamental void in the sense that the axiomatic-
scientific method was doubled with a ‘fracturing’ of the world in multiple fields of study, 
hence losing the possibility and capacity to construct a general and unitary world-view: 
«The world of myth had crumbled: its material had to be reorganized»70. It will then be to 
philosophy to pass from these questions of local ontology to general questions regarding a 
general ontology that will be articulated around a fundamental problematic: the distinction 
between reality and appearance71. The trajectory of philosophy hence is similar to that of 
Wittgenstein – «My work has extended itself from the foundations of logic to the essence 
of the world»72 –, as it extends itself from the axiomatic foundations of science to the 
essential structures of reality.  
 
B. Once upon a time was philosophy…according to Vuillemin. 
 
The preceding exposition of the intellectual context of the birth of philosophy, and 
of the link that Vuillemin traces between philosophy and the axiomatic method, is useful 
in the sense that it enables us to understand why Vuillemin thinks of philosophy as he does, 
and why he describes it as being an essentially theoretical and systematic activity aiming 
                                                          
70 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 104. 
71 Cf. Jacques Bouveresse, «Cours 7. Apparence et réalité : le problème de leur distinction comme problème 
fondamental de la philosophie» in Qu’est-ce qu’un système philosophique?. 
72 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914-1916 (2.18.1916).  
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to trace a line, a frontier separating reality from appearance. The exposition also helps us 
to understand why Vuillemin refuses the idea that philosophy could be otherwise. Why, for 
example, she cannot be reduced to be another literary activity amongst others; the 
exposition also enables us to imagine Vuillemin’s reaction if he was to read what Deleuze 
and Guattari say about logic and philosophy in their book Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?: 
«It is a genuine hate of philosophy that animates logic, in its rivalry or its will to supplant 
philosophy»73. For Vuillemin, logic is on the contrary not animated by a hate of philosophy: 
it is rather the hate of logic that disfigures philosophy, because philosophy is, to be blunt, 
an ontological discourse regulated by the rules of logic.  
 
B.1 An activity that is essentially theoretical… 
For Vuillemin, philosophy is a theoretical activity in the sense that it tries to articulate an 
«image of reality»74. Philosophy hence shares with mythology (and not, as one might think, 
with science) this theoretical aspect. «Theory»: «theorein», which means «to contemplate», 
or «to speculate»; «theoros», which means «spectator». This double etymology is 
                                                          
73 Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari, Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, p. 80. 
74 This is indeed a bizarre characterization of what it means for an activity to be theoretical. But I think that 
what Vuillemin wants to press is the idea that philosophy, even for its dismissal of mythology’s discursive 
practices, shares with it a common goal: to articulate, discursively, an image of reality. Science, though 
theoretical in the common sense of the word (it produces theories), does not aim to do that, and is hence not 
theoretical in that sense. It rather aims at explaining phenomena through the postulation of axioms, of basic 
concepts. It is in this sense that philosophical theorization has nothing to do with scientific theorization: the 
former, unlike the latter, is not hypothetical in that the theses of a philosophical system are not to be verified 
by some natural phenomena. What will bring together philosophy in science (or rather, what they have in 
common) is, according to Vuillemin, the important and central role of the axiomatic method has a means 
towards the stabilization of the discourse (philosophical or scientific) that is under construction. Of course, 
what is questionable here is to what degree is Vuillemin right in assessing this central and decisive role to the 
axiomatic role (for philosophy and for the sciences): is this still true for the contemporary sciences, and if 
not, what consequences does that hold for contemporary practices of philosophy? Has this ever been true at 
all? 
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interesting because it points to the relation that philosophy shares with the reality it 
observes, and to its position or location as compared to this same reality. Hence philosophy 
contemplates reality and speculates about it, about its essential structure. However 
philosophical theorization, for Vuillemin, has nothing to do with scientific theorization, in 
the sense that the first, contrary to the second, is not ‘hypothetical’: «philosophy does not 
describe worldly facts, does not aim to, from them, construct abstract models proper to 
logical-mathematical manipulations and susceptible to be used as basis for previsions and 
interventions in the empirical world»75. 
In this sense, for philosophy, phenomenon are not objects to a study aiming to 
explain them – for this is the goal of science. Rather, phenomenon become, so to speak, 
raw material for a speculation concerning the emplacement of the frontier between reality 
and appearance. Philosophy hence does not aim to save phenomenon, or to save the ‘things’ 
of daily experience; it rather aims to take them and to, from them, speculate about them. 
Philosophy would hence be a «knowledge without object»76 (connaissance sans objet), or 
rather, if philosophy does have an object, it is not this or that object (this chair, this 
ventilator), but the ‘world’ as a «virtual totality»77, 78. Philosophy understood as an activity 
of theorization, of «pure theorization»79. 
                                                          
75 Gilles-Gaston Granger, «À quoi sert la philosophie?», in Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 19, 
1993, p. 59. 
76 Cf. Gilles-Gaston Granger, Pour la connaissance, Odile Jacob, Paris, 1988. 
77 Gilles-Gaston Granger, «À quoi sert la philosophie?», p. 60. 
78 To talk about the ‘object’ of philosophy is hence, in a certain sense, a perverted use of the concept of 
«object», in the sense that an object is ordinarily the product of a decoupage within reality, enabling us to 
differentiate this object from that object, whether it is in the context of ordinary life (this chair differentiated 
from this ventilator), or in the scientific context (neutrons differentiated from protons); the «object» of 
philosophy, the world-as-a-totality, is not the product of an exercise of differentiation in the sense that the 
world differentiates itself from nothing. 
79 «Pure» in the sense that it does not depend upon any kind of reference to empirical experience. Maybe it 
would be better to call philosophy an exercise in «a priori theorization»?  
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As it is suggested by the second etymological root of the word «theory», this activity 
of pure theorization is however done «from a distance», or «from the standpoint of 
‘exteriority’» of the sphere of phenomenon, in the sense that they are the object of a 
spectacle that the philosopher-theorist contemplates. This distance is important for two 
reasons: it firstly affirms the uselessness of philosophy in the sense that the speculation of 
the spectator does not contribute nor does it influence what is happening on stage: «in the 
most common sense of the expression ‘useful’ philosophy cannot and must not be useful»80. 
Philosophy does not aim to bring about change in the world, it does not aim to «change the 
world»81. It is, for philosophers like Vuillemin, Granger, and Bouveresse, the reason the 
history of philosophy is not only the history of our philosophical productions; the history 
of philosophy is also the history of how philosophy has defended itself against the 
reproaches of the public concerning its utility (or rather, its lack thereof). The uselessness 
of philosophy is hence one of the sources of what makes its scandalous, but also, for others, 
the essential source of its dignity. Philosophy is hence distinguished, on this particular 
point, from myth: while myth has a deeply social use, which was to preserve and justify an 
ensemble of social, political and religious institutions, philosophy is devoid of such aims. 
We could here quote the words of Paul Valéry: «A man that gives up the world puts himself 
in the position to understand it». 
Secondly, the distance that exists between the philosopher and the spectacle that he 
contemplates leads us to note what we could call the ‘elitist’ or ‘aristocratic’ character of 
                                                          
80 Gilles-Gaston Granger, «À quoi sert la philosophie?», p. 57. 
81 This conception of philosophy is hence radically opposed to that of someone like Marx, for example: 
«Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.» (Karl 
Marx, «Thesis on Feuerbach»). 
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Vuillemin’s conception of philosophy. Indeed, in the same way that the spectator is not part 
of the play, in the same way that there is a distance between the spectator and the actor, the 
philosopher distances themselves from the «man on the street» and of what he (or they, the 
people in the street) says about the phenomenon that constitute daily life. Philosophy 
«reorganizes representations that are already immanently organized in that they constitute 
our immediately lived experience, individually and collectively»82. If the philosopher talks 
about, or rather, from the same things as the «man on the street», they do not say the same 
things as him. If the «man on the street» talks, it is to talk about his «experience» of things, 
of these things, of those things; but the philosopher wants to talk about the world in general, 
a generality of which we cannot have any experience, «except for the mystics, maybe»83. 
But to talk about things in their total generality, one must walk away from things expressed 
in their particularity. The position of the philosopher is hence one of liberation, freedom, 
and privilege, in the sense that they are not constrained by the limits imposed by the 
economic structures of daily life (les structures économiques du quotidien), imposed by 
particular things; they are completely cut from action, because action is always particular, 
specific-to, and never universal. The philosophical activity in a sense confirms and 
reinforces the privileged status of the philosopher. 
 
B.2 …and systematic.  
Vuillemin however insists, and consistently underlines the fact that the philosophical 
activity is not only theoretical, but also and foremost «systematic». Michael Dummett, in 
                                                          
82 Gilles-Gaston Granger, «À quoi sert la philosophie?», p. 60. 
83 Gilles-Gaston Granger, «À quoi sert la philosophie?», p. 60. 
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his article «Can Analytical Philosophy Be Systematic and Ought it to Be?», notes that we 
can understand the word «systematic» in two different senses: firstly, the term 
«systematic» can mean that philosophy «is supposed to lead to the construction of an 
articulated theory, similar to those that have been proposed by philosophers who have 
constructed big ‘systems’»84. Secondly, the term «systematic» can refer to the 
philosophical ‘demarche’, or to the philosophical ‘method’: philosophy would be 
systematic in the sense that the philosophical community would have agreed upon a given 
method and a set of criteria of research, without expecting of philosophy that she should 
lead to one articulated theory85. 
As it is noted by Bouveresse, these two meanings of the word «systematic» are not 
mutually dependant: «for the most part, the natural sciences are systematic in these two 
senses. But history, for example, is only systematic in the second sense: it possesses 
methods of research commonly accepted and criteria recognized to test the validity of the 
results of the historian’s research; but it does not lead to the constitution of an articulated 
theory»86. Dummett believes, as Descartes, Spinoza, Kant and Husserl have believed before 
him, that philosophy finally is in the position, due to the developments in the philosophy 
of logic and in the philosophy of language since Frege, to change its nature, to cease to be 
a merely speculative activity (Dummett’s use of the word «speculative» is pejorative) to 
«take an authentically scientific character»87; this scientific character would finally enable 
                                                          
84 Jacques Bouveresse, «Cours 2. La philosophie peut-elle être systématique et doit-elle l’être?» in Qu’est-ce 
qu’un système philosophique?, p. 3. 
85 Jacques Bouveresse, «Cours 2. La philosophie peut-elle être systématique et doit-elle l’être?», p. 3. 
86 Jacques Bouveresse, «Cours 2. La philosophie peut-elle être systématique et doit-elle l’être?», p. 3. 
87 Jacques Bouveresse, «Cours 2. La philosophie peut-elle être systématique et doit-elle l’être?», p. 3. 
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philosophy to deal with and resolve the problems that have defined its history. Vuillemin, 
on the other hand, is immunized against this form of philosophical optimism, as it has been 
suggested at the beginning of this chapter. If philosophy is to be ‘systematic’, which it is, 
it can only be in the first sense of the word, that is to say: philosophy is systematic in the 
sense that it proposes an articulated theory concerning the totality of reality, a theory by 
which reality is contrasted from appearance88. 
When Vuillemin says that the philosophical activity constructs an articulated 
theory, this theoretical construction is – and this is what distinguishes philosophy from the 
theoretical enterprise of mythology, as it has been said earlier – guided by the logical voice 
of Beatrice: «We may define the system of signs that is peculiar to philosophy as an 
ontology subjected to logic»89. Philosophical ontology is therefore, so to speak, a genuine 
onto-logy, or rather, it is only as a philosophical activity that one can truly do justice to the 
double-aspect of the notion of «onto-logy»: do justice to being, to reality, and do justice to 
logic; as compared to the mythological activity that, while it addressed the question of being 
and of appearance, did not embarrass itself with the logical character of its affirmations. 
                                                          
88 The significance of the distinction between reality and appearance seems to stem for Vuillemin from a 
necessity that is inherent to any discourse that seeks to communicate a truth or an ensemble of truths. The 
mere idea of truth seems however to suggests a certain logical or conceptual link with the idea of reality, 
reality about which the speaker says something that is truthful. In other words, any discourse that aims to 
express something true must ‘concentrate its attention’ on reality and not on something that is only apparently 
real. The source of the mythological failure on that level (even if the mythological discourse does aim to say 
the truth) seems to rely in the fact that a true discourse (simple or complex: whether we’re talking of a single 
proposition or of a body of propositions) must be regulated in terms of the fixation of the meaning of the 
signs that are used and in terms of the articulation of these different propositions. Philosophy (and science) 
frees itself from the difficulties that plagued the mythological discourse in terms of its construction, in the 
sense that it (philosophy) develops its discourse while respecting the regulations and demands of the 
axiomatic method (fixing the meaning of the philosophical system’s concepts, logically articulating the 
different theses of the system, and so on). What separates then the theoretical articulation of mythology from 
that of philosophy is what Vuillemin called a «complete revolution in the use of linguistic signs». 
89 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 105. 
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The notion of systematicity for Vuillemin is hence linked with what Granger refers 
to when he speaks of the philosophical thought’s responsibility to be «rigorous»: 
philosophical discourse must prove to be rigorous, and one of the ‘proofs’ of this rigor is 
its «submission to the rules of logic stricto sensu, that is to say, at least to propositional 
calculus»90. The notion of systematicity also takes for Vuillemin a third sense that Dummett 
does not explicitly mention, but that philosophy borrows from mythology, that is to say, 
the will to embrace the whole of reality: «philosophy may be said to be systematic in a 
second sense, which recalls and metamorphoses the universality of myth»91. 
 
C. Vuillemin: the philosophical effort beyond and in spite of the inevitable pluralism. 
 
Philosophical discourse hence constitutes itself as a system. It is constructed 
according to the demands and requirements of logic, and aims to offer a complete image of 
reality. We have here a pretty standard notion of what philosophy has traditionally done, 
but one element still lacks to offer a complete portrait of Vuillemin’s conception of 
philosophy. I mentioned earlier, quoting Granger, that according to Vuillemin, philosophy 
«reorganizes representations that are already immanently organized in that they constitute 
our immediately lived experience, individually and collectively»92. One could however ask 
Vuillemin the following question: No doubt, but Jules, how does this reorganizing process 
start? In other words: how does one start to philosophize? To construct a system? This 
                                                          
90 Gilles-Gaston Granger, «À quoi sert la philosophie?», p. 61. 
91 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 105. 
92 Gilles-Gaston Granger, «À quoi sert la philosophie?», p. 60. 
 48 
 
question is crucial and Vuillemin’s answer will help us to understand why he distances 
himself from thinkers like Dummett that defend the possibility of a philosophy that would 
follow the sure path of science93. This answer will also help us to understand the reason 
why Vuillemin believes, as it has been mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, that 
philosophy’s field cannot be anything else than a battlefield, and why this field cannot one 
day become the land of philosophical peace. 
 
C.1 Vuillemin’s answer to the question. 
 As I have said earlier, the philosopher is, for Vuillemin, this privileged character that is in 
a position to ‘look at’, to ‘contemplate’ the discourse or discourses of common sense, and 
to try to trace a line separating reality from appearance. But these discourses say A and 
non-A (for example, that man is free and that he is determined by his physical constitution, 
that the universe is matter and spirit, etc.), and the philosopher, to be able to submit their 
own discourse to the laws of logic, to be able to say the truth of reality, realizes that they 
must choose: «Between self-evident principles equally recommended by common sense 
but mutually inconsistent, a choice is imposed on philosophy»94. However, this choice, 
ultimately cannot be assured or cannot rest on a rational ‘basis’, in the sense that the 
recognition of this ‘basis’ is already the result of a philosophical decision about the nature 
of reason and of its interests. Philosophy is hence, in its simplest expression, a form of 
engagement, an impulse, setting in motion the philosopher’s thought. 
                                                          
93 Cf. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1787. 
94 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 105. 
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Philosophical discourse is hence, in this sense, the development of the logical 
consequences of a choice regarding a proposition or a group of propositions understood as 
universally valid95; and this choice is determinant in the sense that it determines what the 
philosopher will consider to be real and what they will consider to be mere appearance. 
One could say that, for Vuillemin, every book of philosophy should be opened with the 
following words: «If god could say the world, here is what He would say». The essential 
structure of the philosophical discourse is hence that of a conditional96; a conditional that 
aims above anything else at coherence and honesty in its starting point, and in the 
consequences that it (the starting point) generates.  
It is therefore possible to understand why Vuillemin firmly believes that philosophy 
is born and can live only in contest97, and why it can only and necessarily lead (and that is 
its fundamental condition) to a plurality of philosophical positions: because, faced with the 
contradictions offered by the discourses of common sense, the philosopher must choose 
where they start their reflection on reality; because, this ‘where’ is an undetermined given, 
it cannot be otherwise, and that we can equally choose one or the other of the contradictory 
elements of common sense as a premise to our reflection; and finally because the choice of 
this or these premises is «a choice for which there cannot be, in last instance, a perfectly 
concluding determination in the same as a demonstration in mathematics: ‘I say that there 
is no rational decisional criterion in philosophy…»98 It is hence possible, for different 
                                                          
95 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 133. 
96 One could quote Paul Valéry: «The ‘if’ is an essential instrument for mental (philosophical) action». 
97 Jules Vuillemin, What Are Philosophical Systems?, p. 113. 
98 Pascal Engel, «Jules Vuillemin, les systèmes philosophiques, et la vérité», in P. Pellegrin & R. Rashed, 
Philosophie des mathématiques et théorie de la connaissance, l’œuvre de Jules Vuillemin, p. 33. 
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philosophers to choose different starting point to their reflection, meaning that it is possible, 
for different thinkers, to trace different frontiers separating reality from appearance, 
meaning finally that A might attack B concerning the logical development of a 
philosophical system (A might say that B’s system is not coherent), but A cannot attack B 
concerning their original philosophical choice.  
Throughout this chapter I have articulated Vuillemin’s view that the nature of 
philosophy strongly depends upon the intellectual conditions of its birth. I have narrated 
the Greek context of philosophy’s birth, that is to say, how philosophy emerged, with 
science and its use of the axiomatic method, from the mythological slumber of Greek 
thought. I have explained why Vuillemin sees philosophy as being an onto-logy, that is to 
say, a theoretical, systematic and logical enterprise aiming to trace a line separating reality 
from appearance; and finally, I have explained why Vuillemin believes that philosophy is 
essentially and unescapably pluralistic, in the sense that there cannot be something like a 
grand reconciliation of philosophy and of its different and contradictory theoretical 
tendencies and explanations.  
 
«These days, the essential happens  
within the realms of abstraction, 
and to reality nothing is left but the accessory»  
-Robert Musil, in L’homme sans qualité 
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CHAPTER II: Ludwig Wittgenstein or a therapeutic conception of philosophy 
 
«To idealize is also a form of suffering…» 
-Anonymous 
 
«See to it that no one takes you captive through  
hollow and deceptive philosophy, 
which depends on human tradition  
and the elemental spiritual forces of this world…» 
-St. Paul, Epistle to the Colossians 2; 8 
 
«Write. Purge. Heal.» 
-Anonymous 
 
The aim of this second chapter will be to draw a portrait of what we could call a 
therapeutic conception of what philosophy does, or of what it is, that is, the conception of 
philosophy that has been defended and incarnated by Ludwig Wittgenstein. If, in the first 
chapter, I found it necessary to insist on the contingent character of the ‘Greek context’ out 
of which, according to Vuillemin, philosophy was born, contingency that deeply marked 
the morphology and the essential traits of philosophy (its theoretical, systematic and 
ontological character), this second chapter will have – in order to well understand what 
Wittgenstein means when he speaks of «philosophy» – to answer the following two 
questions: (i) What is a philosophical problem or a philosophical question?, and (ii) What 
is a philosophical ‘solution’?. Indeed, if there is one thing that determines the nature of 
philosophy for Wittgenstein, it is the source – or rather, the sources – and the causes of our 
philosophical problems, and the answer – or again, the answers – that one must give to 
them. This chapter will hence, in a certain sense, try to describe what one might call the 
Alpha and Omega of the philosophical activity according to Wittgenstein, that is to say: a 
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description of the emergence and of the vanishing (disparition) of our philosophical 
problems. Already, throughout the chapter, it will be possible to note certain sharp 
differences between the conception of philosophy defended by Vuillemin and 
Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy. It will however be the aim of the next chapter to explain 
these differences, as well as certain resemblances that exist nonetheless between these two 
conceptions. 
Though before attacking these two questions, I should probably answer a possible 
objection or comment: for someone that is minimally familiar with Wittgenstein’s oeuvre, 
it could seem bizarre to talk of philosophy understood as a «therapeutic activity», 
considering that this characterization of philosophy only explicitly emerges in what has 
been traditionally understood to be Wittgenstein’s second philosophy, and considering also 
that this terminology is totally absent from his first philosophy99. Why then should one 
insist, as I will, on the terminology of the second Wittgenstein to describe a general 
conception of philosophy which would be that of both the first and the second 
Wittgenstein? Second point, stemming from the first: Am I not risking a distortion of the 
evolution and metamorphosis of Wittgenstein’s thought by characterizing his conception 
of philosophy as being uniform, from beginning to end? Indeed, is not more reasonable to 
think that Wittgenstein, by abandoning the main theses that he defended in the Tractatus, 
also abandoned his initial conception of philosophy to defend a new one?  
I would like to suggest that, on the contrary, if Wittgenstein abandoned the theses 
defended in the Tractatus, it is in part because he realized that the argument that he 
                                                          
99 Concerning this ‘binary division’ between first and second Wittgenstein (or between early and late 
Wittgenstein), see note 2. 
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developed in his first book did not do what a philosophical enterprise should or must do. In 
other words, Wittgenstein realized that the main theses of the Tractatus actually 
participated to the type of illusions to which the philosopher must resist (as I shall argue in 
this chapter). Hence, under a visible discontinuity of his thought lies a continuous 
philosophical «program», in the same way that, under the discontinuity of our clothing one 
single body is hidden. In this sense, I embrace Rush Rhees’ (amongst others) opinion: «I 
dislike the reference to ‘the philosophy of the early Wittgenstein’ and ‘the philosophy of 
the later Wittgenstein’: as though we might say ‘At one time his philosophy was this, but 
at a later time his philosophy was that’»100. 
In the following chapter, I will try to do three things: (A) I will give a few indications 
regarding Wittgenstein’s general intellectual background, indications that I find important 
and relevant when trying to understand Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy. (B) I will 
try to map out an answer to the first question cited above: what is a philosophical problem 
or a philosophical question? Having done that, I will then try to explain the main causes 
of our philosophical questions and problems, according to Wittgenstein; in other words, the 
different reasons that makes the philosopher dive in the dangerous waters of philosophy. 
(C) Finally, I will try to articulate the therapy (as it is suggested in the title of this chapter) 
that the philosopher must go through to solve their philosophical troubles.  
 
 
 
                                                          
100 Rush Rhees, Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Discourse, p. 262. 
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A. Wittgenstein’s intellectual and philosophical background. 
 
From the time of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein considers that «all philosophy is a 
‘critique of language’ (though not in Mauthner’s sense)»101, and this conviction will be 
constantly present throughout the evolution of his thought, from the Tractatus to the 
aphorisms of his last days, assembled in On Certainty. I chose this quote in particular, 
because it enables me to develop two linked ideas that – when one wants to understand 
what Wittgenstein means when he speaks of ‘philosophy’ – are interesting and important. 
Firstly, the parenthesis concerning Mauthner is important for the following reason: if 
Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy clearly stands out from what traditionally has been 
called ‘philosophy’, one must not believe that that conception is but a kind of philosophical 
(or antiphilosophical) reaction to this conception; also, one should not believe that the 
Wittgensteinian conception of philosophy is an ‘immaculate conception’, or simply the 
fruitful product of the inspiration of a genius; for even the mind of a genius needs 
(intellectual) food to grow. To understand what Wittgenstein’s idea of what philosophy is, 
one must as much look in the direction of philosophers like Frege, Russell, Ramsey or 
Moore, as in the direction of philosophers and thinkers like Lichtenberg, Herder, Hamann 
and Mauthner, or Schlegel, Kraus, Freud, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer and Tolstoy102. 
Although Wittgenstein has been recognized as one of the most famous representatives of 
Anglo-American analytical philosophy, it is probably more exact to say that he, in fact, 
participates in an intellectual and philosophical tradition that emerged in Germany and in 
                                                          
101 Ludwig Wittgenstein, TLP (4.0031). 
102 Adrien-Paul Iliescu, Wittgenstein: Why Philosophy is Bound to Err, p. 11. 
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the Austro-Hungarian Empire. My aim is not to make a detailed presentation of the links 
or ‘family resemblances’ that exist between Wittgenstein and this second group of thinkers. 
But it is important to say the following: that most of these thinkers share a certain form of 
linguistic scepticism or suspicion, whether this suspicion is guided towards language in 
general (Nietzsche, or Mauthner), or towards certain of our uses of language (philosophical 
uses for Wittgenstein, political and journalistic uses for Kraus), and that this is something 
that greatly influenced Wittgenstein’s understanding of the task of philosophy. 
If what Iliescu calls the Classical German Tradition of Language Criticism103 does 
not entirely reject traditional philosophy as understood by Vuillemin – philosophy as an 
ontological or metaphysical enterprise – which it sometimes seems to do (I here have 
Nietzsche and Mauthner in mind), it would not however be completely false to say that this 
tradition, in a certain sense, relocates the fundamental interrogation of philosophy that 
Vuillemin speaks of (the interrogation concerning the separation of reality and appearance) 
within language itself. It would hence not be the world that lacks an explanation and that is 
problematic (although the world still remains an important source of philosophical worry): 
it is rather the word, or language itself that is put into question. The philosophical 
demand104, if such a thing exists, would hence have its origin in language, not in Being, or 
the world. In other words: the theoretical elaboration of an ontology philosophically 
depends upon a proper study of the tool which, in a certain sense, is the condition of the 
possibility of such an elaboration, that is to say, language. A language that, up until that 
                                                          
103 Adrien-Paul Iliescu, «Wittgenstein and the Classical German Tradition of Language Criticism» in 
Wittgenstein: Why Philosophy is Bound to Err, pp. 119-145. 
104 I borrow here the title of one of Bouveresse’s books: La demande philosophique. Que veut la philosophie 
et que peut-on vouloir d’elle?. 
 56 
 
point, seemed to be of secondary importance in the best of cases – or simply taken for 
granted in the worst of cases – by traditional systematic philosophers. 
Secondly, this relocation of the fundamental question of philosophy from the world 
to language is followed by, or implies – and that is, I think, what one should understand 
when reading Wittgenstein’s description of philosophy as a ‘critique of language’ – an 
equivalent change or reorientation regarding the task and obligations of the philosopher. 
For example, for Nietzsche, «there can no longer be philosophical systems à l’ancienne, 
because there can no longer be systems of knowledge as a whole, which was what 
philosophical systems pretended to be»105. The aim of philosophy will hence be to discern 
«behind these ornaments the powerful figure of the priest, the active organizer of reactive 
forces, the one who profits from nihilism, the captain who enjoys resentment»106. This 
discernment process will take the form of a genealogical critique of traditional, 
philosophical, and religious discourses, of their appeal to truth and totality, of their 
moralizing tone, etc. Mauthner will go even further than Nietzsche, embracing a radical 
form of «linguistic nihilism»107, pre-empting any and all attempts to erect an authentic 
ontology: «in the beginning was not the word, in the beginning was action. Knowledge is 
a knowledge of words. We only have words, we know nothing»108.  
Meanwhile, Wittgenstein, although he shares with these thinkers a suspicious 
attitude towards language, will not go as far as to question our language’s capacity to 
                                                          
105 Jacques Bouveresse, «Cours 1. La pluralité des systèmes philosophiques et la question de l’applicabilité 
du concept de vérité à la philosophie», in Qu’est-ce qu’un système philosophique?, p. 6. 
106 Alain Badiou, Wittgenstein’s Antiphilosophy, pp. 75-76. 
107 Jacques Bouveresse, «Langage et illusion», in Études de philosophie du langage, p. 7. 
108 Fritz Mauthner, quoted by Jacques Bouveresse, «Langage et illusion», p. 4. 
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represent the facts of reality109. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine what it can mean, for us, to 
say that language is intrinsically misleading, or mean (mesquin). In other words, what 
practical consequences can and must we draw from this philosophical conclusion, or 
thesis110? In what way can this ‘fact’ (that language is intrinsically misleading) help to 
awaken us from the illusion, from this dream that is language (that every language is?), and 
what would an ‘awaken language’ look like? Wittgenstein will however recognize that 
language does bring us to entertain certain confusions and illusions111, that it does 
sometimes trip, stumble, and fall (indeed, «even the most sublime object is diminished 
under the hands of human beings whenever they apply its idea to their use»112), and that if 
the critique that is philosophy must not (and if it in a certain sense cannot) attack language 
in general, it must however focus its attention, and if possible, eradicate these particular 
linguistic confusions and illusions. 
 
B. The Alpha of philosophy: the philosophical problem. 
 
For Aristotle, the source of philosophy is to be found in a feeling of wonder that 
stems in the philosopher when they are faced with existence, feeling without which «men 
and women would lapse into deadening routine and little by little would become incapable 
of a life which is genuinely personal»113; and this feeling pushes the philosopher to seek 
                                                          
109 Jacques Bouveresse, «Langage et illusion», p. 4. 
110 Jacques Bouveresse, La parole malheureuse, p. 21. 
111 Jacques Bouveresse, «Langage et illusion», p. 3. 
112 Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and Other Writings, p. 36.  
113 John Paul II, Fides et Ratio. Encyclical Letter Concerning the Relationship Between Faith and Reason, §4. 
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the ultimate causes of existence, that is to say, the essential structure of reality. Philosophy 
is hence rooted in an «Urphilosophischeerfahrung»114, in an ‘original philosophical 
experience’, wonder, that incites the philosopher to the deepest speculations, and to the 
deepest questions. For Wittgenstein, however, if philosophy has a ‘sentimental’ source, the 
feeling in question is not wonder, but rather a «Beunruhigung», a ‘preoccupation’ that 
besieges the mind of the philosopher and that places them in a very uncomfortable situation, 
a preoccupation that takes the traits of an obsession115.  
This uncomfortable and properly philosophical preoccupation stems, according to 
Wittgenstein, and he will maintain this from beginning to end, from «our failure to 
understand the logic of our language»116. Having said that, Wittgenstein does not mean to 
say that we suffer from an absence of understanding of the logic of our language, but that 
we rather suffer from a loss (perte) of understanding of the logic of our language. The task 
of the philosopher is not then to answer to what would be an absence of understanding 
through the means of a philosophical discovery of the logic of our language, a logic that 
language would have lacked up until that point; rather, the real task of the philosopher, as 
compared to what one could think, or compared to what one could hope from philosophy, 
will be to rediscover the logic of our language. In other words: this situation of 
incomprehension which is that of the philosopher does not originate in a lack, or in some 
                                                          
114 Richard A. Gilmore, Philosophical Health. Wittgenstein Method in «Philosophical 
Investigations», pp. 101-121. 
115 It is quite easy to see when reading the Wittgenstein’s notes at the time of the Tractatus that, if he does 
not say it openly as he will do so in the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein nonetheless lived and 
experienced philosophical problems as obsessional preoccupations, preoccupations that demanded 
appeasement: Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914-1916, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, Carnets de 
Cambridge et de Skjolden. 1930-1932, 1936-1937. 
116 Ludwig Wittgenstein, TLP (4.003). 
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logical imperfection of which our language would be guilty, a lack that only the philosopher 
could remedy with their redemptive discourse; after all, as Bouveresse says, «language is 
innocent»117, and Wittgenstein repeatedly says that «logic must look after itself»118. Rather, 
it is the philosopher that loses sight of certain things concerning their language, that loses 
sight of, in a certain sense, who they are and where they come from, and that says that «c’est 
ma langue que je ne sais plus reconnaître»119; it is the philosopher who says also: «I don’t 
know my way about»120. 
Language, the relationship that it shares with the world, as well as the «success» of 
this relationship, are never put into question by Wittgenstein, and on this matter, he 
distances himself as much from Mauthner than from Russell and Frege. Mauthner indeed 
cultivates a form of radical scepticism concerning the possibility for language – he has in 
mind here ordinary language and also the technical developments of the sciences and of 
philosophy – to be a true ‘bearer of knowledge’ (epistemology would hence be a vain 
enterprise since it is devoid of any object: «we know nothing»), while Russell and Frege, 
faced with the limits, imprecision and equivocations of our ordinary language, try to 
construct a language that would be absolutely precise and univocal, that is to say, a truly 
logical and scientific language: «its regulations are far too liberal, its administration, too 
complacent, its organization, too relaxed, and its possibilities of movement, excessive. The 
latter must be submitted to severe restrictions that would eliminate once and for all the risks 
                                                          
117 Jacques Bouveresse, La parole malheureuse. De l’alchimie linguistique à la grammaire 
philosophique, p. 299. 
118 Ludwig Wittgenstein, TLP (5.473). 
119 Gaston Miron, L’homme rapaillé, p. 126. 
120 Ludwig Wittgenstein, PI (§123). 
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of verbal confusion and illusion»121. Hence on one (Mauthner’s) side, language is subjected 
to a radical and absolute doubt, while on the other (Russell and Frege’s) side, it is 
considered to be an artisanal and imperfect instrument that must be replaced with a perfect 
and ideal precision tool122. Meanwhile, Wittgenstein, to those who would have doubt 
concerning the talents and capacities of language, will answer what Simon Peter answered 
to Jesus: «Lord, to whom shall we go? You have the words of eternal life»123, and his 
philosophical efforts will revolve around a very clear objective: to bring back philosophers 
to an evidence, that of the «good nature»124 of language. 
This form of «linguistic rousseauism»125 is a thing that will pervade Wittgenstein’s 
thought, from beginning to end. One must not however understand this «rousseauism» as 
being a theoretical, philosophical stance concerning language, as opposed to, for example, 
Mauthner’s linguistic nihilism; one must rather understand it as a wise practical attitude 
towards language. Indeed, a theoretical Rousseauism, as much as a theoretical 
Hobbesianism à la Mauthner, is senseless for Wittgenstein: «the idea of a sort of linguistic 
malin génie, of a fundamental insufficiency or perversion of our language is for him 
[Wittgenstein] senseless, because we cannot draw from this type of hypothesis any practical 
consequence»126. In that perspective, the idea of a benevolent linguistic god is equally 
devoid of any «practical consequence», and hence, in a certain sense, is equally senseless, 
and dangerous. The attitude towards language in general that Wittgenstein proposes could 
                                                          
121 Jacques Bouveresse, La parole malheureuse, p. 10. 
122 P.M.S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion. Wittgenstein on Philosophy and the Metaphysics of Experience, p. 14. 
123 Gospel of St. John (6;68). 
124 Jacques Bouveresse, La parole malheureuse, p. 21. 
125 Erich Heller, «Wittgenstein: Unphilosophical Notes», in K.T. Fann (ed.), Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Man 
and His Philosophy, p. 104. 
126 Jacques Bouveresse, La parole malheureuse, p. 21 
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be characterized as a form of ‘prudent confidence’ (confiance prudente): to accept language 
as being an integral part of – and largely structuring – our form of life, while being 
conscious of the risks that language brings along with it.  
This enables us to understand what we could call the hidden agenda guiding the 
Tractarian sentences, or at least, it informs us on what this agenda is not: the Tractatus does 
not aim to articulate or to say the structures of an ideal and perfect language, but rather to 
show the structures of any and every possible language, including those of our ordinary 
language. Indeed, from the time of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein will say that «all of the 
propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical order»127. 
Russell, amongst others, will overlook these types of declarations and this will lead him to 
fundamentally misunderstand Wittgenstein’s true philosophical intentions: «In the part of 
his theory which deals with Symbolism he is concerned with the conditions which would 
have to be fulfilled by a logically perfect language (…) – not that any language is logically 
perfect, or that we believe ourselves capable, here and now, of constructing a logically 
perfect language, but that the whole function of language is to have a meaning, and it only 
fulfills this function in proportion, as it approaches to the ideal language which we 
postulate»128. This extract from Russell’s introduction to the Tractatus illustrates, not only 
the divergence in philosophical opinion existing between Russell and Wittgenstein on the 
local question of our ordinary language’s value, from a logical point of view; it also enables 
us to put the finger on what Wittgenstein found to be absurd in Russell’s own philosophical 
project: «The apparatus constructed by the philosophers who want to «redo» (refaire) 
                                                          
127 Ludwig Wittgenstein, TLP (5.5563). 
128 Bertrand Russell, «Introduction» in Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, p. 7. 
 62 
 
language is not a machine that would work ideally in real conditions; it is rather ideal in 
the very sense that it does not work»129. The philosophical efforts deployed by Russell to 
construct a perfect language can hence be seen as an attempt to «substitute an empirical 
mechanism that fulfills its normal function to the general satisfaction of everyone by an 
ideal, on-paper schema, not seeing that the legitimate use that we could eventually make of 
this schema is completely different from our use of the real machine»130. 
The linguistic Rousseauism that Wittgenstein entertains will be formulated even 
more explicitly in his Philosophical Investigations: «When I talk about language (words, 
sentences, etc.) I must speak the language of every day. Is this language somehow too 
coarse and material for what we want to say? Then how is another one to be constructed?—
And how strange that we should be able to do anything at all with the one we have!»131 The 
abandonment of the technical and heavily philosophical vocabulary that characterized the 
pages of the Tractatus, doubled with the confessed (or unmasked) abandonment of any 
ambition towards the elaboration of a general theory of meaning will greatly annoy Russell, 
and this will bring him to say of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy that it «serves, in the best 
of cases, as a weak auxiliary to lexicography, and is, in the worst of cases, an idle distraction 
for tea time»132, and that it is nothing else that a «pathetic exhortation to intellectual 
laziness»36. Wittgenstein’s belief in the «good nature» of language enables us to come back 
to our main object, that is to say the real nature of our philosophical problems. Indeed, if 
our ordinary language is truly complete, that is to say, if it is truly logical, it therefore means 
                                                          
129 Jacques Bouveresse, La parole malheureuse, p. 10. 
130 Jacques Bouveresse, La parole malheureuse, p. 10. 
131 Ludwig Wittgenstein, PI (§120).  
132 Bertrand Russell, Histoire de mes idées philosophiques, p. 271. (The translation is mine.) 
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that any attempt to ‘complete’ it, or to ‘replace’ it, or to ‘reject’ it, is to be understood as an 
absurd and superfluous enterprise, a nonsensical one, which will lead Wittgenstein to say 
that «most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not 
false but nonsensical. (…) Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise 
from our failure to understand the logic of our language»133. 
As I have said earlier, one of the ideas that pervades the entirety of Wittgenstein’s 
thought, as much in the Tractatus than in the Investigations, is the idea that philosophy is 
a ‘critique of language’. And as David Pears points out in his Wittgenstein (1971), this 
critique greatly resembles the Kantian critique: in the same way that the Kantian critique 
aimed at tracing the limits of thought, the Wittgensteinian critique aims to trace the limits 
of our language. In other words, it aims to trace the frontiers separating sense from 
nonsense. However, if this frontier in the Tractatus is determined (and fixed) by the fact 
that language shares with the world a common logical structure – «My work has extended 
from the foundations of logic to the nature of the world»134 –, if then this frontier is uniform 
and rigid (because, in a certain sense, it is imposed by the ‘nature of the world’), in the 
Investigations, this frontier will be, so to say, scattered in the midst of our linguistic 
practices135,136. In a certain sense, it is as if the Tractatus aims at tracing the frontiers of a 
                                                          
133 Ludwig Wittgenstein, TLP (4.003). 
134 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914-1916 (2.8.1916). 
135 The emphasis on the word ‘our’ as much stresses the ‘plurality’ of these practices as it stresses the fact 
they are ‘ours’. 
136 Indeed, in the Investigations, Wittgenstein explicitly rejects the attempt made in the Tractatus to give an 
uniformed image of language, an image of language as doing one thing: «It is interesting to compare the 
multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and 
sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language. (Including the author of the Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus)» (§23). As Bouveresse says in La parole malheureuse: «there are as many functions 
of language as there are language games and in a certain sense language does not exist, only language games 
do» (p. 25). 
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country according to the immutable, already there elements of a natural geography (a 
country would hence be limited by a mountain chain, by a river, by a forest, etc.), while the 
Investigations aims at doing the same thing, but by replacing this work of delimitation in 
the midst of our ‘form of life’; meaning that this work would be accomplished in a given 
cultural, political, diplomatic, social, economic, etc., context that would determine in part 
the traits of our linguistic practices and the way by which we give meaning to our words. 
It would hence be impossible to foresee the fluctuations and transformations that these 
frontiers will go through; and it would be even more impossible and senseless to fixate, a 
priori and once and for all the place (lieu) of these frontiers separating sense from nonsense, 
which was the aim of the Tractatus.  
Who says ‘frontier’, or ‘limit’, also says ‘transgression’ and ‘illicit vagabondage’, 
and it is well in these terms that we must, according to Wittgenstein, qualify the things that 
philosophers have said: «The objects of the material world participate to the Ideas», «God 
exists», «The morally right action is the one that produces the most good for the most 
people», «Reality is rational», «Philosophy is an activity that creates concepts», but also, 
«The world is all that is the case», and «A proposition is a picture of reality». The 
philosopher is hence according to Wittgenstein, one who is brought to cross the frontiers 
delimiting the territory of language, thinking that by doing so, they are discovering 
unknown lands (terres jusqu’à-là inconnues), when in fact, we would be much closer to 
the truth by comparing them to Don Quixote, who believes that he is fighting giants when 
he is in fact brandishing his rusty sword towards indifferent windmills. The philosopher is, 
however, in a much worse position than Don Quixote, for if the latter finds in his delusions 
a home in which he can exercise and live his chivalrous impulses, if he has l’esprit 
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tranquille (tranquillity of mind) in the sense that his delusions enable him to be what he 
believes he must be (a knight), if then these chivalrous delusions become for Don Quixote, 
in a certain sense, a language, complete and logical, the philosopher on the other hand is 
tormented precisely by the fact that he or she is the prisoner of a problem, dispossessed of 
any home, and frustrated by their less than convincing attempts at building one. 
This feeling of frustration, this preoccupation about the real signification of a 
concept like «Freedom» or «Good» is, maybe, in fact, but one of the two sides of the coin 
that is the «original philosophical experience» that I mentioned earlier, the other side 
manifesting itself in the shapes of doubt, doubt about the talents and capacities of language 
in general, or about our language in its most daily and ordinary traits. Indeed, as Nietzsche 
says, «language is the most familiar thing of all; one really needs to be a philosopher to 
occupy oneself with it» («Le langage est la chose la plus quotidienne de toutes: il faut être 
un philosophe pour s’en occuper»), and what pushes the philosopher to occupy themselves 
with language – «occupy» in any sense of the term: «take care of», «pass the time», 
«colonize», etc. – is the fact that the philosopher begins to entertain doubts concerning what 
language can do: «The problem is fundamentally one of doubting, of doubting the 
reliability of one’s words, of doubting the ‘content’ of one’s thought. It is, therefore, 
fundamentally a sceptical problem»137. Now, if the original impulse of philosophy is 
‘sentimental’, and if the original philosophical feeling is not wonder, but rather, as 
Wittgenstein says it is, preoccupation, and finally, if this preoccupation is coupled with 
doubt concerning our language, it seems important to state more precisely what leads the 
                                                          
137 Richard A. Gilmore, Philosophical Health, p. 103. 
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philosopher to doubt, what leads them to «take care of language», and what leads them to 
get lost within their own language (perdre son chemin au sein de son propre langage)138. 
An exploration of what one could call the main139 ‘philosophical hallucinogens’ will not 
only help us to better understand what Wittgenstein means to say when he talks of 
philosophical ‘illusions’ or ‘confusions’, but will also enable us to measure one of the 
distances separating the Tractatus from the Investigations. If, has I have said earlier, «under 
a visible discontinuity of his thought lies a continuous philosophical «program», in the 
same way that, under the discontinuity of our clothing one single body is hidden», it is 
nonetheless important to recognize that there are, between these two periods, differences 
in emphases and focus on one or the other of these hallucinogens, differences that I will 
point out dans un second temps. 
 
B.1 Philosophical Hallucinogens. 
Confusion between the grammatical surface and the logical depth. In a footnote to his book 
Our Knowledge of the External World, Russell explains his reasons for rejecting Hegelian 
logic: «Hegel's argument in this portion of his Logic depends throughout upon confusing 
the "is" of predication, as in "Socrates is mortal", with the "is" of identity, as in "Socrates 
is the philosopher who drank the hemlock". Owing to this confusion, he thinks that 
"Socrates" and "mortal" must be identical. Seeing that they are different, he does not infer, 
as others would, that there is a mistake somewhere, but that they exhibit "identity in 
difference." Again, Socrates is particular, "mortal" is universal. Therefore, he says, since 
                                                          
138 Jacques Bouveresse, La parole malheureuse, p. 299. 
139 This ‘list’ does not pretend to be complete, nor exclusive: Cf. Hacker, Insight and Illusion, Chapter V. 
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Socrates is mortal, it follows that the particular is the universal taking the "is" to be 
throughout expressive of identity. But to say "the particular is the universal" is self-
contradictory. Again Hegel does not suspect a mistake but proceeds to synthesize particular 
and universal in the individual, or concrete universal. This is an example of how, for want 
of care at the start, vast and imposing systems of philosophy are built upon stupid and trivial 
confusions, which, but for the almost incredible fact that they are unintentional, one would 
be tempted to characterize as puns»140. Russell explains the distraction (égarement) of the 
Hegelian logic by the fact that it attributes to the two different instances of the verb «To 
be» («Socrates is mortal» and «Socrates is the philosopher who drank the hemlock») the 
same logical function when in fact they do not at all play the same logical role, the first 
being a «‘is’ of predication», while the second is a «‘is’ of identity». Hegel would hence 
have been misguided, in his reasoning, by the apparent grammatical similitude between 
the two propositions, losing sight of their real logical difference, thereby constructing a 
faulty syllogism.  
(Digression). In the first moments of this chapter, I mentioned that it would not be 
completely false to say that the Classical German Tradition of Language Criticism that 
Iliescu talks about relocates what Vuillemin considers to be the fundamental question of 
philosophy (the interrogation concerning the separation of reality from mere appearance), 
relocating it within language. I also mentioned that this relocation leads to a reorientation 
of the task of the philosopher: the latter no longer aims at tracing the essential traits of 
reality, and is no longer inhabited by the desire to submit the world by locking it up in a 
                                                          
140 Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, pp.48-49, footnote 1. 
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system141; the task of the philosopher rather becomes an essentially critical one and, in a 
certain sense, a negative one, in the sense that the philosopher will try to separate the 
legitimate claims to truth from the illegitimate ones, claims made by philosophy, by 
religion, by politics, etc. The two most subversive representatives of this tradition, 
Nietzsche and Mauthner, will however trace the line a little too far, in the sense that they 
do not attack specific and particular claims to truth; they rather attack the very notion of 
‘claim to truth’ made through language. As it has been mentioned earlier on, Mauthner 
develops a radical form of linguistic nihilism according to which language cannot be a tool 
of knowledge: «there are no truths, in the sense that we generally imagine: there are only 
things that we believe and things that we do not believe»142. If, according to Mauthner, the 
ills of language are not curable through means of language, it seems that the only possible 
remedy – and it is an absolutely radical one – is complete and total silence143. Although the 
Nietzschean critique follows that of Mauthner in terms of its radical character – «language 
is systematically misleading because it simplifies and schematizes, because it introduces 
an order, constancies and regularities where, in reality, there are none»144 – the remedy that 
he proposes is in no way as radical and as overwhelming as the diagnosis: indeed, if 
language is a lie that we systematically tell to ourselves, Nietzsche’s proposition is to 
reconcile ourselves with this lie, to lie joyfully, to lie in a matter that is creative and 
artistic145. The cure is hence not to be found in the linguistic formulation of particular truths 
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143 Jacques Bouveresse, «Langage et illusion», p. 6. 
144 Jacques Bouveresse, «Langage et illusion», p. 9. 
145 Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, Introduction théorique sur la vérité et le mensonge au sens extra-moral. 
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(and even less so, in the formulation of universal truths), but in a truthful relationship with 
language, henceforth understood and recognized as being the place of illusion; an illusion 
that I must make mine: «the lie uttered for the sake of pleasure is no longer a lie, and only 
art is capable of lying for the sake of pleasure, only art is capable to say the truth»146. 
The linguistic status of these critical remarks, the fact that they are articulated by 
the means of this tool – language – that is de facto guilty, is of course problematic: how 
can one talk of language in a meaningful and truthful way, without falling back into the 
linguistic illusion that one aims to denounce? I mention this to show, even if it is only in a 
schematic and minimal matter, that the radicality of these critiques of language does not 
change the fact that they represent a philosophical position that has a fragile and limited 
status147. Also, and this enables me to come back to our business, I find these remarks to 
be important and interesting when trying to situate the critiques of language that will be 
articulated by the ‘Founding Fathers’ of analytic philosophy, that is to say, Frege, Russell, 
and in particular, Wittgenstein. If Nietzsche and Mauthner’s aim is language in general, it 
is difficult to understand what these critiques can mean for us, linguistic creatures, and what 
we are supposed to draw from them: yes, those critiques inform us of the fact that language 
drowns us in a state of profound sleep, but how can we talk of sleep when there is no 
possibility for us to wake up. The ‘Founding Fathers’ will be, on this level, less 
metaphysical in the sense that, according to them, «the fact that language can give rise to 
confusions and illusions that necessitate an effort in philosophical clarification does not 
                                                          
146 Jacques Bouveresse, «Langage et illusion», p. 10. 
147 I do not want to spend too much time on this question, knowing that my claim would demand a long, 
articulated and complex treatment. 
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constitute an argument in favour of a form or another of linguistic scepticism or 
pessimism»148. Indeed, this kind of reasoning seems to suggest something similar to saying 
that when we walk, we don’t really move because, sometimes, when we walk, we trip and 
fall, or some other times, we walk on the spot. The ‘Founding Fathers’, on the contrary, do 
not question our capacity to articulate linguistic propositions that are true149. They are rather 
interested by the necessary and sufficient conditions for the articulation of these 
propositions, and in this sense, they showed great interest for the question «what is a 
proposition?». Hence, if the tradition of language criticism relocated the frontier separating 
reality from appearance from the world to language, the ‘Fathers’ are the ones that truly 
rearticulate and change the terms in which we understand this frontier: the frontier aims at 
separating, in the midst of our linguistic uses, or meaningful uses from our meaningless 
ones; to separate our legitimate linguistic gestures from those which are not. The primordial 
sin will hence not be to say something that is false, but to speak nonsense. 
This enables us to come back to the distinction, discussed earlier on, between the 
grammatical surface of our statements and their logical depth. Indeed, if the ‘Fathers’ tried 
to trace a frontier separating what is meaningful from what is meaningless, the essential or 
cardinal problem of philosophy will be that of the proposition: what is common to all 
propositions, to all meaningful linguistic statements? The initial answer that will be given 
to this question will take the form of an oscillation between rejection and approval: a 
rejection of the content of the Aristotelian answer, and an approval of the form of Aristotle’s 
answer; the form of the answer being: what is common to all propositions is the fact that 
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they all share a certain logical form or structure. Aristotle had identified this structure as 
being essentially predicative, as having the form ‘S is P’, and this predicative form has been 
accepted or taken for granted by the philosophical tradition up until, notably, Frege and 
Russell, at the end of the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth century150. 
Although Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein offer different answers regarding the content of 
the logical structure of the proposition, the common ground to their respective answers is 
their rejection of the Aristotelian predicative form; not because it would be false, but rather 
because it is limited and because it «misses some important distinctions»151. What remains 
however, is the idea that all propositions share a certain logical form and that the presence 
or the absence of such a form is the ultimate criterion when trying to determine whether a 
statement is meaningful or not. 
Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein’s quest of the logical structure of the proposition 
demands and requires, and this is a crucial point, a particular form of attention to the mode 
of expression of our propositions, that is to say, to their mode of grammatical presentation, 
and a particular attention also to the fact that this mode of grammatical presentation can 
easily lead us astray. Indeed, the Aristotelian predicative form, and it is one of its dangers, 
is greatly rooted in our ordinary ways of speaking: «Patrick is gone», «Patrick is a student», 
«Patrick is in love», etc., these three propositions have a similar grammatical surface and 
can easily be understood as sharing a common logical form: ‘S is P’. What is however 
neglected or forgotten is the nature of the predicate that is attributed to the subject. 
Understanding these propositions has sharing a same logical form leads us to oversee the 
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logical differences that exist between these three predicates. Or again, «God exists» and 
«Pink Floyd’s last album rocks my socks off»: the similar grammatical surface of these two 
propositions hides the fact that, as Kant showed152, existence is not a predicate that we can 
attribute to a given subject, in the same way that we could say of my hair that it is brown. 
To say «God exists» is a way to affirm «the non-emptiness of a certain set – i.e., at least 
one thing falls under the concept ‘( ) is God’ – and it is a presupposition for attributing any 
properties to anything in that set»153. In other words, even though these two statements 
share a common grammatical form, the first is actually a semi-proposition (hence, it is not 
a proposition at all), and resembles a mathematical ‘equation’ like «5 + ». The logical 
reality of the proposition is hence separated from its grammatical mode of apparition. 
Furthermore, the grammatical appearance often hides the logical reality of the proposition, 
a reality that is hence far from being evident: «Language disguises thought. So much, that 
from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought 
beneath it»154. And it is precisely the hidden character of the true logical form that 
necessitates a particular type of philosophical effort, a work of logical clarification, which 
leads Wittgenstein to say: «the object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. 
Philosophy is not a theory but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of 
elucidations. The result of philosophy is not a number of “philosophical propositions”, but 
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to make propositions clear. Philosophy should make clear and delimit sharply the thoughts 
which otherwise are, as it were, opaque and blurred»155. (End of the digression). 
This opposition between «apparent logical form» and «real logical form» is 
explicitly retaken by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus (TLP, 4.0031), and in the 
Investigations (PI, §664), although the meaning of this opposition and what it demands in 
terms of philosophical work will of course vary. At the time of the Tractatus, although the 
propositions of our everyday language are well in order (TLP, 5.5563), hence although they 
are logical, this does not necessarily mean that this ‘logical order’ is accessible and visible 
to the eye of the ‘profane’: indeed, «Man possesses the ability to construct languages 
capable of expressing every sense, without having any idea how each word has meaning or 
what its meaning is – just as people speak without knowing how the individual sounds are 
produced»156. For Wittgenstein, this logical order is a little bit like the roots of a tree: even 
though it is they that give life to the trunk and its branches, they are nonetheless hidden and 
buried. The point to remember is that there is a gap between the real logical form of a given 
proposition – that is to say, the fact that this proposition is a picture of reality – and its 
apparent grammatical form, and that it is from this gap that a good part of our philosophical 
problems comes157. For example, someone who, like Hegel, speaks philosophically without 
paying enough attention to the different logical functions of the words he uses will produce 
nonsense. This gap between ‘apparent form’ and ‘real form’ leads the philosopher to 
deduce absurd conclusions from valid premises; but this possible confusion is not only to 
                                                          
155 Ludwig Wittgenstein, TLP (4.112). 
156 Ludwig Wittgenstein, TLP (4.002). 
157 P.M.S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion, p. 13. 
 74 
 
be found in the philosophical developments that the philosopher calls ‘answer’: it can also 
pervade the philosophical development at its source, that is to say: it is well possible that 
what is perceived as an authentic philosophical problem is in fact but a pseudo-problem, 
because the pseudo-problem and the real problem share a similar grammatical form. For 
example, the question «Is the cat in the room?» shares with the question «Is Beauty in the 
painting?», or «Is God in the world?», a similar grammatical form that could push a 
philosopher to answer «yes» or «no», an answer accompanied by a such or such form of 
justification: «But of course! Beauty is in the painting! After all, it is the painting that is 
beautiful, and not my eye!», or «But of course not! Beauty is in the eye of the beholder! 
After all, beauty is merely a question of taste!». The apparent logical form of these 
‘questions’ confines the philosopher in a cul-de-sac, and makes him prisoner of a, so to 
say, geographical dichotomy, since the controversy revolves around the location of beauty 
(is beauty in the eye, or in the work of art?); a dichotomy only suggested by the form of the 
question, a form that masks its own non-sense. Borrowing Wittgenstein’s example: «They 
(most of our philosophical questions and propositions) belong to the same class as the 
question whether the good is more or less identical than the beautiful»158. 
In the Investigations, the distinction between ‘superficial grammar’ and ‘deep 
grammar’ is maintained, but the axis of reference of the whole work of investigations has 
been turned159. The superficial grammar makes us lose sight of «the prodigious diversity of 
all the everyday language-games because the clothing of our language makes everything 
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alike.»160. If, in the Tractatus, the superficial grammar keeps us from seeing if a phrase is 
really a proposition (in the technical sense of the term), that is to say, if a phrase is really a 
picture of reality, in the Investigations, this is no longer the (only) question: superficial 
grammar «frequently leads us to misunderstand the use of words»161, and after all, «the 
meaning of a word is its use in the language»162. A word hence has, for the second 
Wittgenstein, a signification, insofar as we use it, and not because it would be intrinsically 
meaningful, significant, signifying, or useful: «The truth is that counting has proved to pay. 
– ‘Then do you want to say that ‘being true’ means: being usable (or useful)?’ – No, not 
that; but that it can’t be said of the series of natural numbers – any more than of our language 
– that it is true, but that it is usable, and above all, it is used»163. That being said, the 
superficial grammar keeps us from seeing the effective use of our concepts and also, the 
variety of these usages. For example, the idea that to all substantive must correspond a 
‘substance’; which leads us naturally to ask, in the same way that we would ask the question 
«What is a horse?», «What is Justice?». Some, like Plato, would answer by reference to an 
Idea or Form of Justice, and others, seeing the difficulties of such a position will answer 
that there is no such ‘thing’ as a ‘substance’ called ‘Justice’. For Wittgenstein, these two 
attitudes are sickly in the sense that the philosophers believes, unjustly, that we must answer 
the question «What is Justice?», due to its grammatical similitude with the question «What 
is a horse?», in the same way, that is to say, with a definition that would be able encompass 
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all of our different uses of the word «Justice»; and if such a definition could not be found, 
that this would lead us to believe that the word «Justice» is in reality senseless. But, 
«consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". (…) – Don't say: 
"There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games'"—but look and 
see whether there is anything common to all.—For if you look at them you will not see 
something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them 
at that. To repeat: don't think, but look!»164. Hence, whether at the time of the Tractatus, or 
at the time of the Investigations, «distrust of grammar is the first requisite for 
philosophizing»165. The philosopher cannot simply hover over the waters of language166: 
they must explore its depths, whether we are talking of the depths of logical analysis 
(Tractatus), or the depths of our linguistic uses (Philosophical Investigations). 
Temptation of an image too strong for a weak mind. The origin of the second form 
of philosophical confusion can be found, ironically maybe, in the metaphor that 
Wittgenstein uses to talk about language in the Investigations: «Our language can be seen 
as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses 
with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs 
with straight regular streets and uniform houses»167. If we take this image seriously, it is 
not rare at all to talk of place as being an iconic place (lieu inconique), for example, Signal 
Hill in St. John’s, the Olympic Stadium in Montréal, or the Eiffel Tower in Paris, even 
though these places are on the same logical plane as the other places, in the sense that they 
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are but one place amongst many others in a given city (ces lieux ne sont qu’un lieu parmi 
d’autres dans la ville en question). They are nonetheless considered, for a number of 
reasons (touristic attraction, historical importance, funny or horrible anecdote, etc.) – 
reasons that are contingent and, up to a certain point, accidental –, as being «important», 
«legendary», «must-see», «unavoidable», etc. In the same way, there are certain images or 
expressions in our language that have become important for a number of reasons that are, 
according to Wittgenstein, accidental and contingent. The error of the philosopher for 
Wittgenstein is to take these images too seriously (why so serious?, he asks), to take them 
out of their contingent, historical, accidental and contextual environment, and to give them 
all the weight of ‘philosophical necessity’. It is not the importance of these images and 
expressions that Wittgenstein is putting into question (after all, why should he care if the 
Eiffel Tower is important or not!), but rather, the swelling of this importance into something 
more, into necessity: «The correctness of such pictures qua pictures, is not in dispute; it is 
rather their application which is»168.  
An example maybe: those who, when concerned with questions of political 
philosophy, think that a political problem can only be truly understood and resolved when 
we study it through the right-left paradigm. The comprehension and the resolution of a 
political problem would hence necessarily be linked to this comprehensive paradigm, 
which becomes, in a certain sense, the logical space of politics. However, these persons 
forget that the expression ‘right-left’ has a rather short history, and that to talk of necessity 
here is quite a difficult thing to justify or defend: the distinction appears indeed during the 
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Première Assemblée nationale constituante of 1789, as partisans of a royal veto sat to the 
‘right’ of the president of the Assembly, while opponents sat at his ‘left’. Although, yes, 
the expression ‘right-left’ is very important if one wants to understand our current political 
situation(s), it is not, however, a sign of wisdom, according to Wittgenstein, to deduce from 
this importance the idea that this analytic-conceptual framework is necessary, or true, and 
it is even less a sign of wisdom to think that we could not try to understand politics through 
another framework. To partisans of such ideas, Wittgenstein would probably say: «How 
would we talk of politics if the chamber of the Assemblée constituante of 1789 had been 
round? Or triangular? Or…?» What we have to keep in mind here is the following: it is not 
because an idea is important, or useful, that it is necessary, and even less, that it is 
necessarily true. As Rorty says: «images rather than propositions, metaphors rather than 
affirmations, determine most of our philosophical convictions»169 
Scientific temptation of philosophy. In 1914, in a conference honouring the thought 
of Herbert Spencer170, Russell says that traditional philosophers have made two types of 
mistakes: firstly, a series of thinkers have conceived philosophy has being a way to answer 
an ensemble of questions emanating from ethical or religious considerations and 
motivations, having in mind thinkers like Plato, Spinoza and Hegel (On the Scientific 
Method in Philosophy, p. 97). However, these motivations, according to Russell, lure us 
away from what is (or should be) an even more fundamental motivation, as we should be 
motivated by Truth: too easily, ethics become moralizing, and all too easily, religion 
                                                          
169 Richard Rorty, L’homme spéculaire, p. 22. 
170 Bertrand Russell, «On Scientific Method in Philosophy», in Mysticism and Logic and Other 
Essays, pp. 97-124. 
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becomes dogmatic, and possibly violent171. There is secondly a series of philosophers - like 
Leibniz, Locke and Hume - that, although they were motivated by properly scientific 
considerations, could not guide philosophy on what Kant called the «certain path of 
science». Indeed, they have, according to Russell, tried to encompass the results of the 
sciences of their time in an even more general philosophical discourse, while they should 
have concentrated their attention on the scientific method, which is what philosophy should 
do: «it is not results, but methods that can be transferred with profit from the sphere of the 
special sciences to the sphere of philosophy. What I wish to bring to your notice is the 
possibility and importance of applying to philosophical problems certain broad principles 
of method which have been found successful in the study of scientific questions»172. For 
Russell, the future of philosophy can only be bright if philosophy rejects its religious and 
ethical pathos, as well as the philosophical and methodological wanderings that they bring 
along with them; philosophy must on the contrary borrow a method that has made its mark, 
that is to say, the method of the natural sciences. 
If very quickly, Russell and Wittgenstein both agreed on what has to be the object 
of philosophical studies, «the logical form of scientific propositions»173, for Russell, the 
philosophical enterprise, mirroring the scientific enterprise and its method, must be 
«piecemeal and tentative (…); above all, it will be able to invent hypotheses which, even if 
they are not wholly true, will yet remain fruitful after the necessary corrections have been 
                                                          
171 Cf. Jacques Bouveresse, Que peut-on faire de la religion? (2011), in which Bouveresse exposes Russell’s 
critique of organized religion. 
172 Bertrand Russell, «On Scientific Method in Philosophy», p. 98. 
173 Ludwig Wittgenstein, «Notes on Logic. September 1913», p. 170 
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made»174. Wittgenstein, in 1915, barely a year after Russell’s conference, condemns 
univocally the Russellian program of a scientific philosophy: «Russell’s method in his 
‘Scientific method in philosophy’ is simply a retrogression from the method of physics»175. 
Indeed, for Wittgenstein, the scientific proposition is a picture of reality. The 
philosophical enterprise of a scientific proposition, however, is not interested in the 
proposition’s ‘factual content’; it is rather interested in what precedes the truth or the 
falsehood of a proposition, that is to say, the fact that we can give meaning to that 
proposition: «What corresponds in reality to a proposition depends upon whether it is true 
or false. But we must be able to understand a proposition without knowing if it is true or 
false. What we know when we understand a proposition is this: we know what is the case 
if it is true and what is the case if it is false. But we do not necessarily know whether it is 
actually true or false»176. If the pictures of reality, like a photograph, can be more or less 
precise, or clear, the «relation of depicting that holds between language and the world»177 
cannot be unclear or fuzzy, «for what would be a mere approximation in science would be 
nonsense in philosophy»178. The groping (tâtonnante), experimental and gradual method 
of science cannot be that of philosophy. This impossibility will be even more abrupt and 
real in the Tractatus (as compared to the «Notes on Logic» of 1913) in the sense that, 
although the object of philosophy remains unchanged, philosophy is no longer considered 
                                                          
174 Bertrand Russell, «On Scientific Method in Philosophy», p. 113. 
175 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914-1916 (1.5.1915). 
176 Ludwig Wittgenstein, «Notes on logic. September 1913», pp. 170-171. Cf. TLP (4.024). 
177 Ludwig Wittgenstein, TLP (4.014). 
178 P.M.S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion, p. 9. 
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by Wittgenstein to be the «doctrine of the logical form», because logic cannot be said, it 
can only be shown179. 
Hence, from the time of the Tractatus, the philosophical enterprise is totally 
separated from the scientific enterprise, separation that will be reaffirmed by Wittgenstein’s 
later distinction between empirical, scientific problems, and conceptual, philosophical 
problems. The second Wittgenstein will, in a certain way, go even further, in the sense that 
even the idea of talking about the logical structure of language180 (which is essential thesis 
of the Tractatus) will be understood as participating to the scientific temptation: this idea 
pushes us to think of language as one thing, unified and uniform, while language should 
actually be seen or approached as a tool box, containing many tools having different 
functions181. However, from beginning to end, Wittgenstein strongly considered the very 
idea of a ‘scientific philosophy’ to be a pure (and dangerous) illusion for the philosopher 
and for philosophy itself. 
                                                          
179 Ludwig Wittgenstein, TLP (4.121) and mostly (4.1212): «What can be shown, cannot be said». The reason 
for this is that seems to stem from Wittgenstein’s pictorial theory of the proposition (see pp. 104-106). Indeed, 
the proposition is a picture of a fact (‘the snow is white’ is a picture of the fact that the snow is white). 
However the ‘picturing activity’ of the proposition (which depends on logic) is not itself in the proposition, 
as one of its elements. Rather, Wittgenstein says, it shows itself through the proposition. Let’s turn to the 
photographical analogy. I take a picture of a cat. Now, in the picture (of my cat), there is my cat. But what 
you don’t see is me taking the picture. You could of course imagine that someone takes a picture of me taking 
a picture of my cat. But then, the same problem emerges again: that someone taking the picture is not in the 
picture, and so on. The ‘proof’ of the ‘picturing activity’ a proposition is in the pudding, so to say. Indeed, to 
try to talk about language would not be a metalinguistic gesture, but would remain a gesture that is made 
within language and would not say anything about language. To say it bluntly: to speak about language, one 
would have to be outside of it, but this is impossible; we do not have access to this outside. We can however 
see the logic of language in the use we make of it and in the way that we are well able to speak about facts of 
the world. In other words, to speak about logic would be to give another example of it, but this would have 
no value in terms of an explanation of logic (which is what a philosophy of logic would claim to do). 
180 And even more so, the idea that this structure of language is identical to that of the world. 
181 Ludwig Wittgenstein, PI (§11).  
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Natural and metaphysical temptation of reason. I alluded earlier to the Kantian 
resonance of the Wittgensteinian critique of language. The Kantian enterprise indeed starts 
with the idea that traditional metaphysical thought has wandered, that it bit off more than it 
could chew, by trying to erect a scientific discourse on what can only be an object for faith: 
«Kant’s critique of speculative reason denied knowledge to make room for faith»182. In 
other words, the Kantian critique aimed at showing the limited character of thought and its 
incapability to think the infinite, to think what does not have the lineaments of the object, 
hence its incapability to do something more or better than thinking183, which is what 
speculative reason tried to do before Kant. However, this critique does recognize that there 
is, for humanity, such a natural tendency towards the idea of a thought exceeding thought, 
a metaphysical desire. At the end of his Conference on Ethics, Wittgenstein says something 
quite similar: « hopeless. Ethics (…) can be no science. What it says does not add to our 
knowledge in any sense. But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I 
personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it.»184. But to 
«respect» something or someone, a friend or a tendency, does not exclude the idea that one 
should correct that friend or that tendency: «If you discover a flaw in your friend, correct 
him in secret (…). Corrections, indeed, are good and are more profitable than a blind eye 
and a mute friendship. If your friend is offended, correct him nonetheless: do not be afraid 
to insist even if he does not take pleasure in the sour taste of correction. It is written in the 
Book of Proverbs that wounds at the hand of a friend are more bearable than the kisses of 
                                                          
182 P.M.S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion, p. 25. 
183 Emmanuel Lévinas, Totalité et infini. Essai sur l’extériorité, p. 41. 
184 Ludwig Wittgenstein, «Conférence sur l’Éthique» dans Lectures et conversations sur l’esthétique, la 
psychologie et la croyance religieuse suivie de Conférence sur l’Éthique, p. 155. 
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flatterers»185. The philosophical method proposed by Wittgenstein at the end of the 
Tractatus does in fact resemble a certain type of ‘fraternal correction’: «The correct method 
in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. 
propositions of natural science—i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy—
and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate 
to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Although it 
would not be satisfying to the other person—he would not have the feeling that we were 
teaching him philosophy—this method would be the only strictly correct one»186. 
If for Kant pre-critical metaphysics is an attempt made by finite thought to 
encompass the infinite in the form of (metaphysical) knowledge, if it is an attempt to bite 
off more than it could chew, metaphysics is for Wittgenstein, at the time of the Tractatus, 
an attempt, as much as a temptation, to go, through language, from the world understood 
as a collection of facts of which we can speak (this is true, that is false…) to Reality 
understood as a world of facts «collectively organized as a unique whole»187; an attempt to 
bite off what cannot be chewed; and what pushes us to try to describe reality as a limited 
whole is a «feeling» (TLP, 6.45) according to which «even when all possible scientific 
questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched»188. As 
Wittgenstein says at the end of his Conference, the idea is not to condemn such feeling that, 
«as a ‘way of feeling’, and as an ‘attitude towards life’, seems to contain a certain type of 
                                                          
185 St. Ambroise, De officiis ministrorum III, 125-135, quoted in «La correction fraternelle», available online 
at: http://www.josemariaescriva.info/docs/correction-fraternelle.pdf. 
186 Ludwig Wittgenstein, TLP (6.53). 
187 Jacques Bouveresse, Wittgenstein : la rime et la raison. Science, éthique et esthétique, p. 43. 
188 Ludwig Wittgenstein, TLP (6.52). 
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irreplaceable wisdom»189, a feeling that probably is an essential element of human 
existence. What is however condemnable is to think that these feelings have a properly 
cognitive structure, that is to say, that it would be legitimately possible to talk about them 
in the same way, or in a way similar to the way that I can talk about this cat being on the 
sofa. If «the limits of my language mean the limits of my world»190, it is hence impossible 
to get out of the world to talk about it as if it was just an object amongst others, or as if it 
was a meta-object. The feeling that pushes us in that direction must, according to 
Wittgenstein, be lived in the silence that is life, silence that is prescribed at the end of the 
Tractatus (TLP, 7), and any attempt to say this feeling is as futile as the attempt to see the 
eye with which one sees (TLP, 5.633). 
Things are slightly different in the Investigations. Metaphysics is described as an 
opting out of the ordinary conditions of our language games. It is described as the fact of 
extirpating or of tearing out a word from its semantic ecological condition, as to give to 
this word what would be an ‘absolute meaning’191, that is to say, a philosophical meaning, 
a meaning that is wholly independent of the ordinary ways by which we give meaning to 
this word. What makes us do such a thing is a feeling similar to what Wittgenstein says in 
the Tractatus, a feeling that a complete picture of reality would leave our Lebensprobleme 
untouched (TLP, 6.52): «the problem is that feeling or thinking or believing that we know 
something, or that we can say something, does not guarantee that we do know it or that we 
                                                          
189 Jacques Bouveresse, La rime et la raison, p. 35. 
190 Ludwig Wittgenstein, TLP (5.6). 
191 The idea of an ‘absolute meaning’ is a reference to the fact of attributing an absolute value to a fact, which 
is nonsensical, as compared to the fact of attributing a relative value to a fact; distinction that Wittgenstein 
speaks of in his Conference on Ethics. 
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can legitimately say it. There seems to be some extra thing that must be there to engage 
with the world»192. This metaphysical tendency that I have talked about, this tendency that 
makes us, in the Tractatus, want to get out of the world and to take it as an object of which 
we can speak of, or that makes us, in the Investigations, want to tear out a word from its 
normal context and try to give it a philosophical meaning, this tendency is hence, and I 
insist, doubled by a feeling of doubt concerning, again, the talents and capacities of our 
language. 
 
B.2 Nuances. 
As I said earlier, these different ‘philosophical hallucinogens’ will play a more or less 
prominent role for Wittgenstein, whether we are talking of the time of the Tractatus, or of 
the time of the Investigations. Indeed, even though from the time of the Tractatus, 
Wittgenstein already believed that the idea of a philosophy guided by a methodology 
similar or identical to that of the sciences was a mistake that must be avoided – something 
that Russell and the members of the Vienna Circle did not do –, even though he well 
mentions this metaphysical tendency (TLP, 6.52) to say what is inexpressible, a careful 
reading of the Tractatus seems to suggest that, if one had to isolate the main and most 
important source of philosophical confusions, one would have to point fingers at language, 
or rather, its grammatical appearance, as most of our philosophical illusions are due to the 
fact that the superficial grammar of our language masks its true logical form: «In everyday 
language it very frequently happens that the same word has different modes of 
                                                          
192 Richard A. Gilmore, Philosophical Health, p. 102. 
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signification—and so belongs to different symbols—or that two words that have different 
modes of signification are employed in propositions in what is superficially the same way. 
(…) In this way the most fundamental confusions are easily produced (the whole of 
philosophy is full of them)»193. The fundamental confusions that Wittgenstein speaks of are 
here understood to be the effect of two things. Firstly, equivocation, meaning that a word 
may have multiple meanings, which brings the philosopher to accept a faulty argument. A 
good example of this would be Russell’s account of Hegel: a same word, ‘is’, is taken to 
have the same logical function when in fact, this is not the case. Another example, not as 
brilliantly exposed as Russell’s could be the following: the word «just» can as much be 
understood as meaning «accurate», or «exact», as it can mean «fair» or «in accord with 
justice». Now one might say that a legal decision that it is just (justice) because it is accurate 
(it follow the rules of jurisprudence). But one should not conflate those two meanings. 
Indeed, it would be senseless to speak of an equation is just in the sense that it is in 
accordance with justice. Secondly, two words that have a different logical role can very 
well be used in sentences that seem to share a same grammatical structure. The sentences 
«Somebody cares» and «Patrick cares». Grammatically identical, but one should not those 
grammatical subject do not have the same logical status: the latter’s «truth-conditions 
depend on the states and doings of some one individual in particular»194, of one ‘object’, 
while the former’s truth-conditions depends on the states and doings of any individual, of 
any object as long as they can be considered to be a somebody (some would say that a cat 
                                                          
193 Ludwig Wittgenstein, TLP (3.323, 3.324) (the emphasis is mine). 
194 Arthur Sullivan, «Introduction», p. 53. 
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is a somebody, others wouldn’t for example)195. A little further in the Tractatus, 
Wittgenstein tells us that «it is not humanly possible to gather immediately from it 
(everyday language) what the logic of language is»196 because «language disguises 
thought»70, which can lead the philosopher to leave the sphere of truth and falsehood, to 
enter the zone of the nonsensical. It is hence possible to say that at the time of the Tractatus, 
philosophy was born from the fact that the philosopher is misguided by language, that they 
are deceived by its grammatical apparition, an apparition that hides the real logical form 
of the proposition. Wittgenstein will later say that «philosophy is the bewitchment of our 
intelligence by means of language»197. Language plays, in a certain way, the role of the 
seducer to whom the philosopher gives up their linguistic innocence by diving into the 
waters of philosophical delirium. The philosopher is one who does not understand their 
own language, one who says «I don’t know my way about»198, one who finally follows 
                                                          
195 Wittgenstein gives very few examples of these ‘fundamental confusions’, but one could think of 
Heidegger’s meditation in What is Metaphysics, as quoted and popularized by Carnap: «What about this 
Nothing? … Does the Nothing exist only because the Not, i.e. the Negation, exists? Or is it the other way 
around? Does Negation and the Not exist only because the Nothing exists? … We assert: the Nothing is prior 
to the Not and the Negation…. Where do we seek the Nothing? How do we find the Nothing…. We know 
the Nothing…. Anxiety reveals the Nothing…. That for which and because of which we were anxious, was 
'really'—nothing. Indeed: the Nothing itself—as such—was present…. What about this Nothing?—The 
Nothing itself nothings.» Not only does Heidegger seem to be taking the word «nothing» as an object about 
which one could say a number of things, he also takes nothing as being a verb: Nothing nothings». Although 
Wittgenstein has expressed sympathy with certain existential (Kierkegaardian) elements of Heidegger’s 
Being and Time, it is not difficult to image that this kind of passage would be considered to be a great example 
of philosophical nonsense. Another example: What is existence? It is quite difficult to understand the meaning 
of this question considering the variety of things that we consider to be existing: love (or not), numbers, 
chairs, democracy (or not), God (or not), species, the unconscious, light, etc. What would it then mean to give 
a definition of existence? These two examples are examples of philosophical questions, but it would not be 
totally false to say that the worse examples of confusions are to be found in the answers that philosophers 
have given to these answers: «Relation without relation» as a description of the ethical relation for Lévinas, 
Plato’s transcendent Ideas, Descartes’ pineal gland as a point of contact between body and soul, Leibniz’s 
thesis that this world is the best possible world… 
196 Ludwig Wittgenstein, TLP (4.002).  
197 Ludwig Wittgenstein, PI (§109). 
198 Ludwig Wittgenstein, PI (§123). 
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naively the suggestions of language, which they follow to the point where language cesses 
to be language, to the point where language becomes nonsense. 
If in a certain sense, philosophy is due, in the Tractatus, to a type of pressure that 
language exerts on the intelligence of the philosopher, if then, the source of philosophy is 
exterior to the philosopher, the description of what Wittgenstein calls, in the Investigations, 
‘our philosophical illnesses’ seems to suggest that, on the contrary, the true source of our 
philosophical troubles is interior: the philosopher is, ultimately, responsible and guilty of 
their own confusions, regardless of the fact that language is still and always a continuous 
source of illusions and confusions, regardless of the fact that language is still able to 
bewitch and captivate the mind of the philosopher; regardless then of the fact that certain 
dominant and important images, which imprison philosophical thought, are to be found at 
the heart of language itself199. In a very limited sense, it would not be completely false to 
say that the philosopher resembles the man unable to live without the guidance of another 
that Kant describes at the beginning of his text, What is Enlightenment?: «This immaturity 
is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage 
to use it»200. The metaphysical temptation to which the philosopher succumbs, even if it 
presents itself as a disinterested desire to know the essence of reality, or of a thing in 
particular (freedom, good, meaning, god…), even if it presents itself as a desire to 
understand (PI, §89), is, in actuality, an urge to misunderstand (PI, §109), a will filled with 
                                                          
199 Jacques Bouveresse, La parole malheureuse, p. 305. Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, PI (§115). 
200 Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’. 
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philosophical expectations and prejudices concerning reality and the things that constitutes 
it: «Philosophy is born in prejudice – prejudice for a certain form of description»201.  
The lexical field that Wittgenstein unfolds to describe our philosophical problems 
is absolutely fascinating202: illusion (§§96, 97, 110, 308…), superstition (§§49, 110…), 
seduction (§93), temptation (§§92, 93, 95, 98, 101…), etc. If very early on, Wittgenstein 
has considered the task of philosophy to have a deeply moral dimension («…After an hour 
or two of complete silence, I told him, ‘Wittgenstein, are you thinking about logic or your 
sins? – Both’ he said, after which he fell back into silence»203), this is even more so in the 
second part of his thought, considering that the difficulty of our problems, if it stems in part 
from the difficulty of understanding the problem itself, is largely due to our attachment to 
certain expectations, exigencies, and to certain prejudices, which are quite hard to leave 
behind. The philosophical effort then, in that sense, is much more an effort of the will, than 
an effort of the intellect204: «What I should like to get at is for you not to agree with me in 
particular opinions but to investigate the matter in the right way. (…) I don’t try to make 
you believe something you don’t believe, but to make you do something you won’t do»205. 
And it is for this reason it seems that the philosophical activity is for Wittgenstein an 
eminently personal affaire206, which leads him to say that «the philosopher is not a citizen 
of any community of ideas. That is what makes him into a philosopher»207. Indeed, since 
our philosophical problems are not objective problems, meaning that anyone could simply 
                                                          
201 Alice Ambrose, quoting Wittgenstein, cited in Jacques Bouveresse, La parole malheureuse, p. 309. 
202 Richard A. Gilmore, Philosophical Health, p. 103. 
203 Jacques Bouveresse, La rime et la raison, p. 21. 
204 Jacques Bouveresse, Essais III : Wittgenstein et les sortilèges du langage, p. 7. 
205 Rush Rhees, Discussion of Wittgenstein, pp. 42-43. 
206 Jacques Bouveresse, Essais III, pp. 7-8. 
207 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel (§455). 
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look at the logic of our language and say ‘Yes! There is the problem!’, since then they are 
born out of certain temptations and tendencies to which the philosopher succumbs, a 
«community of ideas» cannot be of any help to the philosopher, in the sense that his 
problem is, precisely, his problem; it is him, after all, that is lost in the dark streets of his 
language, streets in which the non-philosophers have no problem finding their way 
(although the philosopher’s ‘communitarian contacts’ could help him, accessorily, a little 
bit like a believer can better live his faith when he does so in a community of faith. But, 
ultimately, the faith of the individual is always his own, and the work that faith demands is 
always personal208). As says Bouveresse: «Wittgenstein characterizes philosophy as being 
a work that one must do on oneself, on the way that one sees things and on what one expects 
of them. It is hence a work that has an inevitable ethical dimension (…). We become, in 
our philosophical moments, victims to the illusion that reality is being, in some way, unjust 
towards us because it does not meet the expectations of a prescriptive ideal that we feel 
entitled to hold against it, and we need to learn with great difficulty that it is in fact us who 
are being unjust and that it is our own metaphysical exigencies that are illegitimate and that 
our ideals must be dispossessed of their prestige and of the authority that we think that they 
must have»209. 
If then, it is possible to say that, from beginning to end, Wittgenstein defended the 
idea that philosophy is born out of a form of confusion or a form of misunderstanding of 
                                                          
208 The limit of this comparison is of course that, unlike the philosopher, the believer and his community share 
a given set of dogmas. The believer must nonetheless do all the work, and in this very specific and limited 
sense, one could say that Wittgenstein has a Protestant view of the philosopher. 
209 Jacques Bouveresse, «Santé et maladie dans la philosophie et dans la vie», in Cités, 2009/2, No 38, pp. 131-
132. 
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the logic of our language (or of our language games), it is also possible to say that there is 
a sort of relocation concerning the bearer of the responsibility of this misunderstanding. 
While, in the Tractatus, it is language, or some of its characteristics, that are, so to say, 
guilty of the wanderings of the philosopher, in the Investigations, Wittgenstein clearly wags 
his finger at the philosopher. There is, in a sense, an ‘interiorization’ (intériorisation) of 
the philosophical ill (mal philosophique), as Wittgenstein no longer only talks of confusions 
or illusions, but also of sicknesses, of troubles, of difficulties, of pathologies, that are 
‘interior’ and that inhabit the philosopher’s mind. That being said, even for this relocation, 
his understanding of what a philosophical problem is does not fundamentally change. What 
changes, more than anything, is probably the urgency of the answer that the philosopher 
must find or accept, an urgency that is no longer merely philosophical, but also moral, since 
the ill inhabits the philosopher himself, and concerns him personally! The philosophical 
trouble is especially real considering that it cuts the philosopher from his reality, that is to 
say, that it cuts the philosopher away from ordinary life. 
 
C. The Omega of the philosophical activity: the philosophical ‘solution’. 
 
C.1 The depth of our philosophical problems and the importance of their ‘solution’. 
If the Wittgensteinian conception of what a philosophical problem is can be shocking for 
philosophers, in the sense that it (the conception) classifies what philosophers say in the 
category of non-sense, and in the sense that, according to Wittgenstein, their discourses do 
not concern themselves, properly speaking, with things, but with the words we use to talk 
about them, the idea that philosophy produces absurdity is not so rare in popular, scientific, 
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and artistic circles. Indeed, it is very (and too) frequent to have to defend the very idea of 
studying philosophy to uncles and aunts that then drop declarations like «philosophers, they 
live in the clouds», or «philosophy, what is it good for?»210. Things are not essentially 
different in the scientific community, when we think of the recent disobliging 
antiphilosophical comments of Stephen Hawking or Neil deGrasse Tyson: «Yeah, yeah, 
exactly, exactly. My concern here is that the philosophers believe they are actually asking 
deep questions about nature. (…) Yeah, if you are distracted by your questions so that you 
can't move forward, you are not being a productive contributor to our understanding of the 
natural world. And so the scientist knows when the question "What is the sound of one 
hand clapping?" is a pointless delay in our progress…»211. The idea then of philosophy as 
a source of absurdity is not exceptional. However, these ‘critiques’ of philosophy are empty, 
devoid of any content, in the sense that, contrary to Wittgenstein, they do not try to grasp 
the source of the philosophical absurdity, the source of the non-sense that traditional 
philosophy has produced; they are content with the fact of expressing an empty 
antiphilosophical sentiment. 
The emptiness of extra-philosophical critiques of philosophy is not however without 
exception. A thinker that is particularly close to Wittgenstein in his critique of traditional 
philosophy, and that adopts an explicitly antiphilosophical position – hence a thinker that 
                                                          
210 This second question is, of course, important; and it is not easy to answer it in a satisfying matter. 
211 Quoted in Massimo Pigliucci, «Neil deGrasse Tyson and the Value of Philosophy», posted on 16.5.2014, 
Available online at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/massimo-pigliucci/neil-degrasse-tyson-and-the-value-
of-philosophy_b_5330216.html (the emphasis is mine). Although one should note that these remarks concern 
specific sectors of philosophy of science, and not necessarily those of political philosophy, of ethics, or of 
philosophy of religion. On this point, Wittgenstein is way more radical than deGrasse Tyson, in the sense that 
the former considers that the discursive productions of philosophy are essentially non-sense, and that it cannot 
be otherwise; «non-sensical» is a necessary qualification of philosophical discourse.  
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tries, like Wittgenstein, to give a content to his critique of philosophy – is Paul Valéry. 
Indeed, according to Valéry, traditional philosophy is born of a lie that it spreads 
concerning the real nature of its activity, a lie that consists in this: philosophy presents its 
discourses as being concerned with things, or worst, with their essence, when in fact, they 
are actually concerned with words and meanings. What Valéry says is, on this point, well 
close to what Wittgenstein says, and one could very well attribute to the latter the authorship 
of what the former says: «The metaphysical illusion par excellence is the one consisting in 
trying to search for the profound and real meaning of a word or of a proposition»212, or 
again : «philosophy has taken, according to him (Valéry), the disastrous habit to ‘consider 
words, not as being problems of linguistics, but as being problems of essences and things 
in themselves’ (…) ‘All metaphysics results from a bad use of words’». Valery hence has 
this rather Wittgensteinian idea according to which the discourses of traditional philosophy 
is the product of a bad use, or of a bad comprehension, of words, a metaphysical 
use (PI, §116), that uproots and that tears out a word from its ‘natural ecology’, that is to 
say, our use of it in our everyday lives: «he (the philosopher) speculates according to a type 
of faith in the existence of an absolute and isolable value of the meanings of words. What 
is reality?, the philosopher asks; and What is freedom? The philosopher places himself 
behind a veil of ignorance, closing his eyes on the metaphorical, social, statistical origins 
of these names; he will then make the meaning of these words slip in indefinable ways, 
enabling him to produce in his mind the most profound and delicate combinations»213. 
                                                          
212 Quoted in Jacques Bouveresse, «La philosophie d’un antiphilosophe : Paul Valéry», in Pourquoi pas des 
philosophes?, pp. 254-256. 
213 Paul Valéry, «Léonard et les philosophes», in Variété. III, IV et V, pp. 170-171. 
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Hence, Wittgenstein and Valéry share the following idea: «the historial statements (énoncés 
historiaux) of philosophy are not false, refutable, aged and obsolete, this is not the question 
(…); philosophy, or at least a good part of its propositions and questions, has established 
its discourse below truth and falseness»214, in the sense that philosophy uproots our 
concepts («freedom», «reality», etc.) from the normal contexts in which they become 
bearers of meaning, from the contexts that enable us to say truth and falseness. 
If there is a certain kinship or ‘family resemblance’ between Wittgenstein and 
Valéry’s idea of the origin of our philosophical problems and of the answers that 
philosophers have tried to formulate, Wittgenstein is not at all on the same page as Valéry 
concerning the attitude that one ought to take when faced with these problems. Indeed, 
Valéry seems to hold a pretty ‘simplistic’ approach, in the sense that he defends a wholly 
radical (and probably untenable) form of voluntarism: philosophy being a bad use of words, 
one must simply stop misusing these words; one must cease to uproot these words from 
their natural ecology, one must hence stop to consider philosophical problems as being 
serious and important problems, worthy of the attention of the philosophy; one must hence 
turn away from philosophy and its calls for essence, and ignore it, as one could ignore the 
whining of a spoiled child. 
If Wittgenstein also defends a certain form of voluntarism (as we shall see by the 
end of this chapter), it is rather what one could call a ‘realist’ or ‘unquiet’ form of 
voluntarism, in the sense that to get rid of a philosophical problem is not easy, and that, in 
fact, the difficulty of the task at hand is not at all accidental, but on the contrary is 
                                                          
214 Alain Badiou, «1er cours» in L’antiphilosophie de Wittgenstein (1993-1994). 
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constitutive of what a philosophical problem is. As Wittgenstein says, «The problems 
arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of depth»215, 
a depth proportional to the importance of our linguistic practices in our everyday life. The 
philosophical problem is hence not a mere faux pas that one should correct, and the passage 
from «a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is patent nonsense»216 can only be a 
task that is arduous and difficult, the success of which is in no way assured217. Indeed, if, 
as Wittgenstein says in the Tractatus, the limits of my language are the limits of my world 
(TLP, 5.6), the fact that the philosopher has lost their language, or the fact that they are lost 
in their language, implies the loss of a world, a world that needs to be restored, or recovered. 
This loss cannot hence be taken lightly, as Valéry seems to do, and it actually demands, on 
the contrary, all of our attention, and a considerable amount of philosophical work: «No 
matter what Russell might have thought, what Wittgenstein has to say about the way that a 
philosophical problem must be addressed and resolved is not an incitement to (anti-
)philosophical laziness, but on the contrary: he articulates a demand for a particularly 
difficult task, of which the success is in no way guaranteed»218. Hence, if Wittgenstein 
seems to agree with Valéry on the question of the origin of the absurdity of philosophy’s 
discursive productions, the source of its non-sense, he is not however able to agree with the 
frivolity with which Valéry treats this non-sense: the philosophical gesture is not a faux-
pas, but a slip, in a quasi-Freudian sense, in the sense that it expresses «a tendency in the 
human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life 
                                                          
215 Ludwig Wittgenstein, PI (§111). 
216 Ludwig Wittgenstein, PI (§464). 
217 Jacques Bouveresse, Essais III, p. xix. 
218 Jacques Bouveresse, Essais III, pp. xi-xii. 
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ridicule it»219; a tendency that pushes humanity to attempt to go beyond the world, bringing 
him to run against the boundaries of language220, against the boundaries of sense. 
 
C.2 What a philosophical ‘solution’ cannot be. 
Considering the real nature of our philosophical problems, it seems evident that a first step 
towards their resolution is to recognize that one should not, to a philosophical question, try 
to answer it, properly speaking. For example, to the question «what is freedom?», the 
philosopher must not answer «freedom is ‘this’: the fact of knowing no limitations in terms 
of movement and will» or «freedom is ‘that’: the fact of the possibility to accomplish 
certain things in particular». The reason for this is not that both answers are wrong, as 
compared to another answer, which would be the good one («Ah! Finally, I know what 
freedom is!»): it is rather the very idea of an answer that is wrong, or bad, and idea that 
must then be abandoned altogether. «Wittgenstein implicitly agrees with Moore who 
believes that most of the troubles of philosophy stem from the illusion that certain 
ambitious and apparently fundamental questions have a precise and immediate sense»221. 
In this sense, the first mistake that we make when philosophizing is to say that we are facing 
an authentic ‘problem’. As Wittgenstein says, «The very word "problem", so to say, is 
misapplied when used for our philosophical troubles. These difficulties, as long as they are 
seen as problems, are tantalising, and appear insoluble»222.  Indeed, the word ‘problem’ is 
conceptually linked, in our daily linguistic practices, to the word ‘solution, whether in an 
                                                          
219 Ludwig Wittgenstein, «Conférence sur l’éthique» dans Leçons et conversations, p. 155 
220 Ludwig Wittgenstein, «Conférence sur l’éthique», pp. 154-155 
221 Jacques Bouveresse, Essais III, p. 13. 
222 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Le cahier bleu et Le cahier brun, pp. 95-96. 
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academic context (‘Can you solve the mathematical equation?’), in a scientific context (‘is 
X a carcinogen?’), in a common context (‘how can I fit all these things in this little car?’), 
etc. «There can, indeed, only be a problem when we have at our disposal a prior, at least 
approximate, general concept of what could constitute a solution. And this is not the case 
in philosophy»223, considering the real nature of what constitutes a philosophical ‘problem’. 
The philosophical demand is hence not a demand for solutions, since ultimately, as 
Wittgenstein says in the Tractatus, the philosophical problem is not a problem: «And so it 
is not to be wondered at that the deepest problems are really no problems»224. 
A first reason that pushes Wittgenstein to reject the idea that one can, properly 
speaking, give an ‘answer’ to a philosophical question is that where there is no real 
question, there cannot be an answer – which is the case in philosophy. The question, or the 
problem, emerges indeed from a form of life, in the midst of institutions, in a world, and it 
is in this same form of life, in this same world, that one can give an answer. The question 
and the answer hence has a place. But for Wittgenstein, the place of the philosophical game 
of question and answer is not of this world (beyond the world, Wittgenstein tells us in his 
Lecture on Ethics); the ‘philosophical place’ is a non-place. Devoid of any topology, the 
philosophical game is hence de jure incapable of being a legitimate ‘place of meaning’ (lieu 
de signification), a place where one can say something that is meaningful, which pushes 
Wittgenstein to say: «I see now that these nonsensical expressions were not nonsensical 
                                                          
223 Jacques Bouveresse, Essais III, p. 10. 
224 Ludwig Wittgenstein, TLP (4.003). 
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because I had not yet found the correct expressions, but that their nonsensicality was their 
very essence»225.  
It is also important to note a second reason that pushes Wittgenstein to reject the 
idea of an authentic philosophical ‘solution’. As I have said earlier on, «Wittgenstein 
strongly considered the very idea of a ‘scientific philosophy’ to be a pure (and dangerous) 
illusion for the philosopher, and for philosophy itself», which is why Wittgenstein says in 
the Tractatus that «philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. (The word “philosophy” 
must mean something which stands above or below, but not beside the natural sciences.)»226 
He then says in the following aphorism that «philosophy is not a theory but an activity. A 
philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. The result of philosophy is not a 
number of “philosophical propositions”, but to make propositions clear»227. This 
qualification of philosophy as being an anti-theoretical activity is primordial here in the 
sense that it is precisely through this qualification that Wittgenstein is able to radically 
separate the scientific activity from the philosophical one. Philosophy does not try to 
explain, or theorize, as the different natural sciences do: «Our sickness is this: wanting to 
explain»228; or again: «This is tied, it seems to me, to the fact that we commit the error of 
waiting for an explanation; when in fact, a description is the solution to the difficulty (…). 
The difficulty is there: when to stop»229.  
                                                          
225 Ludwig Wittgenstein, «Conférence sur l’éthique», p. 154. 
226 Ludwig Wittgenstein, TLP (4.111). 
227 Ludwig Wittgenstein, TLP (4.112) – l’emphase est mienne. 
228 Rush Rhees, Discussions of Wittgenstein, p. 45. 
229 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel (§314). 
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The notion of explanation that Wittgenstein rejects for philosophy is that of the 
hypothetical-deductive explanation, which is the explanation mode characteristic of natural 
sciences230, an explanation that is based upon a series of hypotheses, confirmable or 
falsifiable, articulated in a stratified theoretical body. On the other side, philosophy is not 
stratified, but ‘flat’231: contrary to the scientist who works on a theoretical body that relies 
and is constructed experimentally by the verification of hypotheses, the philosopher, so to 
say, always starts from scratch, in the sense that their investigations cannot rely on an 
already existing knowledge-frame that would make them (the investigations) legitimate. 
The scientist constantly has a theoretical frame so as to attack the problems that concerns 
them. They are always, so to say, situated in and guided by the context of their field of 
research. The philosopher, on the other hand, being lost in their own language, has no 
landmark in sight. They are devoid of any context because it is precisely their ordinary 
conceptual context that is the source of their problem. The philosophical investigation 
stems from, as I have said earlier on, a certain form of scepticism concerning our language, 
its talents and its capacities. It is hence impossible for the philosopher to found their 
questions and answers on anything, because it is this «anything» that is put into question. 
The situation of the philosopher is hence fundamentally different from that of the scientist, 
who has the luxury of participating in a research tradition that they recognize as their own. 
The philosopher has no tradition («The philosopher is not a citizen of any community of 
ideas. That is what makes him into a philosopher»232). And it is this difference, between 
                                                          
230 P.M.S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion, p. 119. 
231 Jacques Bouveresse, Essais III, p. xiii. 
232 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel (§455). 
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the situation of the philosopher and that of the scientist that forbids, according to 
Wittgenstein, any identification, rapprochement, or analogy between the two activities. The 
impossibility to give an answer to a philosophical question hence stems from a radical 
difference existing between the philosophical activity and the scientific activity, but also, 
from radical difference existing between the situation of the philosopher and that of the 
scientist233. 
 
C.3 Draft of what a philosophical ‘solution’ is. 
What is however significant, is that the «term, ‘metaphysics’ that he (Wittgenstein) uses, 
not unlike the logical neo-positivists, to designate something that must be avoided, does 
not aim to exclude a certain type of problems (those that traditional philosophers have dealt 
with), but rather to exclude a certain type of solution. Wittgenstein does indeed deal with 
these problems, and seeks to solve them, although this cannot be done in any case, by 
metaphysics»234. Wittgenstein hence elaborates a «critique of philosophy as theory, a 
dismantling of its theoretical pretentions, and a sort of preliminary to antiphilosophy»235. 
But as Badiou says, this critique is a sort of preliminary, an initial gesture that opens the 
way for another philosophy, the nature of which is not theoretical; a philosophy that is 
                                                          
233 If one must, according to Wittgenstein, resist the temptation to consider philosophy as a legitimate game 
of questions and answers, if one must resist the temptation to consider philosophy as being another form of 
life, it is because philosophy is not a form of life; it is because philosophy, understood as metaphysics, stands 
and is constituted in its opposition to life and to the forms that it (life) may take, by trying to articulate a 
lifeless body, a theoretical body, a body beyond every forms of life (and that yet, in a certain sense, is 
concerned with all of them).  
234 Jacques Bouveresse, Essais III, pp. 32-33. 
235 Alain Badiou, «1er cours» in L’antiphilosophie de Wittgenstein (1993-1994). 
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essentially action, a gesture236 («philosophy is not a theory but an activity»237); and it is this 
other philosophy, this philosophy-activity (as opposed to philosophy-theory) that I must 
describe in the next few pages. 
 
C.3.i The form of the ‘solution’: the problem needs to disappear. 
If the traditional philosopher is, in a certain way, imprisoned in an inadequate conception 
of philosophy (has a legitimate bearer of problems and solutions), and if, in a certain sense, 
this prison is located inside of the philosopher’s skull238, the philosophical activity can only 
aim to work on and in the philosopher’s mind – the philosophical activity is hence 
essentially of an ethical nature. Wittgenstein already does qualify philosophy in this way 
when he describes the meaning of his Tractatus to Ludwig von Ficker in 1919: «The 
meaning of the book is ethical. (…) it is formed of two parts: the one that is found here, 
and then, all that I «have not» written. And it is precisely this second part which is the most 
important». Hence, if the philosophical problem is born in the skull of the philosopher, it 
is in this same skull that philosophical work is needed, and it is finally also there that the 
problem can be solved: «Wittgenstein characterized philosophy as being a work of one on 
oneself, on the way one sees things and what one expects and demands of them»239.   
The philosopher that is dealing with a philosophical problem is, as I have said, 
preoccupied, and this state of preoccupation is uncomfortable and obsessing: the 
                                                          
236 Alain Badiou, «1er cours» in L’antiphilosophie de Wittgenstein (1993-1994). 
237 Ludwig Wittgenstein, TLP (4.112). 
238 In the sense that, as I have said earlier, philosophical problems, contrary to scientific ones, are born in the 
mind of the philosopher. 
239 Jacques Bouveresse, «Santé et maladie dans la philosophie et dans la vie», p. 131. 
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philosopher looks at his reflection in the mirror and sees their face, uptight, and tensed by 
the burden of their philosophical difficulties. This state is hence not only uncomfortable, 
but also, and most importantly, pathological, and the aim of the philosophical activity 
proposed by Wittgenstein is to get out of this state. The aim is a form of ‘healing’, or 
otherwise said, the vanishing of the symptoms – the vanishing of the problems. Indeed, 
already in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein tries to avoid (although he does not do so 
systematically) to talk of the ‘solution’ to our problems, preferring to speak of the 
‘dissolution’ (TLP, 4.466) or of the ‘disappearance’ (TLP, 4.1251; 5.441; 5.535; 6.521) of 
our problems. The ‘solution’ hence takes the form of a ‘return to normality’, or rather, the 
disappearance of what upsets the ordinary and daily normality of the philosopher’s 
linguistic life. This return to normality demands however a clarity, a form of transparency 
concerning their language, a clarity that the philosopher lacks: «The real discovery is the 
one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to.—The one that 
gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in 
question»240. The ‘solution’, since it essentially aims to make the symptoms of the 
philosopher disappear, can hence be nothing else than what the philosopher accepts to 
consider as being the solution to their problems: «The ‘good solution’ is essentially the one 
that appears to be the good solution. (…) The good solution is mainly what brings us 
satisfaction and appeasement»241. In the same way that the problem is essentially personal, 
and up to a certain point, subjective, the solution can only be personal and subjective. 
                                                          
240 Ludwig Wittgenstein, PI (§133) 
241 Jacques Bouveresse, Essais III, p. 7. 
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This is however, so to say, a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one, in the 
sense that the ‘subjectivity’ of the solution does not imply «that anything is susceptible to 
satisfy us, that we are ready to accept any kind of solution»242 - and that, for two reasons: 
firstly, as I have said earlier, quoting Bouveresse, the philosophical activity proposed by 
Wittgenstein does not aim at disqualifying a certain type of problem, but a certain type of 
solution (solution offered by traditional metaphysics). The subjective satisfaction that a 
given ‘solution’ brings is not, in this sense, sufficient in the sense that Wittgenstein 
excludes the idea of being truly satisfied by a ‘false’ solution – the question evidently still 
remains: «what does ‘false’ mean, and what is the nature of this ‘truth’ that must replace 
the false solution?»243 Secondly, whether in the Tractatus or in the Investigations, 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical activity’s object of study is the «essential structure» of our 
language, a structure that one could call «objective»: whether we are talking of the logical 
structure of the propositions that constitute our language in the Tractatus244, or of the 
linguistic facts that constitute the grammar of our language game245, the philosophical 
therapy aims to respond to what one might call a lack of objectivity concerning our 
language246, a lack of objectivity that stems from a misunderstanding of the (objective) 
logic of our language. Whether this misunderstanding is provoked by certain characteristics 
of language (as is it suggested in the Tractatus) or whether it is produced by the philosopher 
                                                          
242 Jacques Bouveresse, Essais III, p. 7. 
243 Jacques Bouveresse, «Santé et maladie dans la philosophie et dans la vie», p. 135. 
244 Ludwig Wittgenstein, TLP (4.001). 
245 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel, §447. 
246 The objectivity of our language, or its public or «civil» character (PI, §125) also stems from the fact that 
there is no such thing as a private language. Language is a profoundly social and intersubjective reality, 
incarnated through an ensemble of institutions; and it is from this fact, as we shall see, that Wittgenstein will 
draw the idea that the linguistic facts that he discusses in his investigations cannot be contested, because they 
are available to anyone who knows the language game that is being investigated.  
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themselves (as it is suggested in the Investigations), the fact remains that the 
misunderstanding stems from a doubt about our language, and this doubt brings the 
philosopher to entertain a series of «chimerical hopes and expectations that are condemned 
by nature to remain unsatisfied»247; and it is precisely these hopes and expectations that 
must be dissolved and abandoned so that one may, once again, feel at home in the midst of 
their linguistic practices; so that one may be happy248. But this abandonment is possible 
only for somebody that gains access to a certain point of view that enables the philosopher 
to see the world rightly, to see things (of our language) as they are – and this is as much 
true in the Tractatus as it is true in the Investigations. If the aim is the same (a certain point 
of view), what will change however is the nature of what needs to be done so that one may 
have access to it. In other words, if the aim is formally the same in the Tractatus and in the 
Investigations, it is the method that will change and that will give the aim a content – it is 
the method that will give the aim a face. And the two different faces of the philosophical 
method depend largely on the different ontological-linguistic developments that 
Wittgenstein articulates in the Tractatus, and then, in the Investigations. 
 
C.3.ii The content of the ‘solution’: methods and linguistic ontologies 
The logical analysis of the Tractatus. A first thing to say would be the following: although 
«the truth of the thoughts communicated here (in the Tractatus) seems (…) unassailable 
and definitive»249, Wittgenstein did not consider his Tractatus as being a good example, or 
                                                          
247 Jacques Bouveresse, «Santé et maladie dans la philosophie et dans la vie», p. 132. 
248 Ludwig Wittgenstein, TLP (6.43). 
249 Ludwig Wittgenstein, «preface» in TLP. 
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a good model of what the philosopher-analyst must do250: «My propositions are elucidatory 
in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has 
climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, 
after he has climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world 
rightly»251. The Tractatus can hence be understood as a kind of ironic therapy, aiming to 
turn the reader away from the type of philosophical theory that the Tractatus seems to 
articulate, so that we may see the world correctly. However, the fact of seeing the world 
correctly is not an invitation to a capricious form of idleness: although Wittgenstein does 
indeed believe that he has resolved the cardinal problem of philosophy, this resolution in 
fact opens a programmatic and methodological space, the space of the logical analysis: «I 
am, therefore, of the opinion that the problems have in essential been finally solved. And 
if I am not mistaken in this, then the value of this work secondly consists in the fact that it 
shows how little has been done when these problems have been solved»252. There is hence 
a gap between the de facto practice of philosophy, and the de jure status of philosophy in 
the Tractatus. 
 
As I have mentioned earlier, the main source of philosophical troubles in the 
Tractatus is the fact that the grammatical appearance of our language masks and hides its 
real logical form. This duality that Wittgenstein establishes, following Russell253, in the 
                                                          
250 Although, paradoxically, this bad example was necessary (for him) to discredit a certain (metaphysical 
and, according to him, illegitimate) way of philosophizing.   
251 Ludwig Wittgenstein, TLP (6.54). 
252 Ludwig Wittgenstein, «preface» in TLP (the emphasis is mine). 
253 Ludwig Wittgenstein, TLP (4.0031). 
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midst of our language makes it so that it is possible to be mistaken concerning the real 
origin of the meaning of our statements; or rather: considering the grammatical similarity 
shared by certain sentences (for example, «the cat is in the room», and «God is in the 
world»), it becomes possible and easy to think that a non-sensical sentence is actually 
meaningful, that it actually expresses a proposition; and it this possibility and this risk that 
the logical analysis seeks to eradicate. Furthermore, considering that the grammatical 
surface hides a profound logical reality, the logical analysis takes the form of an 
archaeological movement, since it aims to unearth, so to speak, the origin of the sense of 
the analyzed sentence, that is to say, its logical form. 
The logical analysis however depends upon a certain criterion that enables one to 
separate the legitimate from the illegitimate uses of language, a criterion that can only stem 
from a general and typically philosophical interrogation concerning the nature of the 
proposition and of language254. This language is recognizable by its relation with reality255. 
Hence, the logical analysis as a method is rooted in the ground of a particular ontological-
linguistic system, in the sense that it emerges from a certain conception of reality, of 
language, and of the relation that unites them. To be brief, in the Tractatus, the ontology is 
factual256, the language is propositional257, and the relation that closes this ontological-
linguistic system is representational258. Language represents reality in the sense that the 
                                                          
254 Indeed, if language is but the accumulation of propositions, then to know what a proposition is enables 
one to know the entirety of what our language is: the ocean is already and always contained in the water drop. 
255 Rush Rhees, Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Discourse, p. ix. 
256 «The world is the totality of facts, not of things» (TLP, 1.1). 
257 «The totality of propositions is the language» (TLP, 4.001). 
258 «In the proposition a state of affairs is, as it were, put together for the sake of experiment. One can say, 
instead of, ‘this proposition has such and such a sense’, ‘this proposition represents such and such a state of 
affairs’» (TLP, 4.031). 
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former is an image (picture) of the latter259, or rather: it is the proposition that represents 
reality in the sense that it (the proposition) is a picture of the fact that it aims to represent. 
But what does it mean for a proposition to be the picture of a fact? When one talks 
of a photograph that would be the picture of a person, we recognize that this is so in the 
sense that the «content»260 resembles the person. The link uniting the image of something 
and this something would hence be a link of resemblance. Wittgenstein, however, goes 
further, as it is not just a question of resemblance: «In the picture and the pictured there 
must be something identical in order that the one can be a picture of the other at all»261. 
What is identical? Wittgenstein tells us that «the form of representation is the possibility 
that the things are combined with one another as are the elements of the picture»262. Hence, 
when one takes a picture of a crime scene for example, what is identical in the photograph 
and in the scene itself is the relation between the elements of the scene and the relation 
between the elements of the photograph: there exists, and we can see that, in both cases, a 
same disposition of elements, a same layout (agencement) 263. 
I here speak of «layout» because the elements that constitute the proposition are not 
assembled in a chaotic or hazardous way («The proposition is not a mixture of words (just 
as the musical theme is not a mixture of tones). The proposition is articulate»264); they are 
rather assembled following the lineaments of a structure, of a logic, that is shared with the 
                                                          
259 «The proposition is a picture of reality» (TLP, 4.01). This is the simplest and most direct expression of the 
picture theory of language that is proposed by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. 
260 «Content» understood as what is physically visible on the surface of the photographic paper. 
261 Ludwig Wittgenstein, TLP (2.161). 
262 Ludwig Wittgenstein, TLP (2.151). 
263 In a certain sense, one could call this a geographical layout of the elements of the proposition (nouns) and 
of the elements of the fact (objects). 
264 Ludwig Wittgenstein, TLP (3.141). 
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fact of which the proposition is an image. The possibility for language to be about the world 
hence lies in the fact that the latter is logically structured265. The proposition hence has a 
meaning if the fact is structured in the same as the elements of the proposition266. This 
means that to understand the sense of a proposition is to know, is to see the factual 
conditions for the truth of the proposition267. For example, if someone tells me «the cat is 
in the room», I understand this proposition if and only if I know what has to be the case so 
that this proposition is true (the fact that the cat is indeed in the room)268. The meaning of 
a proposition could hence be described in the following way: it emerges from a given, 
determinate269, and precise270 syntactical arrangement, an arrangement that ultimately 
depends upon an arrangement that is identical (not analogical, or similar) to the 
arrangement of the fact that the proposition seeks to picture; and it is this co-dependence 
existing between the proposition and the fact, between language and the world, that enables 
Wittgenstein to propose a philosophical program that revolves around the method of the 
logical analysis. 
The logical analysis indeed aims to demonstrate that, although a given sentence 
(«God is in the world») seems to have the same logical structure as another sentence-
proposition («the cat is in the room»), if the sentence looks like a proposition, this is mere 
appearance in the sense that the theological statement does not give meaning to one of its 
                                                          
265 The Tractatus hence elaborates what one could call a pure and literal «onto-logy»: the structure of being 
is logical. 
266 One can hence talk of something like the organic nature of meaning and of being in the Tractatus. 
267 To understand the sense of a proposition is to be able to see the logical layout that the fact should share 
with a given proposition. 
268 Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, TLP (4.063). 
269 Rush Rhees, Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Discourse, p. xxvii. 
270 Semantics is hence a mechanical and calculated production of the syntax of our language.  
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elements («God»), element that does not have any equivalent object in the world. Or again, 
if a theologian persists in attributing a meaning to this sign, the task of the philosopher-
analyst will be to bring to the attention of the theologian one of the symptoms of the non-
sensical nature of his words, that is to say, the fact that it is not possible to think their truth 
conditions. It is of course possible that the theologian will not be satisfied, and that they 
won’t accept the philosopher’s analysis: «accepting the solution not only requires 
adhesion (adhésion) of the intellect, but also, a renunciation of the will that is, in many 
ways the most difficult thing to do. (…) But the fact that the solution is not recognized as 
such (…) does not mean, of course, that it is not the correct solution»271. 
The logical analysis proposed by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus hence depends upon 
a precise understanding of the proposition (of language), of its internal duality (grammatical 
surface and logical depth), of the relation that unites language and world, and of the origin 
of sense (the logical depth and the representational relation that it entertains with the logical 
structure of the world); the logical analysis aims to surpass the grammatical superficiality 
of our propositions to reach and see their profound logical structure. 
The conceptual explorations of the Investigations. Things are of course different 
when we turn to the Investigations: while the philosophical method of the Tractatus 
stemmed from an investigation concerning the essence of the proposition, hence from the 
essence of language and its relation with reality, «between the Tractatus and the 
Philosophical Investigations, he [Wittgenstein] has deliberately excluded himself from the 
paradise of the essential, to enter the purgatory (or hell) of the particular cases»272. In the 
                                                          
271 Jacques Bouveresse, Essais III, p. 7. 
272 Jacques Bouveresse, La parole malheureuse, p. 36. 
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Investigations, Wittgenstein mobilizes his philosophical energy to orchestrate an attack 
against essentialism273, in the sense that he refuses to adhere to the philosophical project of 
reduction to the essential (reduce language to X), aiming for a «clear apprehension of 
diversity, of the indefinite, and of inexactitude»274; he refuses the idea that there is one 
language, defending rather the existence of multiple language games where each has its 
own domain, its own laws or rules, its own objectives, etc. This bursting (éclatement) of 
language brings about a bursting of the method: «There is not a philosophical method, 
though there are indeed methods, like different therapies»275. If the language games are the 
new places (lieux) of meaning (as opposed to the place of meaning of the language of the 
Tractatus), and if there is a multiplication and a diversification of the different mechanisms 
for the production of sense, then the transgression that has traditionally been the 
philosophical gesture can now take a great number of forms, and this means that the 
therapeutic road is not necessarily the one traced by the logical analysis of the Tractatus. 
In fact, the therapeutic road cannot be that of the logical analysis, because the latter 
presupposes that the origin of the sense of our propositions, their logical body, is hidden 
under their grammatical cloak: the philosopher-analyst hence looks to «to penetrate 
phenomena…»276; he «see(s) in the essence…something that lies beneath the surface. 
Something that lies within, which we see when we look into things, and which and analysis 
digs out»277. This belief in the hidden aspect of the real origin of sense that the Tractatus 
                                                          
273 George Pitcher, «The Attack on Essentialism» in The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, pp. 215-227.  
274 Jacques Bouveresse, La parole malheureuse, p. 36. 
275 Ludwig Wittgenstein, PI (§133). 
276 Ludwig Wittgenstein, PI (§90). 
277 Ludwig Wittgenstein, PI (§92). 
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aims to unearth is however rejected explicitly by Wittgenstein in the Investigations as being 
the symptom of a philosophical illness: «it is fruitful to view Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy as an investigation of the conflicting pressures stored up in the conception of a 
language as a system of hidden rules»278.  
Even if in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein defends the idea that our common language 
is meaningful (and in order) as it is, the common user, the non-philosopher is always 
haunted by the idea of the possibility of the non-sense of what he says. We can only be sure 
and certain of the meaningfulness of our propositions if we do the necessary logical and 
analytic work. In the Investigations, Wittgenstein rather defends the idea that «we do not 
wait upon philosophy to discover whether our ordinary sentences have any meaning»279, 
hence the importance of not looking behind our linguistic phenomena, and the importance 
of looking, precisely, where sense manifests itself, that is to say, in the midst of our daily 
linguistic practices. Making-sense, says Wittgenstein, is not the fruit of the activity of «a 
will independent of us (…). A word has the meaning that somebody gives it»280. If then the 
making-sense is the fruit of our own daily linguistic activities, the philosophical sceptic 
doubts concerning this very making-sense can only be addressed, resolved, or appeased by 
a careful study of these same activities: «The aim is not to build a new building, or a new 
bridge, but to judge the geography, as it is now»281. 
                                                          
278 G.P. Baker & P.M.S. Hacker, An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations. Volume 2. 
Wittgenstein, Rules, Grammar and Necessity, p. 37. 
279 P.M.S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion, pp. 120-121. 
280 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Le cahier bleu et Le cahier brun, p. 71. 
281 Jacques Bouveresse, La parole malheureuse, p. 143. 
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The philosophical method is hence doubly affected: (i) it goes through the same 
bursting as language, and the method is then not the mere repetition of the same procedure: 
since the language is not only one thing, then a transgression of language cannot be only 
one thing neither. The method depends rather on the nature of the problem in question, 
which itself depends greatly upon the grammar of the language game from which the 
philosophical problem emerges; the method depends also greatly upon the nature of the 
philosophical illusion that the philosopher wants to maintain. (ii) Secondly, the healing 
place is no longer really the same: while in the Tractatus, the place that the philosopher is 
looking for (the logical place) is hidden and must be unearthed, in the Investigations, 
everything is on the surface, everything is available, and one must, in a way, come back to 
the surface of our language, one must remember again certain known and easily neglected 
facts, facts that the philosopher had lost track of. It is this renewed and strengthened trust 
in the capacity for our ordinary language to make sense that partly shapes the method (or 
methods) of the Investigations; it is this same trust that also explains the importance of the 
grammatical study of our ordinary linguistic facts in resolving our problems, a descriptive 
study of the grammar of our linguistic habits that «is supposed to dispel the temptation to 
seek the kind of systematic account of language and thought offered»282 by traditional 
philosophy.  
In the Investigations, the philosophical problem emerges when the philosopher gets 
lost in their language, when they lose sight of certain landmarks, certain evidence that, 
normally, would guide them without any problem; this is what explains the need to turn the 
                                                          
282 John Koethe, The Continuity of Wittgenstein’s Thought, p. 5. 
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attention of the philosopher towards a series of normal and ordinary facts concerning our 
linguistic practices, as these facts need to serve as landmarks, guiding the philosopher 
towards familiarity. However, when I am lost (when I do philosophy), if a speculation 
concerning the hidden essential structure of the world does not help me in finding my way 
again in the world, it is no more helpful to simply look around and say, «there, on my left, 
there is a tower. And on the right, there is a…». As Wittgenstein says, «the work of the 
philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose»283, the purpose 
being to obtain a «synoptic view» of our language game. This synoptic view is not however 
what one could call a ‘philosophical vision’ of our language game: «there are things, 
particularly the way our language works, that we do not understand for philosophical 
reasons, but there is not a philosophical way to understand them»284, although there is 
indeed a necessary philosophical work that must be done to understand them (again). 
For example, if one is obsessed with a certain image of language (language as a 
descriptive tool), it can be helpful to go to neighbourhoods of our language in which the 
aim of language is not to describe (the neighbourhoods of orders or commandments, those 
of humour, those of poetry, etc.). Or, if we wonder whether we are free or not, it can be 
helpful to study the different contexts in which we say that were free or not, so that we can 
realize that our freedom is something that we talk about in only a limited amount of cases, 
that it does not make sense to say that we are unilaterally free, and that by ‘free’, we mean 
a lot of different things. Or finally, if we wonder what it means to count, and that were are 
convinced of the truth of our way of counting, it can be helpful to imagine forms of life 
                                                          
283 Ludwig Wittgenstein, PI (§128).  
284 Jacques Bouveresse, Essais III, p. 17. 
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different from our own in which counting would be made differently. These different 
techniques can be helpful in the sense that they try to untie specific knots in our 
understanding, so that we may see the things of our language as they are: «Say what you 
choose, so long as it does not prevent you from seeing the facts. (And when you see them 
there is a good deal that you will not say.)»285 Indeed, confronted with the fact that language 
is not only descriptive, but that it may have other functions, one which would be obsessed 
with the image of the descriptive language will have to either abandon their obsession (that 
is to say, to heal), or to reject these examples has not being legitimate acts of language (that 
is to say, to lock themselves up in their obsession); the first option being by far the 
preferable one. These different techniques then can be helpful, but they are not magical, 
and do not guarantee anything. If they are not helpful, the philosopher must do something 
else. 
The conceptual explorations proposed by Wittgenstein in his Investigations hence 
depend on a certain understanding of language as being a collection of games, as being a 
multiplicity of ways to make-sense. This multiplication of the ways to make-sense implies 
a multiplication of the ways in which we can fall into non-sense. The therapy is hence 
intimately tied to the nature of the transgression, tied also to what pushed the philosopher 
on this transgressive road. In any case though, the therapy does aim to refresh the 
philosopher’s memory concerning the ordinary conditions of meaning, conditions that the 
philosopher had forgotten for philosophical reasons. And it is only by having these things 
in mind that the philosopher can appease their philosophical anxieties. In other words, the 
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method aims to surpass the superficiality of our philosophical illusions concerning our 
language and our concepts, so that we may reach and see their actual grammar, their actual 
logical structure. 
 
D. A dominating image: ‘vision’ and logical ‘understanding’. 
 
If in the Tractatus and in the Investigations, the therapy is not the same, it seems to 
me that what is aimed at, health, is the same. I said earlier that the logical analysis aims to 
show to the philosopher-analyst the ‘logical point of view’, while the philosopher-
grammarian seeks to obtain a ‘synoptic view’ of the examined language game, and that it 
is only from this point of view that the philosopher can «see the world rightly»286, or «have 
access to a vision of the use of our words (…), the form of account we give, the way we 
look at things»287. But to see the world correctly is to see the logic of our language that 
shows itself in the correct use that we make of it. To see the world correctly is to stop seeing 
a problem where there is none – after all, logic is the absence of any sickness of the mind288; 
to see the world correctly is finally to accept that «if we do not try to express what is 
inexpressible, we lose nothing. On the contrary, the inexpressible is – inexpressibly – 
contained in what is expressed»289. But if, for Wittgenstein, «meaning is the use we make 
of the words»290, to understand or to see the meaning of our concepts is maybe nothing 
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more than the fact of using them correctly; this means of course that we must accept what 
Wittgenstein tells us in the famous paragraph 118 of the Investigations: «Where does our 
investigation get its importance from, since it seems only to destroy everything interesting, 
that is, all that is great and important? (As it were all the buildings, leaving behind only bits 
of stone and rubble.) What we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are 
clearing up the ground of language on which they stand». The ground of language is of 
course the ground that is our form of life and the different ways by which we give meaning 
to the words we use. And the silence prescribed at the end of the Tractatus is not – and this 
is what the philosophical therapy aims to make us understand – an amputation of sense, but 
rather the only way to let sense live and breathe; the only way to give it a voice. In other 
words, the point of view that is the aim of philosophical therapy is that of the user of 
language, those who know how to live in language and be happy there; those that are not 
stunned and overwhelmed by the weight of philosophical difficulties. The silence of the 
happy man, his peace of mind (tranquillité d’esprit) is hence not the death of sense, but 
rather, its life291.  
The understanding of the logic of our language, whether it is in the Tractatus or in 
the Investigations, is hence intimately tied to the idea of seeing the things of language 
correctly. But this vision is not to be understood as a passive and detached form of 
philosophical contemplation. On the contrary, to see the world correctly is to be able to act 
and to engage oneself in a correct and meaningful way in one’s language, that is to say, in 
a world of institutions, practices, and cultures, and if we must speak of ‘detachment’, we 
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must not think that the philosopher is detached from the world. We must rather understand 
that the philosopher detaches themselves from themselves, from their own confusions and 
illusions, and from certain of their desires that they take for realities.  
 
«I must quickly flee this debilitating field  
to find once again the real figures of the simple life»  
-Gottfried Keller, Henri le Vert 
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CHAPTER III: Wittgenstein and his relationship to traditional philosophy 
 
The aim of this third chapter will be to trace the traits of a comparison between the 
traditional and therapeutic conceptions of philosophy as they have been exposed, 
respectively, in chapters one and two. This comparison will enable me to articulate the 
beginnings of an answer to the second question that I have raised in the General 
Introduction: what enables us to say that, even for the evident discontinuities, the 
Wittgensteinian conception of philosophy is a – legitimate – heir to what philosophy, 
traditionally understood, has been and has done; what enables us to say that his conception 
of philosophy is not, like Deleuze thought it was, a violent form of antiphilosophy, or worst, 
an attempt to «assassinate philosophy»? This third and final chapter hence articulates the 
tension in the midst of which the Wittgensteinian philosophical activity maintains itself, a 
tension between continuity and discontinuity; a tension that Wittgenstein himself 
recognizes: «If, for example, we call our investigations ‘philosophy’, this title, in a certain 
sense, will seem to be adequate; in another sense though, it will incontestably mislead 
certain persons. (We could say that the subject which occupies us is one of the heirs of the 
subject that we have called ‘philosophy’.)» 292 
This tension will be articulated in four moments: firstly, the Alpha of philosophy, 
so the nature of the philosophical demand; I will touch upon the questions of the object and 
of the source of this philosophical demand, and also the question of its solitary character. 
Secondly, the Omega of philosophy, so the nature of the philosophical response; I will here 
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touch upon the question of the form of this response (the question of its theoricity and of 
its systematicity). Thirdly, I will rearticulate the thesis’ main problem: what enables us to 
connect the Wittgensteinian novelty to what the philosophical tradition has been and to 
what it has done? This moment will be doubly crucial: it will enable me to articulate the 
exact nature of the tension in the midst of which the Wittgensteinian philosophical activity 
maintains itself; crucial also because it will enable me to adjust and specify the parameters 
of the answer that I will finally give to the question that I have just raised.  
I must at once warn the reader that the development of this final chapter will be 
somewhat circular and repetitive, in the sense that I will have to reaffirm certain points that 
have already been developed in the first two chapters; in the sense also that the articulation 
of one of the moments might necessitate elements that will themselves be developed in 
another one. This circularity and repetition will not be, however, an obstacle to the 
understanding of what I mean to say; they will rather constitute one of the conditions of 
such an understanding. 
 
A. The philosophical demand. 
 
A.1 The source of the philosophical demand.  
In the second chapter, I established that there was a difference between the Aristotelian 
original philosophical experience, so the experience of a certain type of wonder when faced 
with the «miracle of the existence of the world» (to borrow a Wittgensteinian expression), 
and the Wittgensteinian original philosophical experience, that is the experience of a 
preoccupying strangeness, the feeling of a perplexing worry concerning our language, a 
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worry concerning the real capacities and talents of our language. The Vuilleminian original 
philosophical experience, while Vuillemin has not made it explicit in What Are 
Philosophical Systems?, could well be located somewhere in between the Aristotelian 
experience (wonder) and the Wittgensteinian experience (worry). The Vuilleminian 
philosopher, when facing the miracle of the existence of the world (Aristotelian element), 
does not feel any form of wonder, but rather a worry analogous to the Wittgensteinian 
worry: indeed the philosopher, faced with the localized and spectacular advances of 
science, feels more than anything the loss of the ‘totality’ that was offered to him by 
mythology. He feels more than anything the loss of this mythological image of reality 
understood as a totality; and it is, for Vuillemin and the philosopher, this «virtual totality», 
to borrow Granger’s expression, that must be reconstituted, a reconstitution that will have, 
as a guide, the logical voice of Beatrice.  
The philosophical question par excellence (and in a certain sense, the only 
philosophical question), that of the location of the frontier separating reality from 
appearance, emerges from a preoccupation and a worry concerning the incapacity of the 
sciences to recuperate or to reconstitute the lost image of reality, a worry that shows to the 
philosopher the necessity to do this work of reconstitution by means that are not those of 
the mythological activity (an eclectic and exploded activity of juxtaposition), but those of 
philosophy. The philosophical activity hence finds its source in the emergence of a worry 
concerning the incapacity of what appears to the eyes to exhaust what really is; and on that 
point, Vuillemin and Wittgenstein seem to agree: the first is dismayed by the contradictory 
impulses of the different discourses of common sense, and by the incapacity of the different 
sciences to recuperate these discourses and to unify them under the guise of coherence. 
 121 
 
Hence what appears to be evident or even self-evident in the context of everyday life 
becomes problematic for philosophy because it cannot accept all the contradictory beliefs 
of common sense in its attempt to articulate a coherent image of reality, or rather, a coherent 
discourse about that reality. The insufficiency of the apparent to exhaust what really is 
repeats itself in the work of Wittgenstein. Indeed, the necessity of the logical analysis in 
the Tractatus stems from the recognition that the superficial grammar of propositions 
actually hides their true logical form, hides what makes these propositions elements of our 
language. For example, the proposition «God exists», although it appears to be a 
propositional element of our language, is actually nonsense because there is no object of 
which «God» is the name. That a name has indeed a meaning is not something that is simply 
given to the philosopher. In the Investigations, the superficial grammar is just that, 
superficial and it often hides the underlying grammatical workings of our language games. 
For example, one of the most common philosophical sickness according to Wittgenstein is 
that of essentialism, to think that, for example, concepts have an essence which exhaust 
their meaning. There is a strong incentive to believe this because one sign («freedom») is 
used in many different ways. We are then convinced that because there is only one sign, 
there must be something that unites or justifies the fact that we always use the same sign, 
hence that there must be something in common between the different uses of the same. This, 
Wittgenstein argues, is a philosophical prejudice and it keeps us from seeing what there is: 
a diversity of use that don’t necessarily have anything substantial (or essential) in common. 
The philosopher must then see beyond what appears to be a conceptual necessity (a rule 
concerning the meaning of a concept), a necessity that is in fact the mere expression of a 
philosophical prejudice. The philosopher must do so as to see what there really is: a variety 
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of different uses. For both Vuillemin and Wittgenstein then, philosophers find themselves 
unsatisfied regarding what world has to offer, regarding what the language has to offer. 
 
A.2 The object of the philosophical demand.  
The Vuilleminian worry, although it is analogous to the Wittgensteinian one, can be 
distinguished from the latter regarding its object, and this difference will have an impact 
(as we shall see later on) concerning the answer that one must give to this worry. Indeed, 
the object of the philosophical disquietude according to Vuillemin is the world, reality – or 
rather, the fact that it is not possible, without a certain philosophical treatment, to trace a 
total, consistent, and coherent image of reality. For Wittgenstein, the source of the worry 
is language (in the Tractatus), or certain regions of language (in the Investigations). As it 
has been mentioned at the beginning of the last chapter, Wittgenstein carries out what one 
could call a displacement of the Vuilleminian philosophical question, a displacement of its 
object (from world to language) that implies a parallel reorientation in terms of the task and 
obligations of the philosopher, that is to say, a reformulation of the traditional philosophical 
question: the philosopher is no longer interested in finding the essential structures of reality, 
since their attention shifts to the essential structures of language. The essential dichotomy 
of philosophy, the distinction between reality and appearance is hence delocalized from the 
world, relocalized in the midst of language, and reformulated, as the philosopher will now 
seek to distinguish real language from apparent language. They will seek to trace a frontier 
enabling the philosopher to put their finger on what makes sense, and to wag their finger at 
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what is nonsensical293. Hence, if Wittgenstein and Vuillemin seem to agree concerning the 
original philosophical experience – the experience of a certain form of worry or of 
disquietude – they do not agree however on the source, or the object of this disquietude294. 
But what does seem to remain, in both cases, is a worry for the integrity of this 
object, whether we’re talking about language, or the world (or reality). I mean by this that 
the Vuilleminian and Wittgensteinian philosophers are both worried about the integrity of 
reality or of language, about its capacity to fully be what it is. The evidence of language or 
of the world is taken to be insufficient, to be fragile, and as demanding a certain kind of 
support, a certain foundation, so that what is entirely capable of standing up on its two feet 
in everyday life may sit and be rested (afin d’assoir ce qui, dans la vie de tous les jours, 
peut très bien se tenir debout). The Wittgensteinian philosopher, faced with what he – 
Wittgenstein – will call the ‘grammatical surface’, will be convinced that something is 
missing, that the fact that language signifies and is meaningful cannot solely rest on this 
grammatical surface (considering the confusions that it can engender: i.e., the curious case 
of the copula ‘is’295), and that behind that surface, or under it, is hidden – no! MUST be 
hidden – a logical reality that can be the only justification of the fact that our language 
signifies as it does. In a similar way, the Vuilleminian philosopher, even for the theoretical 
bodies produced by the different sciences, sees these gestures as being insufficient: 
although the sciences do give us access to certain regions of reality, they are incapable of 
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Wittgenstein makes of this word in the Tractatus. 
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Tractarian sentence according to which «the limits of my language mean the limits of my world» (TLP, 5.6); 
the world of language is the language of the world. 
295 Ludwig Wittgenstein, TLP (3.323). 
 124 
 
reassembling these fragments, these manifestations of the multiple, these incarnations of 
the broken real, so as to offer us an image of reality as a totality. The philosopher, in both 
cases, is unsatisfied: reality is not real enough, and language is not linguistic enough (le 
language n’est pas assez langagier). It would hence probably be better not to talk of the 
philosophical demand, but rather, to talk of the demand of the philosopher, a demand that 
is made to reality or to language. 
 
A.3 The solitary character of the philosopher’s demand.  
The philosopher’s disquietude concerning the world, regarding language, places them in a 
particularly difficult position, socially speaking, and «what is difficult in the rapports of 
the philosopher with others of life (…) is essential to philosophy»296. Essential indeed 
because philosophy starts off and is fuelled by this doubt about the world and about the 
language of common sense. But this doubt, this questioning of what is socially and 
normally taken for granted, is not only a questioning of a given number of beliefs, ideas, 
theses, etc. What is questioned is also the community of believers, in the most intimate and 
visceral of its dimensions: indeed, if «to imagine a language means to imagine a form of 
life»297, then to attack these beliefs and these certitudes is also to attack the persons that 
understand and live according to that given language. These persons, the philosopher «puts 
them in an awkward state, he inflicts them with the unforgivable offense of making them 
doubt about themselves»298; hence the possible danger of the sole fact of philosophizing: 
                                                          
296 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, «Éloge de la philosophie» dans Éloge de la philosophie et autres essais, p. 41. 
297 Ludwig Wittgenstein, PI (§19). 
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 125 
 
this offense, unforgivable as it is, can only receive one answer, condemnation and, possibly, 
death (cette offense, impardonnable qu’elle est, ne peut que recevoir, pour seule réponse, 
la condamnation, ou, si la mise en doute est assez radicale, la mort). The story of Socrates 
is the proof of that. And a reminder. The position of the philosopher is hence an awkward 
and difficult one: marginal, and atopotatos, to borrow Plato’s word when he describes 
Socrates299. The place of the ordinary world is not sufficient, the place that ordinary 
language describes either, and it is this insufficiency that pushes the philosopher to exile 
themselves in another place, a high-place (un haut-lieu), the (non-)place of the 
philosophical thought. 
The general remarks of the preceding paragraph concerning the solitude of the 
philosopher, concerning the cut separating the philosopher from the rest of the community 
and concerning the possible radicality of this cut (death), can be applied to both the 
Vuilleminian and to the Wittgensteinian conception of philosophy. Indeed, for Vuillemin, 
the philosopher is incapable of being satisfied with the discourses of common sense, and 
with the attempts of the sciences to exceed common sense and to articulate a true, unified 
and coherent discourse about the world. Hence, faced with the contradictory theses that, in 
everyday life, intersect without any kind of coherent binding, the philosopher believes that 
they are invested with the task of choosing one of these theses, one of these themes and to 
elevate it, to ennoble it, to give it a title, that of «fundamental principle of reality». But this 
properly philosophical gesture brings with it a reorganization of the different elements of 
common sense, in the sense that to accept this principle (as real) over another implies the 
                                                          
299 Platon, Banquet, 215a; Phèdre, 229-230; Alcibiade, 106a. 
 126 
 
refusal of all the others (as mere appearances). This choice and the refusals that it implies 
of course offends common sense in the sense that in the context of ordinary life, both what 
is chosen and refused by the philosopher is accepted as true by common sense, and placed 
on the same plane, that of quotidian evidence (le plan de l’évidence quotidienne); common 
sense is ready to accept a thesis and its opposite as being true. But it is that juxtaposition 
that the philosopher is unable to accept: «For a philosopher like Vuillemin, we could say 
that the weakness of common sense consists precisely in the fact that it juxtaposes where 
philosophy proper realizes that it must choose»300. The malaise of the philosopher faced 
with the eclectic practices of common sense, and the choice that the philosopher feels 
obliged to make are hence two successive gestures by which the philosopher dissociates 
and marginalizes themselves, by which they exclude themselves from the common space 
and from the discourse that it carries; an exclusion that, one could say, takes the form of an 
allergic reaction: the philosopher, allergic to the incoherence of common sense, just as 
common sense is allergic to the logical exigencies of the philosopher. From the point of 
view of common sense, the philosophical question already being an insult, or the proof that 
the philosopher is ridiculous («How could you even put in doubt the fact that the exterior 
world exists?»), the answer of the philosopher becomes, for the non-philosophical soul, a 
continuation, or a form of injurious stubbornness, a stubbornness that is doubly injurious, 
hence doubly condemnable, especially if it is contagious, especially if it corrupts the 
young.301 
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As for the Wittgensteinian philosopher, their solitude, their distancing, their 
disconnection from the rest of their linguistic community goes without saying: the 
philosopher is indeed the one who says «I don’t know my way about»302. The philosophical 
question, and this is what I tried to articulate in the first half of the second chapter, emerges 
when the philosopher loses sight of certain essential traits of their language, when they lose 
sight of certain benchmarks that normally enable them to navigate without any difficulty in 
the midst of an ensemble of concepts (language game), in the midst of a certain form of 
life. This questioning, this forgetfulness, this conceptual amnesia of which the philosopher 
suffers becomes a space, a crevasse separating the philosopher from their language, that 
cuts them from any reality, and that isolates them from the rest of the community that 
speaks that language and that lives in that reality. «The philosopher is not a citizen of any 
community of ideas. That is what makes him into a philosopher.»303 Indeed, to be a citizen 
of a certain community of ideas, the philosopher would have to share in common, not 
necessarily a set of specific ideas, but minimally, a common language, an ensemble of 
concepts, a certain way of making sense, a certain way of living, etc. But the philosophical 
amnesia produces a loss of what enables philosophers to identify themselves, to understand, 
and to live in the midst of this ensemble of concepts, in the midst of a certain way of 
making-sense, of a certain way of living, ensemble and ways that are those of their (now 
lost) linguistic community. Indeed, in questioning ordinary language’s capacity to mean, 
                                                          
302 Ludwig Wittgenstein, PI (§123). 
303 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel, §455. 
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philosophers exile themselves from their community, and faces the difficulties that are, in 
a certain way, similar to those that a person faces in a foreign country304. 
The amnesic character of the philosophical question is not, of course, something 
obvious for the one that is threaded by a philosophical question; the amnesia is in a certain 
way the name that the repentant philosopher gives to his former, questioning state, before 
his healing; similarly to the converted that says that it is only at the moment of their 
conversion that they really started to live and that before this moment, they were not really 
living305. But in the context of the philosophical questioning, in the context of what one 
could call the unfolding of the philosophical experience, this amnesia is taken and 
understood, as we saw, as being a form of doubt concerning the talents and capacities of 
the language of ordinary life. 
And it is probably this duality, or rather the fact that the philosopher perceives and 
understands this ‘state of mind’, first as a form of doubt, and then as a form of amnesia, 
that will separate the Vuilleminian conception of philosophy from the Wittgensteinian 
conception. Indeed, the overcoming of this amnesia demands an exploration of what we 
already know (of or what we already know, not so long ago). Doubt, on the other hand, 
could as much need to be dissipated by a similar form of exploration of what was once 
familiar, as it could need an ontological speculation aiming to replace or amend this same 
familiarity that seems to be, from the philosophical standpoint, inadequate, insufficient, or 
                                                          
304 The difference being of course that the philosophical traveller is a stranger in their own country, in their 
own language, and that there is not, in philosophy, a lingua franca, like English, to facilitate the linguistic 
transactions between the philosopher and the users of ordinary language. There is no interlinguistic language. 
The gap in meaning is radical and total. The philosopher is completely lost. Wittgenstein in this sense, and as 
it has been said in the second chapter, distances himself on that point from Frege and Russell, who both aimed 
to articulate the syntax of a language, the language of logic, that would serve as this lingua franca. 
305 John 3; 1-21, «Jesus and Nicodemus: Episode of the New Birth». 
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incomplete. In both cases however, the doubt that inhabits the philosopher puts them apart, 
marginalizes them, isolates them from the community and traps them in a cage of questions, 
of interrogations, and of uncertainty.  
 
B. The philosophical answer. 
 
B.1 The form of the philosophical answer.  
In the last pages of the first chapter, I summarized the Vuilleminian conception of 
philosophy, describing it as being an ontological activity that is essentially of a theoretical 
and systematic nature. (i) Ontological, because it aims to articulate the frontier separating 
what is from what merely appears. (ii) Theoretical, because it aims to offer an «image of 
reality» (aim that philosophy shares with mythology), because it enables the philosopher to 
see reality as it really is306; theoretical also, in the sense that the perspective of the 
philosopher, that which enables them to see the world correctly, is the perspective of the 
spectator that is detached from the spectacle that unfolds before their eyes; a spectator that 
is useless and a stranger to the unfolding of the spectacle and to the logic of that unfolding. 
Contrary then to the mythological discourse that offered a justification of the practices, of 
the discourses and institutions of common life, the value of philosophy does not lie in its 
social utility or in its capacity to reassure the social in its convictions. On the contrary, the 
philosopher forces common sense to sacrifice one of its convictions (hence a part of itself) 
on the altar of logic and coherence, hence its polemic and controversial character. 
                                                          
306 After all, the philosopher is the one, some say, that sees things as they are. 
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The space that this controversy opens, however, enables the philosopher, according 
to Vuillemin, to free themselves from what I have called the limits and constraints of the 
economic structures of daily life, and this space, a non-place socially speaking, is hence the 
expression of a privilege: the privilege of theoretical necessity, incarnated by the 
philosopher, freed from the contingencies of practice and action. (iii) Systematic, because 
philosophy «is supposed to lead to the construction of an articulated theory, similar to those 
that have been proposed by philosophers who have constructed big ‘systems’»307. 
Systematic also because the accumulation of the philosophical gestures that constitute and 
trace the traits of a given system are administered by a worry (souci) for coherence, and 
«what measures the coherence of a system and its agreement (accord) with the real (..) is a 
philosophical responsibility»308 that the philosopher feels concerning the fundamental-
ontological thesis on which the whole system rests. In other words, the initial and original 
thought of the philosopher must resonate and be perceptible in the entirety of the system309. 
Systematic finally, because the system seeks, not unlike the myth, to cover with its 
philosophical coat the entirety of reality: the philosopher’s discourse can hence be 
understood as an attempt to say the world systematically, without exception. 
This qualitative triad that Vuillemin unleashes hence traces the traits of a creative 
activity: the philosopher, through their discourse, secretes a world that is the expression of 
an original intuition regarding the nature of reality and appearance. What comes to mind is 
                                                          
307 Jacques Bouveresse, «Cours 2. La philosophie peut-elle être systématique et doit-elle l’être?» in Qu’est-
ce qu’un système philosophique?, p. 3. 
308 Gabriella Crocco, «Méthode structurale et systèmes philosophiques» in Revue de métaphysique et de 
morale, Vol. 1, N. 45, p. 82. 
309 Each gesture of the philosopher must be the expression of a fidelity towards the founding gesture of the 
system; a gesture that is itself the expression of an original intuition regarding reality and what separates it 
from mere appearance.  
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hence the image of an architect that draws the plans for a luxurious, complex and total 
castle. It is however well known that Wittgenstein’s philosophy «destroys everything 
interesting (…) (which ends up being) nothing but houses of cards»310. Opposed to a 
productive philosophy, we then have Wittgenstein’s destructive philosophy311. 
As opposed then to the theoretical and verbal philosophy à la Vuillemin, philosophy 
à la Wittgenstein presents itself as fundamentally anti-theoretical and silent, «a critique of 
philosophy as theory, a dismantling of its theoretical pretention, (…) a dismantling or a 
critique of the category of truth as elaborated and proposed by philosophy»312. Hence, faced 
with the impulsion to articulate a theoretical response to a particular philosophical question, 
Wittgenstein brings forth the idea according to which the philosophical question is, 
properly speaking, a hallucination of sense, and if this is true (and accepted), to ask 
questions about the form of the answer is as absurd as to ask what’s the colour of the non-
existent elephant. It is not that the qualities (ontological, theoretical, and systematic) are 
not the right ones, and that there would be another series that would be the right ones; it is 
rather the fact that there is nothing to qualify. On the other hand, the questions that assail 
the mind of the philosopher, these hallucinations of sense, are real and the philosopher 
cannot simply ignore or forget them (à la Valéry); or rather, forgetfulness can only be the 
result of a certain work (travail), of a certain therapy. Hence, if the philosophical question 
does not have an answer, there is however a way to address it. 
 
                                                          
310 Ludwig Wittgenstein, PI (§118). 
311 Adrian-Paul Iliescu, Wittgenstein: Why Philosophy is Bound to Err, p. 43. 
312 Alain Badiou, «1er cours» in L’antiphilosophie de Wittgenstein (1993-1994). 
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B.2 The theoricity of the philosophical demarche.  
Hence, a first thing that could be said is that the Wittgensteinian ‘answer’ is not theoretical, 
but that it rather falls in the category of the action, of the gesture, a gesture that philosophers 
pose against themselves; more specifically, against certain tendencies of their own 
thinking: «Working in philosophy – like work in architecture in many respects – is really 
more a working on oneself…On one’s way of seeing things (and what one expects of 
them)» 313. If Wittgenstein says certain things about language, about the world, or about the 
relation that unites them, it is foremost because he believes that they are things that one too 
easily forgets when one begins to philosophize; and he only says them because he believes 
that they might help to see the world correctly: «The work of the philosopher consists in 
assembling reminders for a particular purpose»314. If what is said does not have the desired 
effect, then the philosopher must say something else. Hence the ‘necessity’ of what the 
philosopher says is not to be found in its truth, or its coherence, but rather in its capacity to 
affect the philosopher, to upset their (philosophical) way of seeing (and of questioning) 
things315.  
The Wittgensteinian ‘answer’ hence differs from the Vuilleminian answer in the 
sense that what matters, for the former, is not that something should be said, but that 
something should be done, and accomplished: the philosophical-therapeutic statement 
acquires its pertinence not because of what it is (or what it presents itself to be), as a 
                                                          
313 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarques mêlées, p. 71.  
314 Ludwig Wittgenstein, PI (§127). 
315 One could say that Wittgenstein has a ‘consequentialist’ conception of the ‘morality’ of a philosophical 
statement : the ‘morality’ of a statement is to be measured by the therapeutic consequences or effects that it 
is able to produce in the mind of the one that seeks to be healed from their philosophical worry. 
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statement; rather, its pertinence stems from its effect on the mind of the philosopher, from 
the fact that it is efficient qua gesture316.  
Earlier on, I said that the philosophical activity was, for Vuillemin, also theoretical 
in the sense that it is a process of liberation: the philosopher, situating themselves in a non-
place from which they can think reality and free themselves from the structures of daily life 
and from the contradictions that it imposes on thought in the name of life. Philosophy is 
hence theoretical in the sense that it establishes a distance between the philosopher and the 
discourse of common sense, liberating the former from the latter. If one cannot describe the 
Wittgensteinian philosophy as being theoretical – in the sense that it would offer a 
discursive image of reality –, one could however say that it is theoretical in the sense that 
it permits a certain analogous form of ‘distanciation’ or detachment from the discourse of 
philosophy. If traditional philosophy is the promise of a liberation from the errors, the 
distractions, and contradictions of common sense, the Wittgensteinian philosophy is the 
opposite of a liberation, because the healed philosopher, the one who ceases to speak 
metaphysically and starts to talk like everyone else, realizes that the only way to be free is 
to be-in-the-world, in a world of language, of institutions, of practices, of culture, and that 
to want to be freed from that is as absurd as to believe that we free a flower when we rip it 
from the ground. If Wittgenstein’s philosophy is a form of liberation, it is rather a liberation 
from oneself, from one’s own illusions, from one’s desires that are taken for realities; a 
liberation that Wittgenstein sees appropriate to call ‘healing’. 
                                                          
316 Although, as Wittgenstein says at paragraph 79 of the Investigations, this does not mean that the 
philosopher may choose to say anything to heal: «Say what you choose, so long as it does not prevent you 
from seeing the facts. (And when you see them there is a good deal that you will not say.)» 
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The personal character of the philosophical demarche. This theoretical and, one 
could say, theatrical rapport uniting the philosopher and the spectacle that they seek to 
contemplate is however rather particular, because the philosopher-spectator – the one that 
could be defined by the distance that they establish between themselves and the spectacle 
– is not part of any philosophizing-crowd: the philosophical distance is also that of solitude 
and asociality; and this is true for both Vuillemin and Wittgenstein. For the former, indeed, 
the philosopher, contra their community, starts to question the different beliefs and theses 
that circulate (all too) freely (according to the philosopher) in the space of common 
discourse. They begin to believe that all of these things cannot be true all at once, and that 
the daily evidence is not a sufficient criterion for truth. The philosopher then understands 
that, from these different beliefs, they must choose, and commit themselves to think, that is 
to say, to articulate honestly what they believe to be the frontier separating reality from 
appearance. Hence what Wittgenstein says about the philosopher, Vuillemin would 
probably accept it without difficulty: «The philosopher is not a citizen of any community 
of ideas. That is what makes him a philosopher.»317 Indeed, for Wittgenstein also, the 
philosophical question separates the philosopher from the rest of their linguistic 
community: while their linguistic townsmen are well able to circulate with ease within the 
semantic obviousness of the concepts of their language, the philosopher can only see a 
multitude of occasions of sceptical doubts. If all roads lead to Rome, for Wittgenstein, all 
philosophical questions lead to exile and solitude. 
                                                          
317 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel (§455). 
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Furthermore, this exile cannot, for both Vuillemin and Wittgenstein, simply be 
abolished by the dark powers of the Negative, in the sense that the negation of the 
community that is exile cannot then be itself negated by the gathering of a new 
philosophical community. The philosophers cannot gather, outside of the ordinary city, in 
an artificial city, a philosophical city, a similar to the scientific city; and this «is not, as it 
is often said, a scandal, but rather a fundamental characteristic of the philosophical work, 
that must be accepted from the start»318. Vuilleminian philosophers, if they are united by 
their respective exile, cannot be then reunited under the colours of a Community of the 
Answer, because this answer is not the product of a rational choice, but rather stems from 
a personal and original intuition that must then be articulated systematically. There can 
hence be no agreement regarding the real nature of reality; there can only be different 
techniques of logical rectification of the philosophical discourse: «These two ideas are 
contradictory», «What do you mean by that?», «Can you give me an example please?», etc. 
Hence, for Vuillemin, the philosophical question is a process of ‘desocialization’, the 
philosophical answer is a process of individuation and personalisation. 
For Wittgenstein, the result (the absence of a community of philosophical ideas) is 
the same, although the reason is different: even if all philosophers were to agree on a given 
ontological-fundamental principle of reality, this achievement would be but an imaginary 
and imagined achievement in the sense that what has been traditionally understood as a 
‘philosophical achievement’ is to be understood, for Wittgenstein, as a form of nonsensical 
perseverance, a form of perseverance of thought in its magical, mythological and illusory 
                                                          
318 Jean-Jacques Rosat, « Les armes de Wittgenstein » in Agone, No. 48, 2012, p. 153. 
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deviations. The only possible community, for Wittgenstein, is the community that our 
language and our form of life offer to us. Hence, for both Vuillemin and Wittgenstein, 
philosophy itself is not the promise of a communion to come, on the contrary: the 
philosopher is alone by definition. 
 
B.3 The systematicity of the philosophical demarche.  
Concerning the systematicity of philosophy, although Wittgenstein had a profound respect 
for (some of) the philosophers of the tradition and for what they have tried to do, it is for 
him obvious that philosophy can no longer succumb to the temptation of the big systems 
of traditional metaphysics. The nimbus of philosophy has been lost, Wittgenstein tells us; 
the image of philosophy as a discovering enterprise has also been lost; and the loss of this 
image and of this nimbus is not, however, purely negative, as it opens us up on a method: 
«For we now have a method of doing philosophy, and can speak 
of skilful philosophers. (…) Philosophy is now being reduced to a matter of skill and the 
philosopher's nimbus is disappearing»319. Hence, if Vuillemin, when faced with the two 
meanings of the word «systematic» that Dummett proposes320, chooses the first one321, 
Wittgenstein leans rather on the side of the second one, on the side of a method that must 
be adopted, and that one must follow scrupulously. 
                                                          
319 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge, 1930-1932, p. 22. 
320 Cf. Chapter 1. 
321 Reminder: Philosophy is systematic in that it «is supposed to lead to the construction of an articulated 
theory, similar to those that have been proposed by philosophers who have constructed big ‘systems’» 
(Jacques Bouveresse, «Cours 2», p. 3). 
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To resist to the temptation of the big system is also a way for Wittgenstein to reject 
the kinship that Vuillemin sees between philosophy and myth, in their common attempt to 
produce a total image of reality; in their common attempt to encompass reality and to 
capture it with the concepts that constitute the system. Wittgenstein, far from aiming to 
totally capture reality, is quite sceptical when it comes to these kinds of pretention. He is 
also and mostly suspicious about the kind of intellectual satisfaction that these theoretical 
articulations give us, and about what pushes us to develop these kinds of theories. Hence, 
even for the respect that Wittgenstein has for the philosophers of the tradition, philosophy 
cannot, according to him, allow itself to follow them, because that would imply to entertain 
a certain illusion that keeps us from seeing things clearly322. 
The Wittgensteinian rejection of these two forms of systematicity leaves a third 
form intact. Indeed, Vuillemin supposed a third form of systematicity, described as a kind 
of resonance, of coherence, or of fidelity of different philosophical gestures towards a 
fundamental-ontological thesis that is supposed by the system. If Wittgenstein resists the 
temptation of the big system, and if the form of his writing and his style invites the 
commentator to interpret Wittgenstein’s thought as being antisystematic, one should not 
forget that the aphoristic ruptures of a philosophical expression can very well, in principle, 
hide an underground continuity in terms of meaning, of objectives, of orientation, in terms 
of presuppositions, etc. ; and it is, it seems to me, what one should think of Wittgenstein’s 
method and the gestures that it enables: these gestures are indeed oriented towards a 
particular purpose, the healing of the philosopher’s mind, that is to say, the dissolution of 
                                                          
322 Hence for Wittgenstein, an illusion is an illusion, no matter the level of its sophistication. 
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a philosophical difficulty. These gestures are hence the expression of a common intention 
– that of healing – and of the acknowledgement of the heaviness and the difficulty of the 
task at hand. The systematicity of the philosophical activity can hence be understood as 
being of form of reflexive attention to the coherence of the different gestures, regarding to 
their continuity, and regarding their common sense of direction. 
 
C. Reformulation of the thesis’ problematic. 
 
Vuillemin and Wittgenstein hence seem to be more or less on the same page when 
it comes to the Alpha of philosophy, in the sense that both of them think that philosophy 
emerges as a general interrogation concerning the emplacement of the frontier separating 
reality from appearance323. However, when we turn our attention towards what has been 
called the Omega of philosophy, it becomes urgent to wonder whether the difference 
between the verbal and theoretical answer à la Vuillemin and the silent and therapeutic 
answer à la Wittgenstein brings with it a radical modification of the meaning of the question 
that initiates the philosophical movement, and hence a radical modification of the nature of 
the activity that stems from it. Maybe this difference is such that it would push us to say, 
almost as a joke, that if Wittgenstein and Vuillemin are indeed on the same page, they are 
maybe not necessarily in the same book. 
In the general introduction, I put forward the idea according to which one of the 
elements that could link the Wittgensteinian philosophical activity to what the 
                                                          
323 Whether the object of that interrogation is Reality, or Language (or one of its regions); for language, the 
frontier separates real language from apparent language; sense from non-sense. 
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philosophical tradition has done would be that Wittgenstein did not try to abolish an 
ensemble of problems (that of the tradition of philosophy), but that he rather wanted to 
reject a certain way of answering them (the theoretical way). A question that arises is 
however the following: can we legitimately talk of an identity, of a similitude or of a 
community of questions considering that the answers that we are willing to give differ in 
radical ways? If the answer to this question is ‘no’, we must maybe bring ourselves to 
accept the Deleuzian idea according to which Wittgenstein must not be included in the book 
of the history of philosophy, unless we present him as being an antiphilosophical logico-
terrorist. If on the contrary, the answer to this question is ‘yes’ – which is my own leaning 
– there is, it seems, two possible lines of answer from which we can and must choose. 
(i) Firstly, there is a Wittgensteinian-inspired line of answer that could be expressed in the 
following way: there is not something like philosophy (la philosophie), of which we could 
give a definition, or a concept under which we could gather a whole ensemble of practices 
told to be ‘philosophical’; a concept which would delimit the territory of philosophy and 
would enable someone, to preserve the purity of the discipline and of what it does. As 
Bouveresse says, «the word ‘philosophy’ is not the name of an timeless essence; it rather 
points to a complex of human activities that are linked to each other only by close or distant 
family relations and that have evolved historically in meaningful ways, while conserving, 
nonetheless, a certain community of orientation, but probably not much more than that»324. 
There is nothing more, properly speaking, then philosophical practices that share certain 
‘family resemblances’ certain ‘common traits’, certain ‘common places’ (lieux communs) 
                                                          
324 Jacques Bouveresse, Essais III, pp. xviii-xix. 
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or ‘community ties’; for example, an ensemble of questions that more or less go across the 
history of philosophy: «does the exterior world exist?», «what is the relation uniting body 
and soul?», «are we free?», etc.  
Hence, if really, as Wittgenstein says, «the meaning of a word is its use in 
language»325 or, to say it otherwise than with a slogan, if the meaning of the world 
‘philosophy’ emerges only through the diversity of its uses in the midst of certain of our 
forms of life,  there is no problem, in principle, in saying that a discipline can, generally 
speaking, be unified by an ensemble of similar questions, even if there is a more or less 
radical difference in terms of the answers that we are prepared to give to them. It then 
becomes easy to say what Wittgenstein says about his new method at the beginning of the 
1930s: «One might say that the subject we are dealing with is one of the heirs of the subject 
which used to be called "philosophy"»326. 
This line of answer has, however, two weaknesses: (a) it does not convince anyone, 
except maybe «those who have themselves already thought the thoughts which are 
expressed in it—or similar thoughts»327. Indeed, the one who asks to be convinced that the 
Wittgensteinian therapy is philosophical will most likely be reassured in their unfavourable 
opinion, in the sense that: (b) if really, meaning is use, and if it is not false to say that «it is 
the solution that the philosopher accepts as true that illuminates us on the exact nature of 
his problem»328, then maybe we have to admit that even for the grammatical similitude that 
is shared by the traditional questions of philosophy and the Wittgensteinian questions, the 
                                                          
325 Ludwig Wittgenstein, PI (§43). 
326 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Le cahier bleu et Le cahier brun, p. 72. 
327 Ludwig Wittgenstein, «preface» in TLP. 
328 Jacques Bouveresse, Essais III, p. 8. 
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Wittgensteinian philosophical activity is, in fact, totally other; and if the activity is not 
necessarily antiphilosophical, it would not however be inappropriate to tag it as being ‘non-
philosophical’. 
The difficulty is the following: rejecting the idea of an essence that would exhaust 
what philosophy is and that would delimit what it can do, the one who defends this line of 
answer falls back on a vague (and maybe empty) concept, that of ‘family resemblance’ to 
bring the Wittgensteinian activity closer to the traditional one. But the vagueness of the 
concept makes it so that it has no argumentative ‘friction’329; the argument has no grip and 
the interlocutor, the one to be convinced, finds themselves in front of a choice between two 
forms of ‘propaganda’, in front of two philosophical programs. The Wittgensteinian-
inspired argument, although it wants to convince us to do something that we do not want 
to do, neither convinces us to do that thing, nor does it bring us to want it, and it leaves us 
wanting more, faced only with the dense and weighty reality of our philosophical freedom. 
In other words, the argument does not respect the Nietzschean law of mutual relation: the 
argument «should be suited to the specific person with whom you wish to communicate». 
(ii) Secondly, there is a Vuilleminian-inspired line of answer, which will be mine, 
that could be summarized in the following way: if, as Wittgenstein says, the first step of 
philosophy is to entertain a form of distrust regarding the grammar of our expressions, if 
then the letter can easily hide a spirit that is totally stranger to it330, it becomes important 
and natural to apply this mistrust to what Wittgenstein writes, as it is one thing to take what 
                                                          
329 «We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, 
but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough 
ground!» (PI, 107). 
330 The letter of the philosophical question that seemingly makes sense in fact hides its own non-sense. 
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someone writes seriously, it is another thing to accept it as true. It seems to me that the fact 
of taking seriously the metaphilosophical letter of Wittgenstein pushes us to accept as being 
true the metaphilosophical spirit of Vuillemin: the mere idea of a therapy, and the idea of 
something like a ‘linguistic health’ that is opposed to one or multiple sickly states «cannot, 
it seems, only consists of practical directives and be completely devoid of any theoretical 
or quasi theoretical assertions regarding what things are (or will be one day) really331, or at 
least, a choice regarding what things are. In other words, the mere idea of a therapy implies 
or hides a certain idea regarding what the body of language really is. 
It is one thing to suggest an answer, it is another to articulate it. In what follows, I 
will try to show that the Wittgensteinian metaphilosophy must be understood as stemming 
from a properly philosophical choice (in the sense that Vuillemin gives to that term) 
concerning the reality of language: it is indeed the fact that Wittgenstein centers his activity 
around this choice that makes him a worthy heir and member of the philosophical tradition. 
 
D. Philosophy, choice and fidelity 
 
According to Wittgenstein, philosophy emerges in the mind of the philosopher and 
takes the form of a sceptical derangement that takes them away from the conceptual 
certainties of ordinary language. Hence, what is lost is the trust (confiance) of the ordinary 
man, the trust that morphs the common and the quotidian in evidence and normality. This 
trust gives out under the pressures of scepticism and leaves the spirit of the philosopher in 
                                                          
331 Jacques Bouveresse, «Santé et maladie dans la philosophie et dans la vie», p. 141. 
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the hands of their philosophical uncertainties – between the fingers of the Question. But 
scepticism is the fact of questioning the idea according to which the obviousness of the 
appearance that presents itself as true is a sufficient condition for the truth of that 
appearance. Scepticism is the recognition that, somewhere, there is a division, a line, a 
frontier – in the midst of the field of experience of the philosopher – that separates reality 
from appearance in the sense that the former cannot simply be identified or reduced to the 
latter.  
The sceptical question is hence the recognition that realism, if it is not obvious332, if 
it is not ready at hand, can only be the product of a certain work of thought on itself, a work 
on what it accepts or can accept as being true. Thought cannot then simply accept itself, 
take itself for granted in all of its determinations («I think that x», «I think that y», «I think 
that non-x»…) – which would be to reduce reality to appearance. Thought must, on the 
contrary, determine itself, choose itself, articulate itself, and work itself, while always 
keeping in mind the idea of this frontier between reality and appearance; while keeping 
itself from falling into idle talk that forgets what it is talking about (reality). 
«The idea of a phantasm of philosophy, and the idea of a realism in philosophy that 
can be opposed to it, are essential to my reading of Wittgenstein and to what I believe to be 
Wittgenstein’s main legacy»333, Cora Diamond tells us; and it is this worry to think beyond 
any phantasm, to not mistake our desires for realities, the worry of staying faithful to a 
certain notion of reality, it is this worry then that illuminates what truly animates 
                                                          
332 If appearances are not enough. 
333 Cora Diamond, «Préface à l’édition française» in L’Esprit réaliste. Wittgenstein, la philosophie et 
l’esprit, pp. xi-xii. 
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philosophy’s activity: this desire of reality, and not the reality of our eclectic desires. It is 
this ascetic worry of the philosophical activity and the fidelity of this asceticism to what 
really is, as compared to what merely appears, that allows us to understand philosophy as 
being, before anything else, an ontological activity. But for Wittgenstein, as we have seen 
at the beginning of the second chapter, there is a certain displacement of the ontological 
question: the object of the question is no longer reality, as separated from appearance, but 
language, its meaningfulness, separated from non-sense (apparent language). What 
occupies Wittgenstein’s mind is the question of the reality of language qua language. 
This sceptical recognition of a frontier existing between reality and appearance – 
recognition whose only virtue is to be a sign of the work that thought must do – places the 
philosopher in an uncomfortable position: their world, the one they know, «shatters on itself 
and becomes a black hole that swallows what makes sense»334, in the sense that this world, 
as it appears to the philosopher – as appearance – is not enough to secure its own truth and 
reality. The philosopher then has to affirm reality – because the later cannot do that on 
itself, or else it would show itself obviously and apparently: they must choose, and this is 
what Vuillemin calls a philosophical choice. 
Wittgenstein does not back away when faced with the necessity of this choice, on 
the contrary: faced with the question «what is a proposition?» that haunts his notebooks as 
early as 1914, he chooses what will become one of the main theses of the Tractatus, the 
idea according to which: «the proposition is a picture of reality» (TLP, 4.01); that to be an 
image of reality means to share a same logical structure with the reality in 
                                                          
334 Mathieu Charlebois, «Les persécutés de la droite médiatique» in L’actualité, 17/02/2015. 
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question (TLP, 4.014); that this logical structure cannot be said, but only shown (and 
therefore seen), and that it is this logical structure – already seen by the competent user of 
a given language – that the philosophe-theorist must see so that they can see the world 
correctly. After a decade of silence, realizing the limits and difficulties of his first choice 
and of the way he had articulated it, Wittgenstein will make a second choice that is in fact 
a radicalization of the first one: in the Investigations, language shows itself – and is seen – 
not in the recognition of a hidden logical structure, but in the recognition of the place and 
role that language plays in our everyday life, that is to say, in the midst of our daily – 
linguistic or not – practices. Wittgenstein’s philosophical choice hence consists in affirming 
that the reality of language is something that is shown through its correct use, whether we 
are thinking of the calculated use of language as described in the Tractatus, or of the living 
and colored uses that are described in the Investigations. 
But from the moment that Wittgenstein chooses to identify the reality of language 
with its correct or normal use, and from the moment that he chooses to understand this 
correct use as something that can be shown and not said335, it becomes easier to understand 
why the philosophical question – which is a questioning of this correct use of language – 
is not according to Wittgenstein to be understood as an occasion to reach a certain point of 
view, inaccessible to others; quite the contrary, the philosophical question is rather the sign 
of a loss of vision, the sign of a distracted gaze that does not see what it would normally 
see. If the reality of language shows itself, to ask the sceptical question of that reality is to 
confess that to us, nothing is shown.  
                                                          
335 For indications concerning the Showing/Saying distinction, note 179, pp. 80-81. 
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This loss of vision, this loss of what gives us access to the world in its most ordinary 
and intimate determinations, panics the mind of the blind one, and their only desire is to 
see again. This desire to see, burning as it is, can of course lead us on the torturous roads 
of error, in the same way that panic, when we are lost, can lead us to run in the wrong 
direction. That is, according to Wittgenstein what happens to us when we try to really give 
an answer to the questions of philosophy, when we are unable to recognize their nonsensical 
character. When instead, our philosophical activity is centered on our desire and need to 
see, when then we addresses the difficulty at hand calmly and methodically, we 
considerably augment our chances of seeing again. Wittgenstein’s weird descriptions (of 
the philosophical question as being a sickness of the mind, the method as being a form of 
therapy, and the philosophical ‘answer’ as being a form of healing) start to make sense 
when one recognizes that they are articulated around an original choice concerning the 
reality of language, understanding this reality as a correct use, accessible to our gaze. 
Against this reality, there is non-sense, the one we produce; a non-sense that is a form of 
transgression, more or less voluntary, but a transgression nonetheless for which we are 
always, in the end, responsible. 
A healthy language is hence a language that is used correctly and accepted as such. 
Knowing this, one can finally understand why Wittgenstein says, at the end of the 
Tractatus, that his book is to be understood as nonsense that one must overcome so that 
one might see the world correctly. This is not the expression of a stylistic caprice, but rather 
a direct consequence of the fundamental thesis of the book concerning the distinction 
between what can be shown and what can be said. The gestures of the Tractatus are only 
useful as long as they help the reader to stop trying to say what can only be shown. Also, 
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there is hence nothing bizarre about the Wittgensteinian characterization of philosophy as 
being an act of clarification, rather than an ensemble of doctrines or of philosophical theses. 
Wittgenstein is in fact completely faithful to the intuition that guides him. In the same way, 
in the Investigations, Wittgenstein reaffirms this intuition: philosophy and its linguistic 
manipulations are senseless because they are not rooted in any form of life. Language only 
has meaning in a life-context, and it is this context that one must find again and see, thus 
explaining the therapeutic importance of turning our attention towards totally ordinary and 
trivial linguistic facts about our ways of speaking; because it is this type of things that the 
philosopher loses sight of when they start to philosophize.  
Hence, even for their novelty, even for their antitheoretical character that can very 
well scandalize many philosophers, it is nonetheless possible to say that the philosophical 
methods proposed by Wittgenstein in his Tractatus and then in his Investigations are of a 
philosophical nature. If, indeed, the philosophical tradition is a series of attempts to 
articulate an ensemble of gestures around an original intuition concerning what separates 
reality from appearance, if then the philosopher is the one who tries to remain faithful to 
that intuition, who tries to make this intuition echo in the four corners of their discourse, it 
is not inappropriate to include Wittgenstein in that long list of thinkers: having localized 
the reality of language in its correct use, and having identified this reality as something that 
shows itself, the philosophical and discursive developments that Wittgenstein offers us, in 
their division between question and answer, can only be understood as the expression of 
dichotomies like sickness and health, illusion and dissipation of that illusion, transgression 
and correction, etc. And faced with the difference between the developments of the 
Tractatus and that of the Investigations, one might choose to believe that far from 
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abandoning his original intuition, Wittgenstein in fact deepens it; far from abandoning his 
idea, he reaffirms it radically. What change are the gestures that must flow from that idea. 
He will come to understand that the Tractatus, for all of its good (and therapeutic) 
intentions, actually paved a way not towards a promised healing, but towards another hell, 
as it was animated by a fetishization of language as representation that kept him from seeing 
our language in all of its diversity, in all of its states, in all of its vitality, that is to say, 
language as we live it and as it makes us live in the context of everyday life. And the 
emphasis on what is the most familiar to us is not the expression a form of philosophical 
laziness, it is rather the most difficult thing to do in philosophy: to see what is right under 
one’s nose. Indeed, «the hardest thing of all is to see what is really there»336; the hardest 
thing to understand is that the strangeness that we experience is nothing else then the loss 
of what is most familiar to us, that is to say our life, and the importance of language.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
336 J.A. Baker, The Peregrine. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Of this thesis, I hope that the reader will have remembered three things. 
(i) Developed throughout the first chapter, the idea that philosophy, according to Vuillemin, 
is an attempt, beyond the mythological effort – that is semantically, semiotically, and 
methodologically unstable – to trace an image of reality and to articulate the principles of 
an authentic ontology. This ontological articulation will stem in the ground of an original 
intuition concerning what separates reality from its appearances and will develop itself 
systematically from – and around – this intuition. This constitutes the essential of what I 
have called the traditional or generic conception of philosophy. (ii) Developed throughout 
the second chapter, the therapeutic conception of philosophy as defended by Wittgenstein. 
We should remember that faced with the appearances of language, faced with a ‘false 
language’ that philosophers of the tradition have developed and develop, Wittgenstein 
offers a series of therapeutic gestures aiming to straighten out the philosophical mind, and 
aiming to liberate it from what pushes it to speak a false language – of what pushes it to 
dive in the dark waters of nonsense. Wittgenstein hence defends the conception of a 
philosophy that is essentially critical, of a philosophy that destroys everything as if it were 
houses of cards, a conception then that seems to be totally opposed to that of Vuillemin 
which seems to have a tendency to construct houses of cards, rather than destroy them. 
(iii) Developed throughout the third chapter, the idea that even for the Wittgensteinian 
rejection of philosophy as a theoretical-systematic construction enterprise, the activity that 
he has to offer is nonetheless philosophical and does participate in what philosophy has 
traditionally done. Indeed, his therapeutic gestures are only possible when one accepts that 
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certain linguistic manifestations are but appearances of language, that they are the fruit of 
a sick mind that must be healed, that must be brought back to reason. Hence, the rejection 
of theoretical productivity as a legitimate activity of philosophy is itself the product or the 
consequence of an intuition concerning what distinguishes real language from apparent 
language. The therapeutic gestures can hence be understood, even for their fragmented, 
scattered and aphoristic presentation, as a series of gestures that are systematically 
organized and oriented towards a determinate purpose, the healing of the philosophical 
mind, that is to say, a mind that is brought to see the reality of language in the appropriate 
use that we make of it: the Wittgensteinian activity as the systematic and coherent 
organization of therapeutic gestures understood as a series of steps towards health, reality 
and life.  
A question that the reader might want to ask is the following: is it justified to tie, as 
I do, the philosophical activity à la Wittgenstein to the philosophical activity à la Vuillemin 
through a severe deflation of the notions of ontology, of theoricity and of systematicity? 
Indeed, this triad (ontology, theory, and systematicity) that is heavy and substantial for 
Vuillemin, I deflate it into a series of worries (soucis) so that it might encompass 
Wittgenstein’s activity: the will to ontology, the will to construct an ontology, is replaced 
by an ontological worry, a worry to separate reality from appearance, a worry to see things 
clearly; the will to theory, the will to say reality, to describe it, is replaced by a theoretical 
worry, a worry to liberate oneself from the pretentions of the Said (Dire) to find and see 
reality as it shows itself; finally, the will to systematicity, the will to construct a descriptive 
system (will highly attached to the will to theory), is replaced by a worry for systematicity, 
a worry to articulate the work of thought so that it remains faithful to the intuition from 
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which it stems. Successive and solidary deflations that become the signs of a philosophical 
practice that seems to have more in common with ethics than with science. Worries that 
become the parameters of the work of thought on itself, of what it accepts as being true, 
and of what it demands and expects from reality. 
It could however seem as if these deflations are merely ways to move away from 
what Vuillemin considers to be essential to philosophy: its oscillation between mythology 
and science, sharing with the former its ends (to construct an image of reality), and with 
the latter its means (the tools of the axiomatic method). To «deflate» the Vuilleminian triad 
would hence be the same as to «denature» it, to «corrupt» it, or to «betray» it. 
These deflations are however not to be understood as traitorous gestures, but rather 
as a way to indicate that Vuillemin’s description of the philosophical activity loses sight, 
maybe, of the intention that gives it birth, that is to say: faced with the shortcomings of the 
manifest evidence of appearance, thought realizes that it cannot think what it wants, that it 
cannot accept itself as it is – without examination – since its beliefs are scattered by the 
different impulses of contradiction. Thought then seeks, behind and beyond these 
contradictions, what could unite it with itself, hence the necessity for it to think this line of 
reality, a frontier between reality and appearance. This line is hence the criterion enabling 
thought to separate what it can think from what it cannot think. This line is then like the 
compass of thought so that it does not lose its way (afin qu’elle ne perde pas le nord du 
réel). This intention does not seem to necessitate theoretical developments, or the 
articulation of a ‘system’ in Vuillemin’s sense of the word. What it – the intention – does 
seem to suggest however, is that the philosophizing thought must be the product of a work, 
and that this work must bring thought to cease to think certain things in the name of a faith 
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towards a line (of reality) that precedes it337. Vuillemin’s emphasis on philosophy as 
discursive secretion hence seems to depend upon a prior decision concerning the nature of 
reality and the way in which we can have access to it. 
The deflations that I propose also enables us – and I finish on this last note – to 
explain an ensemble of philosophical gestures which are difficult to disqualify: the ironic 
gesture. Indeed, if philosophy is defined as the work of thought on itself, if then philosophy 
is closer to ethics than to the sciences, this probably enables us to not marginalize these 
(ironic) gestures that are so important and striking in the history of philosophy: Socratic, 
Sceptical, Cynical, Kierkegaardian, Nietzschean, Lichtenbergian, Schopenhauerian, and 
Wittgensteinian gestures. Far from being an ensemble of accessory or passing gestures, it 
seems that, on the contrary, they are philosophical through and through, and central to 
philosophy, which seems difficult to accept from a strictly Vuilleminian point of view. If 
to be faithful to an intention is a serious matter, the gestures of the faithful need not be – an 
important Wittgensteinian lesson indeed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
337 One could poetically say that thought realizes that it needs the music of faith to dance. 
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